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Many countries rich in natural resources exploit
and squander their wealth to enrich a minority
while corruption and mismanagement leave the
majority impoverished. A special responsibility
falls on civil society in such countries to push
their governments toward transparency and
spending that responds to public needs.
Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and
Development provides journalists with practical
information about the petroleum industry and
the impact of petroleum on a producing country.
By helping the media inform the public about
natural resource issues, Covering Oil seeks to
contribute to lifting the “resource curse” that
impedes the development of many impoverished
countries.
The Open Society Institute and its Revenue
Watch program published this report in
collaboration with the Initiative for Policy
Dialogue. It is the second in a series of guides
published by Revenue Watch to promote
government transparency and accountability. 
The first, Follow the Money, is a guide for
nongovernmental organizations on monitoring
budgets and oil and gas revenues.
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The Open Society Institute, a private operating and grantmaking foundation, aims to
shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human rights, and economic,
legal, and social reform. On a local level, OSI implements a range of initiatives to sup-
port the rule of law, education, public health, and independent media. At the same
time, OSI works to build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as
combating corruption and rights abuses.
OSI was created in 1993 by investor and philanthropist George Soros to support
his foundations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Those
foundations were established, starting in 1984, to help countries make the transition
from communism. OSI has expanded the activities of the Soros foundations network
to other areas of the world where the transition to democracy is of particular concern.
The Soros foundations network encompasses more than 60 countries, including the
United States.
OSI’s Revenue Watch sees the transparent use of revenues generated by the sale
and transport of natural resources as an issue of great importance for regional devel-
opment and the promotion of civil society. The program aims to generate and publicize
research, information, and advocacy on how revenues are being invested and disbursed
and how governments and extraction companies respond to civic demands for account-
ability. It also seeks to build the capacity of local groups to monitor government
management of oil revenues and to ensure that existing and future natural resource
revenues are invested and expended for the benefit of the public.
www.revenuewatch.org
Nobel laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz founded the Initiative for Policy Dialogue
(IPD) in July 2000 to help developing countries explore policy alternatives, and enable
wider civic participation in economic policymaking. All economic policies entail trade-
offs that benefit some groups more than others. Yet instead of exploring the full range
of economic solutions, the international debate has often centered on a narrow range
of policy alternatives. IPD represents a positive response to these concerns. IPD ana-
lyzes the trade-offs associated with different policies and offers serious economic
alternatives, while allowing the choice of policy to be made by the country’s political
process. IPD is a global network of more than 200 leading economists, political scien-
tists, and practitioners from the North and South with diverse backgrounds and views.
The initiative is housed at Columbia University in New York City.
www.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/
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Foreword
Many countries rich in natural resources exploit and squander that wealth to enrich a
minority while corruption and mismanagement leave the majority impoverished. 
Breaking that pattern is difficult. Because of their resource wealth, such coun-
tries do not have to borrow money from multilateral lending agencies that insist on
fiscal transparency and good budget practices. The world’s leading democracies,
dependent on importing oil, gas, or minerals, often have little appetite to use diplo-
matic pressure to demand better fiscal practices from resource-rich countries. And
multinational energy companies, which depend on good relationships with host gov-
ernments to allow them to continue extracting natural resources, are also unlikely to
press for good economic management.
As a result, the citizens of resource-rich countries—the actual owners of their
countries’ natural wealth—bear a special responsibility to push their governments
toward transparency and spending that responds to public needs. And for that citizen-
ry to be informed, it is up to journalists to convey reliable, accurate information about
how their government is managing the development of the country’s natural resources.
In order for this to happen, journalists themselves must be well informed and able to
report and write freely.
Over the last two years, the Initiative for Policy Dialogue and Revenue Watch,
working with local partners and other sponsors, have organized workshops for jour-
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nalists in the oil-exporting countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria on the
subject of “Covering Resource Wealth.” This book is a result of those workshops, in
which journalists expressed a great need for more information to help them under-
stand the petroleum industry and the impact that petroleum development and export
may have on their countries. 
Journalists around the world have told us how hard it is to report on government
management of oil, gas, and mining revenues. A shortage of information about extrac-
tive sector projects, a lack of technical competency, short deadlines, and government
repression of the free press in many countries undermine the quality of reporting on
these issues. Journalists are usually not trained economists or engineers and do not
have the background in economics, engineering, geology, corporate finance, and other
subjects helpful to understanding the energy industry and the effects of resource
wealth. Lacking this kind of knowledge and access to information, reporters are often
unable to cover natural resource stories in a meaningful way. In addition, some often-
underpaid journalists succumb to gifts and payments from local companies,
compromising their integrity and objectivity as well as their willingness to report hon-
estly and accurately.
The repression and exploitation of the press are obstacles that this handbook can-
not overcome, but knowledge is a powerful tool that can help brave, ethical journalists
address them.
Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development will provide journalists
with practical information in easily understood language about the petroleum industry
and the impact of petroleum on a producing country. The report contains tip sheets for
reporters on stories to pursue and questions to ask. Sample stories are also included.
A resource section recommends further reading. A glossary defines key financial, geo-
logical, and legal terms that can improve reporters’ understanding of the literature on
petroleum development. We hope that this book will give journalists the background
information they need to write in-depth, analytical, critical, and informative pieces on
energy and development—a subject affecting millions of readers around the world. 
Chapter 1, “Making Natural Resources a Blessing rather than a Curse,” looks at
some of the major policy dilemmas facing governments of resource-rich countries that
seek to maximize the return they get from their resources: How quickly should the
money be spent and on what? How do accounting frameworks need to be revised to
handle the funds flowing into the country? What will be the distributive consequences
of resource wealth?
Chapter 2, “Understanding the Resource Curse,” explains the paradoxical prob-
lem of the “resource curse”—the odd fact that many countries with abundant natural
resources are often more economically troubled, conflict-ridden, and poorly governed
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than countries lacking natural resources. The chapter explains how a combination of
oil price volatility, pressure on the manufacturing and agricultural sectors, growing
inequality, tax disincentives, and weak institutions combine to produce policy failures
and growth collapses.
Chapter 3, “A Primer on Oil,” provides background information on petroleum.
The chapter addresses some of the key geopolitical questions surrounding petroleum.
Are we running out of oil? What are the security implications of a reliance on oil? And
what are the environmental consequences of a reliance on oil?
Chapter 4, “Oil Companies and the International Oil Market,” offers background
on the oil industry. Which are the largest petroleum companies and how did they reach
their dominant position? What are the challenges these titans face in the coming
decades? And how is petroleum bought and sold on international markets? The chap-
ter also discusses the increasing pressure on companies to adopt corporate social
responsibility practices, including greater transparency over their payments to host
governments.
Chapter 5, “The ABCs of Petroleum Contracts,” covers one of the most impor-
tant yet least-reported aspects of petroleum development: the contracts that producing
countries enter into with petroleum companies. These contracts, which determine how
much the government will earn from development of the country’s natural resources,
may be binding for periods of 20, 30, or more years. How can reporters tell whether
their government is getting a fair deal? This chapter explains the different kinds of con-
tracts that producing governments sign, the main components of such contracts, and
the risks that governments and the public need to be aware of.
Chapter 6, “Protecting Developing Economies from Price Shocks,” addresses
one of the great challenges faced by petroleum-exporting countries: how to protect
their economies from huge fluctuations in international petroleum prices. Because the
price of oil is so volatile, governments highly dependent on petroleum revenues face
great instability. Budget planning becomes difficult. Governments often overspend
when oil prices are high, then suddenly cut back on spending when oil prices fall.
These sudden changes can cause macroeconomic havoc and political unrest. Chapter
6 explores some tools that governments may use to reduce their exposure to price
volatility, including stabilization and savings funds and hedging instruments.
Chapter 7 covers “The Environmental, Social, and Human Rights Impacts of Oil
Development.” Oil is a resource that can provide financial benefits to local communi-
ties if managed transparently and equitably, but these potential benefits can and should
be viewed in the context of the possible social and environmental consequences for
those same communities. Chapter 7 discusses the various risks that attend many oil
production projects, including spills, displacement of local communities and human
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rights violations, destruction of surrounding ecosystems, and contributions to global
warming. The chapter identifies the kinds of questions that reporters should be asking
about oil development projects so that their readers can weigh the potential benefits
against potential costs.
Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development is the second in a series
of guides, published by the Revenue Watch project of the Open Society Institute, which
target different audiences to help them break out of what has come to be called the
“resource curse.” Follow the Money, a guide for nongovernmental organizations moni-
toring government revenues from the development of natural resources, is available at
www.revenuewatch.org.
Anya Schiffrin Svetlana Tsalik
Director of Journalism Programs Director, Revenue Watch
Initiative for Policy Dialogue Open Society Institute
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1. Making Natural Resources 
into a Blessing rather than 
a Curse
Joseph E. Stiglitz
There is a curious phenomenon that economists refer to as the “resource curse.” 
It appears that, on average, resource-rich countries have performed worse than those
with smaller endowments—quite the opposite of what might have been expected. But
not all resource-rich countries have fared the same. Some 30 years ago, Indonesia and
Nigeria had comparable per capita incomes, and both were heavily dependent on oil
revenues. Today, Indonesia’s per capita income is four times that of Nigeria’s. Nigeria’s
per capita income has actually fallen, from US$302.75 in 1973 to US$254.26 in 2002.1
Both Sierra Leone and Botswana are rich in diamonds. Botswana has had an average
growth rate of 5.2 percent between 1974 and 2002,2 but Sierra Leone has plunged into
civil strife over control of its diamond riches. The socioeconomic failures in the oil-rich
Middle East are legion. 
But even when countries as a whole have done fairly well, resource-rich countries
are often marked by large inequality: rich countries with poor people. Two-thirds of the
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people in OPEC member Venezuela live in poverty as the fruits of the country’s oil
bounty go to a minority. Since tax proceeds on oil producers could be used to create a
more egalitarian society, one should expect less not more inequality in countries like
Venezuela, one of Latin America’s largest oil exporters.
These puzzles cry out for an explanation, one that will allow countries to do some-
thing to undo the resource curse. Over the past decade, research by economists and
political scientists has done much to enhance our understanding of the issues. We
understand, in particular, that much of the problem is political in nature. This book is
predicated on the belief that wider understanding of the underlying forces can help
shape the political processes in ways that will make positive outcomes more likely; that
such understanding will lend support to institutional reforms more likely to ensure that
the resources will be well used for the benefit of all the people of the country; and that
in-depth and balanced coverage by journalists will help limit some of the worst abuses.
There need to be both macroeconomic and microeconomic policies put in place
to ensure that the country gets the most for its resources; that the resources of the
country lead to increased growth; and that the benefits are widely shared. 
Macroeconomic Policies
The most difficult questions facing a producing country include: How fast should the
resource be extracted and how should the revenue be used? Should the country
increase its cash flows by borrowing? And what institutional reforms should be adopt-
ed to ensure that the appropriate macroeconomic decisions are put into place?
The rate of extraction
Resources not extracted today are still around tomorrow—they do not disappear. In
fact, it may not make sense to extract natural resources as fast as possible. If a country
is unable to use the funds well, it may be preferable to leave the resources in the
ground, increasing in value as resources become scarcer and prices increase.3 A mili-
tary dictatorship might use the country’s resource wealth to repress its population and
to purchase arms to fund its favorite wars, so its people may actually be worse off than
they would be if the country did not have the resources.
Moreover, the extraction of resources lowers the wealth of a country—unless the
funds generated are invested in other forms. Extraction in itself makes the country
poorer because resources such as oil, gas, or minerals are not renewable. Once they are
out of the ground and sold, they cannot be replaced. It is only the subsequent rein-
vestment into capital (physical or natural) that can offset the loss of this natural wealth
and make the country richer.
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Since natural resources are an asset, one should view extraction as simply a port-
folio reallocation, converting some of the asset base from the natural resource into
another form. A country like Bangladesh, with limited reserves of natural gas, might
want to exercise caution when selling its gas, given that there is no other effective way
of insuring itself against an increase in the price of energy over the long run.
Borrowing: a word of warning
International banks often contribute to the tendency of petroleum-exporting govern-
ments to spend beyond their means. When oil prices are high, they are willing to lend
them money to increase their rate of expenditure. However, capital markets are fickle,
fair weather friends. When oil prices fall or interest rates rise, the lenders are quick to
call in the loans. The bankers’ general maxim is that they prefer to lend to those who
do not need their money. When oil prices fall, the country needs the money, but it is at
that point that the lenders want their money back. That is why capital flows, especially
short-term capital flows, tend to be pro-cyclical, exacerbating the fluctuations brought
about by the fall in the price of the natural resource anyway. 
If the money were well spent by governments on high return investments, yield-
ing a return considerably in excess of the interest rate they have to pay, all of this would
be fine. But often it is not. The net increase in investment as a result of the borrowing
may be small, typically much less than the amount borrowed. And when the borrowed
funds are used to finance domestic expenditures, these expenditures can contribute to
the overvaluation of the exchange rate, actually hampering domestic exporters and sup-
pliers through the effect known as Dutch Disease.4
Accounting frameworks
Part of the reason that governments often manage their revenues so poorly relates to
the widely used standard accounting frameworks. Governments naturally want to
show that they know how to manage their economies well. If they can increase their
growth rates, they think they are better off. But gross domestic product (GDP) does not
provide a true measure of economic well-being. As we have noted, if the country
extracts more resources, and the funds are not invested well, the country is poorer, not
richer. 
Alternative frameworks, sometimes referred to as “green GDP,” attempt to more
accurately measure sustainable well-being.5 Just as a firm’s accounting frameworks take
into account depreciation of its assets, a country’s accounting framework should take
into account depletion of its natural resources and deterioration of its environment. Just
as a firm’s accounting frameworks consider assets and liabilities, so should a country’s,
noting whether there are increases in liabilities (debt) as well as assets. A country that
sells off its natural resources, privatizes its oil company, and borrows against future rev-
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enues, may experience a consumption binge that raises GDP, but the accounting frame-
work should show that the country has actually become poorer. 
Institutional reforms—stabilization funds
International commodity prices are subject to enormous volatility, providing the major
motivation for the creation of stabilization funds (“rainy day funds”) that allow the
smoothing out of expenditures. But such stabilization funds can serve other functions.
For instance, they can help ensure that the pattern of expenditures does not give rise to
large Dutch Disease problems. By setting aside funds in a separate account, stabiliza-
tion funds can provide a check against a natural proclivity of governments to spend all
of the resources at their disposal; and they can help ensure that the funds are spent on
investments, so that the depletion of natural resources is offset by an increase in
human and physical capital. 
Stabilization funds can also be used to reduce rent seeking. By providing an open
and transparent process for determining how the funds are used, stabilization funds
can help prevent and diminish the often violent conflicts that have so marked resource-
rich countries.
Microeconomic Policies
Governments can undertake a variety of policies to increase the likelihood of obtaining
more revenues and of making sure revenues are well spent.
Transparency
Perhaps the most important set of policies are those entailing increased transparency:
more information about how the government interacts with those involved in the
extraction of the natural resources; the contracts that are signed; the amounts the gov-
ernment received; the amount of natural resource produced; and the uses to which the
funds are put. Such transparency reduces the scope for corruption. After all, it is often
cheaper for companies to bribe the government of a producing country than to pay
market prices for the right to develop a petroleum reserve. Transparency limits the
opportunities for corruption. At the very least, questions are raised: why did the gov-
ernment not receive full value for the country’s resources? 
When the petroleum company BP first proposed making public what it pays to
the Angolan government, the government objected.6 But a number of other producing
countries, including Nigeria, have started to require all oil companies to “publish what
they pay” and government officials to make public where the money goes.7
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Auction design
The kinds of contracts that a natural resource–producing country enters into with
multinational companies to develop its resources can have a great effect on how much
revenue the government subsequently receives. The issue of contracting is a compli-
cated one and is developed more fully in chapter 5.
Some ways of engaging foreign firms may result in markedly reduced competi-
tion, and this in turn leads to lower revenues for the government. For instance, “fire
sales” where governments make large tracts of oil fields available for commercial devel-
opment in quick succession are likely to result in lower prices.8 Even large oil
companies have a seemingly limited appetite for risk, and are willing to buy more and
more options for exploration (before knowing about the return on leases previously
obtained) only at reduced prices. 
Allowing one firm to come into a country ahead of others may discourage sub-
sequent competition. A firm that is invited to do initial exploration will benefit from
asymmetries of information—that firm will know more about the potential not only of
the oil or gas tract it has explored but also have information about neighboring tracts.9
Even if the government then puts up other tracts for competitive auction, the informa-
tion asymmetry (as well as the original firm’s relationships with officials) will result in
less competition and lower revenues for the government. Each of the competitors will
know that they are at an informational disadvantage: if they win the auction it is
because they bid too much—more than the informed competitor who knows the real
value of the field. As a result, the new companies will bid less aggressively.
Governments can organize the bidding for leasing oil tracts in different ways.
Bonus bidding requires companies to compete based on how large a bonus they will
pay the host government at the start of the contract. Bonus bidding forces producers to
pay large amounts up front without knowing either the quantity of the natural resource
or the costs of extraction. These risks to bonus bidding may discourage companies
from competing. Royalty bidding, where competitors bid on the fraction of the rev-
enues they give to the government as royalties, carries less risk and generates more
competition than bonus bidding. Bonus bidding is especially of concern in developing
countries, where there is more risk of expropriation, or future governments changing
the terms of the contract.10 As a consequence, royalty bidding may generate more rev-
enue for the government than bonus bidding, due to the lack of significant investment
required up front and the lessened risk to companies of major loss should a govern-
ment later default.
In some places (including the United States), there has been concern that lease
provisions lead to premature shutdown of wells or, in other cases, to excessively rapid
extraction. The payment of any royalty that lowers the net revenue received may influ-
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ence an oil company’s decision to shut down a well earlier than necessary.11 Well-
designed contracts thus may have a term that allows, as the oil becomes extracted and
the costs of extraction increase, the lowering (or even possibly the elimination) of roy-
alties upon the payment of a fixed amount. 
While the details are complicated, the basic point is a simple one: the way a coun-
try engages producers can make a great deal of difference. Both in the United States
and Europe, the design of auctions for the airwaves used by radio, TV, cell phones, and
so forth (the so-called spectrum actions) have had a major effect on enhancing govern-
ment revenues.12 Countries should assess their auction processes by looking at the
fraction of total natural resource revenues they receive, and comparing these to what
other countries with comparable extraction costs and risks receive. 
Role of Developed Countries
Resource-rich countries have the primary responsibility for ensuring their govern-
ments receive the most that they can for their natural resources and use the funds to
improve their long-term well-being. But there are actions that the developed countries
and the international community can take to enhance the likelihood of success. The fol-
lowing list is meant to be suggestive, rather than complete.
First, developed countries can put pressure on the oil and natural resource com-
panies to be more transparent, to “publish what they pay.” A simple requirement could
go a long way: only allowing published payments to be tax deductible.
Secondly, countries can enforce stringent anticorruption and antibribery laws. 
Thirdly, secret bank accounts encourage bribery by providing a safe haven. The
international financial community has made great strides in stopping the use of secret
bank accounts by terrorists, but restrictions on secret bank accounts should be extend-
ed to make it more difficult for oil revenues to be funneled through the international
banking system, instead of going straight into developing country treasuries. 
Finally, the International Monetary Fund should encourage developing countries
to establish stabilization funds. This will require it to change its accounting frame-
works, which treat increased expenditures out of the stabilization funds, say during a
recession, just like any other expenditure and subject the funds to harsh criticism for
running deficits, vitiating one of its major benefits. Moreover, the IMF should not put
undue pressure on countries to privatize their extractive industries. (In many develop-
ing countries, privatization is tantamount to selling the natural resources to foreign
firms, since there are no domestic firms with the capital and skills necessary to under-
take the task of extraction.) Privatization is only one way of engaging foreign firms in
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the extraction of natural resources. There may be alternative ways (contractual arrange-
ments) that generate more revenue for the developing countries.13
We have noted that one of the reasons for the resource curse is the conflict to
which rent seeking often gives rise. Western governments can try to reduce such con-
flict by encouraging inclusive democratic processes.
Perhaps even more important is action that the developed world can take to 
circumscribe the “benefits” that arise from conflict by, for example, extending to other
areas the campaign against “conflict diamonds.” Much of the revenue goes to the 
purchase of arms, and arguably restrictions on the sale of arms could also make an
important contribution.
There is no simple panacea, no single set of prescriptions that ensures growth
and development. But if reforms are adopted by the natural resource–rich countries
and by the international community, there is the prospect that the resource curse can
be lifted and made a thing of the past. Natural resources can and should be a blessing.
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2. Understanding 
the Resource Curse
Terry Lynn Karl
The experience of four decades has shown that exporting oil by itself does not trans-
form poor countries into flourishing economies within a generation. In earlier years,
many experts thought the “black gold” of oil would bring riches and economic devel-
opment. Today their expectations are far more restrained. 
Oil-exporting countries are more likely to be described as suffering from “the
paradox of plenty,” “the King Midas problem,” or what Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, the
founder of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), once called
the effects of “the devil’s excrement.” Their reality is sobering: countries that depend
on oil for their livelihood are among the most economically troubled, the most author-
itarian, and the most conflict-ridden in the world.
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What the Resource Curse Is . . . and Is Not
The consequences of development based on the export of petroleum have tended to be
negative during the past 40 years. Detrimental effects include slower-than-expected
economic growth, poor economic diversification, dismal social welfare indicators, high
levels of poverty and inequality, devastating environmental impacts at the local level,
rampant corruption, exceptionally poor governance, and high incidences of conflict
and war. 
When compared to countries dependent on the export of agricultural commodi-
ties, mineral- and oil-exporting countries suffer from unusually high poverty, poor
health care, widespread malnutrition, high rates of child mortality, low life expectancy,
and poor educational performance—all of which are surprising findings given the rev-
enue streams of resource-rich countries. 
Due to the highly volatile nature of oil markets, oil-exporting nations often fall
victim to sudden declines in their per capita income and growth collapses of huge pro-
portions. The statistics are startling: In Saudi Arabia, whose proven crude oil reserves
are the greatest in the world, per capita income has plunged from $28,600 in 1981 to
$6,800 in 2001.1 In Nigeria and Venezuela, real per capita income has decreased to the
levels of the 1960s, while many other countries—Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ecuador,
Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and Trinidad Tobago—are back to the levels of
the 1970s and early 1980s.2
The surprisingly negative outcomes in oil- and mineral-dependent countries are
referred to as the “resource curse.” Before discussing what the resource curse is, how-
ever, it is helpful to clarify what it is not. The resource curse is not a claim that natural
resource abundance is always or inevitably bad for economic growth or development,
as some believe. To the contrary, there are powerful historical examples of successful
resource-based development, including the United States (which was the world’s lead-
ing mineral economy when it became the world’s leader in manufacturing), Canada,
Australia, Chile, and Norway—although there are almost no cases of successful devel-
opment based on the export of petroleum. 
The resource curse does not refer to the mere possession of petroleum or other
minerals, but rather to countries that are overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenues.
This dependence is generally measured by the extent to which oil exports dominate
total exports (usually from 60 to 95 percent of total exports) or by the ratio of oil and
gas exports to gross domestic product—a figure that can range from a low of 4.9 per-
cent (in Cameroon, which is running out of oil) to 86 percent (in Equatorial Guinea,
one of the newest exporters). 
Nor is the resource curse a claim that oil and mineral exporters would be better
off with smaller endowments of natural resources—that it would be better to be Haiti,
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for example, than to be Venezuela. Oil is simply a black viscous substance that can be
beneficial or detrimental: what matters most is not the inherent character of the
resource itself but how the wealth generated by petroleum is shared and utilized.
In its narrowest form, the resource curse refers to the inverse relationship
between high natural resource dependence and economic growth rates. A number of
recent studies have shown that resource-rich developing countries have underper-
formed when compared with their resource-poor counterparts. But not all resources
are created equal. Those countries dependent on exports of “point source” natural
resources (meaning those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such
as oil or minerals) are more strongly associated with slower growth. In fact, oil- and
mineral-driven resource-rich countries are among the weakest growth performers,
despite the fact that they have high investment and import capacity. 
A study of OPEC members from 1965–1998 showed that their per capita gross
national product decreased by an average of 1.3 percent per year, whereas non-oil devel-
oping countries as a whole grew by an average of 2.2 percent over the same period.3
Studies show that the greater the dependence on oil and mineral resources, the worse
the growth performance. Countries dependent on oil export revenue not only have per-
formed worse than their resource-poor counterparts, they have performed far worse
than they should have, given their revenue streams.
Explanations for the Resource Curse
Explanations for this poor economic performance vary and are debatable, but a combina-
tion of factors makes oil exporters especially prone to policy failures and growth collapse.
E Oil price volatility: The global oil market is arguably the world’s most volatile, and
the sudden price gyrations and subsequent boom and bust economic cycles are
difficult for policymakers to manage effectively. Price volatility exerts a strong
negative effect on budgetary discipline and the control of public finance as well
as on efforts at state planning. It is also negatively associated with effective
investment, improved income distribution, and poverty alleviation. 
E The Dutch Disease: Oil-dependent countries often suffer from the so-called
Dutch Disease, a phenomenon in which the oil sector drives up the exchange rate
of the local currency, rendering other exports noncompetitive. In effect, oil
exports crowd out other promising export sectors, especially agriculture and
manufacturing, making economic diversification particularly difficult. In
response, policymakers adopt strong protectionist policies in order to sustain
increasingly noncompetitive economic activities, placing the funding burden on
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the oil sector. As agriculture and manufacturing become dependent on these
transfers from oil, dependence on petroleum is reinforced, removing incentives
for a more efficient use of capital. Over time, it can result in a permanent loss of
competitiveness.
E Lagging skill accumulation and heightened inequality: As the world’s most capital
and technologically intensive industry, the petroleum industry creates few jobs,
and the skills required by these jobs generally do not fit the profile of the
unemployed in oil-exporting countries. Instead, highly skilled labor is sent abroad
to train or foreign workers are brought in to do the work, thus robbing oil
exporters of the huge benefits from the “learn by doing” process that is the crux
of economic development. Contrast this with resource-deficient countries where
demand for education is high, especially from the manufacturing sector. Skill
accumulation occurs at a more rapid rate, and wealth inequalities tend to be less
common in these countries. The rate of economic growth generally rises through
increased productivity and not merely through financial transfers of petrodollars.
The net impact is evident: according to the second Arab Human Development
Report, released by the United Nations in 2003, high dependence on oil in parts
of the Middle East has led to “the over concentration of wealth in a few hands,”
and “faltering economic growth,” and “weakened the demand for knowledge.”4
E The enclave and tax problem: Because oil projects in many countries tend to be
large-scale, capital-intensive, and foreign-owned, there are few productive links
with the rest of these countries’ economies. Generally, revenues derived from the
exploitation of oil go directly to the government, either as royalties or rents paid
by foreign oil companies, or as taxes and profits earned by state-owned enter-
prises. This arrangement removes incentives for establishing tax systems
separate from petroleum, further exacerbating dependence on oil. The rulers
who control the coffers of the state need not tax their own people, thus breaking
a critical link between taxation, representation, and state accountability.
Dependence on oil acts as a barrier to more productive activities, and removes the
accountability necessary to satisfy the demands and the scrutiny of taxpayers.
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The Crux of the Problem: Weak Institutions 
and Rentier States 
Proposals for avoiding the resource curse include commodity stabilization funds that
can smooth out price volatility; more economic openness and sophisticated foreign
exchange policies to mitigate Dutch Disease; more efficient investment in human
resources, especially education and skill acquisition; and greater transparency and new
tax policies. But utilizing petroleum wealth effectively is not easy. For these policies to
be successfully implemented, capable states and relatively high levels of governance are
necessary. If sophisticated governments in the more developed world have trouble exe-
cuting ambitious interventionist policies, how can governments in less developed
countries be expected to administer even more ambitious and complicated policies? 
Overdependence on oil exports is strongly associated with weak public institu-
tions that generally lack the capacity to handle the challenges of petroleum-led
development. This is partly the result of timing: if pre-existing institutions are weak or
the state only partially formed, the influx of rents from petroleum tends to produce a
rentier state—one that lives from the profits of oil. In rentier states, economic influence
and political power are especially concentrated, the lines between public and private are
very blurred, and rent seeking as a strategy for wealth creation is rampant. Rulers tend
to stay in power by diverting revenues to themselves and their supporters through sub-
sidies, protection, the creation of public employment, and overspending. Oil states
have a chronic tendency to become overextended while promoting cultures of rent
seeking among their populations. 
In resource-poor countries, intense popular pressure on scarce resources is more
likely to reduce the tolerance for inefficiency and predation, and the economy cannot sup-
port extensive protection and overexpanded bureaucracies over a long period of time. But
in oil states, oil wealth weakens agencies of restraint. The net result is a state that looks
powerful but is hollow. Democracy may be another casualty of this rentier dynamic:
authoritarian rulers use petrodollars to keep themselves in power, prevent the formation
of opposition groups, and create vast militaries and repressive apparatuses. Not surpris-
ingly, such regimes tend to last a long time and democratic change is hindered. 
Other political problems make oil states unusually susceptible to policy failures.
Because the state is a “honey pot,” it is prone to capture by powerful interests and to
widespread corruption. As a group, oil-exporting countries are significantly more cor-
rupt than the world average (even if Canada and Norway are included). Nigeria, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Congo, Cameroon, and Indonesia compete for the position of “most 
corrupt” in the annual rankings of Transparency International, a nongovernmental
organization dedicated to countering corrupt government and international business
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practices.5 High levels of corruption contribute to the resource curse by deforming pol-
icy choices; for example, policymakers in oil-exporting countries tend to favor
mega-projects in which payoffs can be more easily hidden and the collection of bribes
facilitated, while eschewing productive long-term investments that are more transpar-
ent. This, in turn, lowers both growth and income levels.
Countries dependent on oil are particularly susceptible to policy failure. Because
the institutional setting is generally incapable of dealing with the economic manifesta-
tions of the resource curse, it ends up reinforcing them in a vicious development cycle
or “staple trap.” As regimes distribute and utilize resources to keep themselves in
power, this political distribution of rents causes further economic distortions, depress-
es the efficiency of investment, entrenches opposition to economic reform, and
permits distortions to build behind protective barriers. Foreign borrowing may prolong
this trap, but in the end a growth collapse is likely. So is violence. Not surprisingly,
where the prospects of wealth are so great, petroleum is more associated with civil war
and conflict than any other commodity. Countries dependent on oil are more likely
than resource-poor countries to have civil wars, these wars are more likely to be seces-
sionist, and they are likely to be of even greater duration and intensity compared to
wars where oil is not present. Oil may be the catalyst to start a war; petrodollars and
pipelines may serve to finance either side and prolong conflict. And this, of course, is
the biggest resource curse of all.
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T I P  S H E E T
Questions about the Oil Economy
E How has petroleum production affected your country over time? Are oil revenues
being used to help alleviate poverty? Have poverty indicators improved? Has
access to clean water, good schools, and hospitals improved over time? Are more
people completing higher education since petroleum production began? Are there
proposals being considered that could be put in place to help combat poverty
using oil revenues?
E Have problems of corruption deepened or improved since your country began
producing and selling petroleum?
E Have more jobs been created since your country began petroleum production? 
E How have non-oil sectors been affected? Have the manufacturing and agricultural
sectors grown, remained stagnant, or diminished?
E Has governance improved since petroleum production and export began? Are
elections considered free and fair in your country? Is freedom of expression
respected? Are opposition parties allowed to organize and compete freely in
elections?
E Look at where the money is going: Examine your government’s budget to see what
oil revenues are being used for. Compare your government’s spending to other
countries in the region and in other parts of the world.
E Are oil revenues being used to pay for armed conflict? Is there conflict or labor
unrest in oil producing regions?
CABIMAS, Venezuela, Sept. 27, 2000—
Fredy Valero put down his beer and kicked
the dirt angrily. 
“Do you know how much wealth
comes out of this soil?” he asked. “Dig a
hole anywhere and out comes oil. I can't
even think how much money that is. And
how much do I have? Or anyone here?” 
His right arm flailed out, pointing over
the ragged, working-class neighborhood.
“Next to nothing.” 
Welcome to oil country, Venezuela-
style. 
Cabimas is at the heart of the Lake
Maracaibo region, which pumps about $13
billion worth of crude annually. But its
story could be echoed in many places in
other OPEC nations, economists say.
Valero is an unemployed oil worker,
one of many around the poor, sweltering
town. Despite the vast wealth produced in
the area, little of it stays or benefits the peo-
ple. Living costs are sky-high, almost all
consumer goods are imported and unem-
ployment is estimated at 25 percent. 
Economists say that the Maracaibo
region and Venezuela are classic examples
of the Dutch Disease, a term derived from
the Netherlands’ experience in the 1970s
after huge North Sea natural gas fields
came into production. 
Instead of the bonanza the country
expected, the resulting flood of cash
warped the economy by making citizens
rely on government largesse and imports
rather than export revenue and domestic
products. 
“The Dutch Disease is alive and well
here, and it’s the cause of all our prob-
lems,” said Pedro Garcia, co-owner of an
import company and president of the
Maracaibo Chamber of Commerce. “Oil
has distorted our economy horribly.” 
Garcia should know. He is a member
of the region's small elite, which has long
lived ostentatiously from the nation’s oil
wealth. In Venezuela, as in other OPEC
nations, those who have it, flaunt it. 
“Some people think nothing of flying
to Miami on Friday to buy shoes for a 
party here Saturday night,” said Norka
Marrufo, society columnist for Panorama,
Maracaibo’s leading daily newspaper. 
That’s a world apart for Valero. A 25-
2 8 C O V E R I N G  O I L
S A M P L E  S T O R Y
More Poverty Than Affluence 
in Venezuela’s Oil-Fed Economy
By Robert Collier of the San Francisco Chronicle
year-old worker on the boats that constant-
ly ply the derrick-studded waters of Lake
Maracaibo, Valero likes the pay, when he
can get it—about $560 per month, plus
medical care and other generous benefits
given by Petroleos de Venezuela, the state
oil monopoly. 
By Third World standards, that’s not
bad. But he has been unemployed for most
of the past year and large portions of previ-
ous years. 
“Unfortunately, vice is all too common
because of the boom-and-bust nature of
this business,” said Pastor Lopez, an oil
union official. He noted that gambling on
horses and dominoes soaks up a large part
of many local residents’ income. 
Venezuela has another dubious distinc-
tion that analysts link to the flow of oil
money—it is the world’s fifth-highest per
capita consumer of Scotch whiskey. 
Although they might have more work
if OPEC increased production to drive
prices down, Valero and his compatriots
voice fervent support of President Hugo
Chavez’s attempts to keep prices relatively
high. Chavez was enthusiastically elected
because he promised to quell corruption in
Venezuela. 
Many Venezuelans fondly recall the
boom years of the 1970s and early 1980s,
when OPEC succeeded in pushing world
oil prices more than twice the current
price, when inflation is taken into account. 
A recent nationwide poll found that 80
percent of the population believes the
country is among the richest in the world,
although at least two-thirds live in poverty. 
It thus follows, in the minds of mil-
lions, that the primary task of government
is to redistribute existing wealth rather
than to create it. Venezuela has developed
hardly any high-tech industry and, apart
from oil, produces little but consumer
goods for domestic consumption. 
There is plenty of money sloshing
around in the coffers of OPEC nations
these days: They are expected to earn more
than $200 billion this year, up from $160
billion last year, and oil proceeds account
for roughly half of Venezuela's $26.7 bil-
lion budget.
When Chavez took the oath of office
last year, oil was selling for $13 a barrel and
soon tumbled to $8. Among his first acts
was to slash public spending. The charis-
matic former army colonel’s government
now has $10 billion more in extra oil rev-
enues than last year. 
Reprinted with permission of the San Francisco Chronicle.
Editor’s note: The story employs an effective technique
of using an ordinary citizen to sum up the problems of
society. The same technique could be used in most
resource-rich countries where the poorer residents do not
enjoy the spoils. The reporter backs up statements with
statistics from credible sources.
The story does a nice job of contrasting the lifestyles
of the rich and poor in Venezuela, which, like most
resource-rich countries, suffers from a poor distribution
of wealth. The story could have benefited from a quote
from a government official.
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3. A Primer on Oil
John Roberts
Oil is a plentiful resource, but it comes with a high price tag. Oil is found in a variety
of geological strata but much of the world’s richest oil regions are also the most risky,
either geologically or politically. While its role in history has changed through the
decades, oil is never far from the front pages of the newspapers. Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 precipitated the Gulf War of 1991, and prompted furious debate about
“ war for oil.” Some would argue that the 2003 war in Iraq, with its continuing U.S. mil-
itary involvement in that country, was also about oil. The dependence of the United
States and other major developed countries on imported oil means that the commodi-
ty plays a major role in national security considerations and international relations.
Oil has been used to fuel sacred flames for thousands of years and in medicines
for nearly as long. Its primary use today is as a fuel for planes and automobiles. In the
industrialized world, no less than 97 percent of transportation runs on oil and there is
no readily available and affordable alternative in sight. In addition, oil is vital in some
parts of the world for heating, while it is also widely used in the petrochemical indus-
try to make plastics and, in its roughest form, to help pave roads.
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Principal concerns in the 21st century include the question of whether oil pro-
duction is close to reaching its peak. In other words, is oil running out? In the short
term, will producer nations be able to meet the routine requirements of consuming
nations? Perhaps the most important medium- and long-term issue is oil’s contribution
to global warming. 
This chapter begins by explaining the geology of oil, how oil is measured, and
energy consumption patterns worldwide. It then turns to these three crucial questions:
First, are we running out of oil? Second, what are the security implications of relying
on oil? Finally, what are the environmental consequences of an over-reliance on fossil
fuels?
What Is Crude Oil?
Crude oil or petroleum—the terms tend to be used interchangeably—is technically a
mixture of pentanes and heavier hydrocarbons, principally recovered from crude oil
reservoirs. When pentanes and heavier hydrocarbons are found in natural gas reser-
voirs, they are known as condensate. In practice, condensate is treated as oil. In
addition, oil reservoirs may produce lighter liquid hydrocarbons such as propane and
butane, which are classified as natural gas liquids (LNGs). 
In many ways, crude, condensate, and LNGs can be considered close members of
the same family. But it is worth noting that when organizations talk about oil produc-
tion or oil reserves, they may—or may not—be including LNGs and/or condensate in
their tallies. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) excludes
LNGs and condensate from its members’ production quotas, even though these may
contribute significantly to some OPEC members’ overall hydrocarbons output.
The composition of crude oil varies from field to field. The density of crude oil is
usually measured in degrees, according to a scale developed by the American
Petroleum Institute (API). The World Energy Conference classifies heavy crude as
crude that is below 22° API, medium crude as oil between 22° and 31° API, and light
crude as anything above 31° API. Some condensates have a gravity of 60°. 
Light, medium, and heavy crudes are considered “conventional crude.” Some
crude grades can be blended to produce the right overall quality that appeals to refin-
ers while condensate or LNGs are often mixed in with heavier crudes to ensure
pipelines do not get clogged up. 
The light grades usually sell at a premium to the heavier grades, mainly because
of their high yield of valuable refined products like gasoline or jet fuel. North Sea
grades like Brent and Ekofisk, Nigerian crude like Bonny Light, and other African
crudes are light crudes while most of the Middle East oil is of the heavier variety.
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Oil below 10° API is commonly known as bitumen and requires special treat-
ment. Bitumen is mined from sand, sandstone, or other sedimentary rocks, whereas
conventional crudes are drilled. One of a number of nonconventional crudes, bitumen
is currently produced from the tar sands of Canada and Venezuela.
Bitumen undergoes various washes and treatments to separate the oil content from
sand, water, and minerals, and is then diluted with condensate. As a result of undergo-
ing these processes, bitumen has become known as “synthetic crude,” sometimes
shortened to “syncrude,” although in strict linguistic terms it is not synthetic at all. 
Measuring Oil
Oil is routinely measured either in barrels or in metric tons. The most common oil pro-
duction measure is barrels per day (b/d) or metric tons per year (mt/y). Because barrels
are a measure of volume and tons are a measure of weight, there is no precise correla-
tion, as different qualities of crude oil will vary in weight. But the rule of thumb is that
there are 7.33 barrels to a ton and that 1 b/d corresponds to 49.8 mt/y. Gasoline at the
pump is in most cases measured in liters, but in the United States it is measured in
gallons (one gallon equals 3.75 litres and 42 gallons equal one barrel) while in some
countries it may still be measured in British imperial gallons (one gallon equals 4.5
liters while 35 gallons equal one barrel). 
A ton of oil equivalent (toe) is a term used to express the production or use of
other forms of primary energy—such as gas, coal, nuclear, or hydro (which each have
their own industry’s systems of measurement)—so that it can be compared directly
with both oil and with each other.
Oil’s Place in the Global Energy Mix
By and large, oil is the world’s most important commodity. It is the world’s most widely
used fuel, not least because most of us drive cars or rely on public transport that is pow-
ered by oil. But it should also be noted that while oil still accounts for the largest share of
world commercial fuel production—3.637 trillion mt in 2003, or 37.3 percent of world
production of 9.741 trillion mtoe—some 2 billion people still rely on the most basic fuel
of all, wood and combustible waste products, for simple cooking and heating.1
In considering oil’s place in the global energy mix, one has to look both at the vol-
umes consumed of the major fuel types, and at the varied markets that rely
predominantly on specific types of energy. The global energy balance in 2003—in terms
of the consumption of fuels that are commercially traded—is summarized in Table 1.
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But this balance contains considerable market differences, not least in terms of
energy consumption per capita. For example, U.S. energy use per capita is twice as high
as that of the European Union, with which it shares a broadly similar standard of liv-
ing (see Table 2).
In its 2003 assessment of global energy trends, the International Energy Agency
(IEA) anticipated that between 2000 and 2030 nonnuclear, nonhydro renewables (in
other words, wind power, solar power, and perhaps wave power) would be the fastest
growing sector of the global energy market, roughly doubling its share of the market
and tripling in terms of absolute output. This growth in renewables, however, repre-
sented only a 2 percent increase in market share (from 2 to 4 percent); fossil fuels were
also expected to increase their share of the market by 2 percentage points (from 87 to
89 percent). And while oil does lose ground, it is mainly to another fossil fuel, gas. 
In comparative terms, the new renewables sector simply compensates for an
expected stasis in production of nuclear energy, which is expected to produce about as
much energy in 2030 as in 2000, but will lose market share given that the overall ener-
gy sector is expected to increase by around 66 percent over this 30-year time frame. 
While oil is expected to lose a little of its overall market share, since its 30-year
increase is expected to be 60 percent, some areas of the world are expected to see an
explosive increase in oil use. For example, oil consumption in China is expected to soar
from around 5 mb/d (250 metric tons a year) in 2000 to 12 mb/d (600 mt/y) in 2030.
Soaring Chinese demand contributed to the record-high crude oil prices recorded in
2004.
TABLE 1
World Energy Balance in 2003 
(In millions of tons of oil equivalent – MTOE) 
MTOE %
Oil 3,636.6 37.33
Natural Gas 2,331.9 23.94
Coal 2,578.4 26.47
Nuclear Energy 598.8 6.15
Hydro 595.4 6.11
Total 9,741.1 100
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2004
Also available at: www.bp.com/statisticalreview2004
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TABLE 2
World Energy Balance by Region and Per Capita (pc) Usage in 2003 
(Volume totals in millions of tons of oil equivalent – MTOE; per capita in tons of oil equivalent per person) 
Oil Natural Coal Nuclear Hydro Total Pop’n TOE/pc
Gas
North America 1,093.2 686.3 612.7 201.1 133.9 2,727.3
USA 914.3 566.8 573.9 181.9 60.9 2,297.8 291.0 7.896
Central & South America 216.6 98.6 17.7 4.7 127.8 465.5
Brazil 84.1 14.3 11.0 3.0 68.9 181.4 176.3 1.029
Europe (including CIS) 942.3 975.7 535.9 285.3 174.3 2,913.4
EU-15 639.7 363.5 222.7 204.0 68.3 1,498.1 379.0 3.953
France 94.12 39.4 12.4 99.8 14.8 260.6 59.9 4.351
Germany 125.1 77.0 87.1 37.3 5.7 332.3 82.4 4.033
Russia 124.7 365.2 111.3 34.0 35.8 679.8 144.1 4.718
Turkey 31.9 18.9 15.5 - 8.0 74.3 70.3 1.057
UK 76.9 85.7 39.1 20.1 1.3 223.2 59.1 3.777
Middle East 214.9 200.4 8.6 - 3.0 426.8
Iran 54.0 72.4 0.7 - 2.0 129.1 68.1 1.896
Saudi Arabia 67.0 54.9 - - - 121.9 23.5 5.187
Africa 118.6 60.7 90.6 2.9 18.5 291.0
Egypt 25.0 22.1 0.7 - 3.2 52.0 70.51 0.737
South Africa 24.2 - 88.9 3.0 0.8 116.0 44.76 2.592
Asia Pacific 1,048.1 310.9 1,306.2 104.7 137.5 2,908.4
Bangladesh 4.2 11.0 0.4 - 0.2 15.9 143.8 0.111
Japan 248.7 68.9 112.9 52.2 22.8 504.3 127.5 3.956
China* 275.2 29.5 799.7 9.9 64.0 1,178.3 1,294.9 0.910
India 113.3 27.1 185.3 4.1 15.6 345.3 1,049.6 0.329
Pakistan 17.0 19.0 2.7 0.4 5.6 44.8 149.9 0.299
South Korea 105.7 24.2 51.1 29.3 1.6 212.0 47.4 4.473
World 3,626.6 2,331.9 2,578.4 598.8 595.4 9,741.1 6,400** 1.522
* Excluding Hong Kong
** Author’s estimate
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2004
Population figures from IMF, International Financial Statistics, December 2003. EU population from Eurostat.
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Are We Running Out of Oil?
Reserves: how much oil does the world possess?
One of the most contentious subjects in the heated debate on international energy is
the extent of the world’s oil resources. It is usually said that the world has around 1 tril-
lion barrels of oil; this is a sensible figure for routine day-to-day usage, but it is only the
beginning of a complicated story. One well-regarded source for oil reserve numbers is
the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, which is updated annually. BP’s figure for
the volume of “proved reserves” (also known in the industry as “proven reserves”) is
revised each year and essentially reflects official government claims for an individual
country’s reserves, taking into account the latest discoveries, improved knowledge of
fields already under development, and the amount of oil pumped from known fields.
Normally, little attention is paid to the actual description of what constitutes
“proved reserves.” BP says simply that these are “generally taken to be those quantities
that geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can be
recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating
conditions.” This definition will, of course, change as technology changes. 
To Stone Age people, reserves were unknown and irrelevant because production
consisted of little more than capturing and using oil that trickled to the surface.
Improved technology first enabled humans to dig wells by shovelling and draw up oil
TABLE 3
World Primary Energy Demand 1971–2030 (in MTOE)
1971 2000 2010 2030 Average  
annual growth
2000–2030 
(%)
Oil 2,450 3,604 4,272 5,769 1.6
Gas 895 2,085 2,794 4,203 2.4
Coal 1,449 2,355 2,702 3,606 1.4
Nuclear 29 674 753 703 0.1
Hydro 104 228 274 366 1.6
Other Renewables 73 233 336 618 3.3
Total 4,999 9,179 11,132 15,267 1.7
Source: World Energy Outlook 2002, International Energy Agency, Paris, October 2002.
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in a bucket; and then to drill for oil some 10 or 20 feet. Currently the prospector can
search for oil, even though it may be located in such previously inaccessible places as
a couple of thousand meters below a seabed, which itself may lie a couple of thousand
meters below the ocean surface. Technology has also improved the types of oil we can
extract.
Canada provides a good example of the difficulty of calculating reserves. Canada’s
National Energy Board (NEB) officially estimates that the Athabasca tar sands contain
as much as 174.7 billion barrels in what it terms “established reserves.” This is a defi-
nition used to cover both proven reserves and half of the country’s probable
reserves—with “probable reserves” themselves being defined as “reserves contiguous
with proven reserves that are interpreted to exist with reasonable certainty.” In stating
this, Canada was officially proclaiming that it now considers its reserves to be second
only to those of Saudi Arabia. Contrast this position with either the 6.9 billion barrels
listed in BP’s 2003 Statistical Review as the size of Canada’s proved reserves of all kinds
of oil or the NEB’s own figures of 4.3 billion barrels for the country’s proven reserves
of conventional crude oil.
Essentially, the problem is one of simple definition—and cost. The oil is there,
the question, as ever, is how much are we prepared to pay to get it out. With oil at
$50/bbl, as it was in 2004, more oil in the ground is going to be economically feasible
to extract and produce.
TABLE 4
Increase in Global Oil Demand 2000–2030 (in mb/d)
Increase Annual % 
in mb/d increase 
OECD N. America 9.5 1.1
China 7 3.0
East Asia 5 2.75
Latin America 4.5 2.4
South Asia 4.5 3.5
Middle East 3.8 2.2
Africa 3.5 3.25
Transition Economies 2.5 1.5
OECD Europe 2.5 1.0
OECD Pacific 2.0 0.8
Source: World Energy Outlook 2002, International Energy Agency, Paris, October 2002
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The issue is further complicated where declarations of private companies about
the scale of their reserves in corporate filings to banks or regulatory authorities are con-
cerned. These generally require specific programs to be in place for actual development
of the resource. So in considering the reserve issue, it is important to note that while
geologists and miners may know the oil exists, there are a multitude of reasons why it
may still not be formally classified as a proved or proven reserve.
The issue of reserve declarations was front-page news in 2004 after Royal Dutch/
Shell, one of the world’s largest and oldest oil giants, admitted that it had exaggerated
its proven reserves. By the end of May 2004, the company had downgraded the size of
its proven oil and gas reserves four times in five months in a scandal that stunned its
shareholders and financial markets and forced three top executives to resign. In early
2005, Shell announced a further 10 percent cut in its reserves.
Costs and prices
The question of cost is a recurrent theme. Oil companies operate on tight margins and
don’t want to spend more than around $10–15 per barrel for the entire cost of exploring
for oil, developing the reserve, and transporting it to market. And yet, even if one takes
$12/bbl as a reasonable development figure, this is very low compared to other oil prices. 
The market price for crude oil, essentially determined by a host of factors from
supply and demand to geopolitical tensions to the action of OPEC and of the futures
market speculators whose positions can exacerbate any price move, has averaged well
over $30/bbl for the past two years, with spikes of well above $50/bbl. 
The price of refined products also contains a tax component, making the cost to con-
sumers much higher than for crude oil. Some products, notably aviation fuel, are not
taxed, but most motor gasoline is taxed, often very heavily. The price of gasoline at the
pump in Western Europe, where it is heavily taxed, can be as much as $180 a barrel. In
the UK at the end of March 2004, the price of oil at the petrol pump ranged from 76 to 82
pence a liter, with 82 pence being the equivalent of $4.65 a U.S. gallon or $195 a barrel! 
Even if one were to try to calculate an average retail price for all the barrels of oil
sold in various forms around the world, the price might reasonably be expected to be
more than twice that of the daily price for crude on the open market. And the actual
physical cost of producing oil may be as little as 15 percent—and often much less than
that—of the average price paid by consumers. That means, in extremis, there is a lot of
room for absorbing increased production costs to access ever more complex forms of
oil resources.
Such issues help to explain why the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) postulates that
recoverable resources—the amount of oil we might reasonably anticipate extracting
from the ground—could effectively double the total of global proved reserves currently
listed by BP for the next 30 years. 
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Reserves and resources
Resources are not quite the same as reserves. They are defined as “reserves plus all the
accumulations of a fossil energy source [such as oil, natural gas, or coal] that may even-
tually become available.” To the politician worrying about energy security or to the
layman fretting over whether the world will run out of oil, a reasoned resource analy-
sis is probably more relevant than a simple reserve estimate.
At its simplest, the USGS, in a reassessment published in 2000, listed “mean
remaining reserves”—essentially the reserves we already know we have—at 859 billion
barrels, a level somewhat lower than BP’s figure of 1.047 trillion barrels for proved
reserves. But to this figure, the USGS added 612 billion barrels of what it termed “mean
conventional reserve growth”—essentially an increase from existing fields due to
improved oil recovery techniques. It also added some 649 billion barrels in what it termed
“mean undiscovered conventional reserves”—oil expected to come from new discoveries. 
These three categories of reserves amount to a putative global resource base of
2.12 trillion barrels, but even this total is not final. For one thing, the USGS figures
exclude the United States. In 1995, the USGS estimated U.S. “technically recoverable
resources” of crude oil to be 165 billion barrels. In addition, the 2000 study puts exist-
ing LNG reserves at 68 billion barrels, conventional reserve growth at 42 billion barrels,
and undiscovered resources at 207 billion barrels. These four elements add up to a fur-
ther 482 billion barrels. 
If all the USGS forecasts turn out to be accurate, the reserve base available to the
world between now and 2030 will not be the current conventional estimate of around
1 trillion barrels, but no less than 2.602 trillion barrels, or 355 billion metric tons. 
The consumption issue
How long it might take the world to use up this volume of available oil, or to find a
cheaper or more environmentally friendly substitute, depends on how fast we consume
it. The BP Statistical Review’s global proven reserve figure of 1.048 trillion barrels
equates to about 143 billion metric tons of oil. Current usage of oil—taking 2002 usage
of 75.7 million barrels a day or 3.52 billion metric tons for the year—yields a standard
reserve-to-production (R/P) figure of 40.6 years. Using the mainstream assessments
contained in BP’s Statistical Review, we have enough oil to last us for 40 years—so long
as we confine ourselves to current levels of use.
Global oil consumption, however, is set to grow, with serious projections from
the U.S. Energy Department’s Energy Information Administration that it could reach as
much as 117 million b/d by 2025. 
Purely as a hypothetical example, one could say that average consumption
between now and 2030, the time frame in the USGS report, might entail an average
annual use of around 100 million b/d or 4.65 billion mt/y. If reserves remain
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unchanged, the oil would then run out in around 30 years. But if the USGS resource
estimates were to be converted into reserves, we would have enough oil to last us for
76 years. 
Admittedly, predicting long-term energy trends does not have a very good track
record. A 1972 report by the Club of Rome entitled Limits to Growth predicted that if oil
continued to be consumed at the same rate as in 1972, and there were to be no increase
in reserves in the meantime, then the world’s oil resources would be depleted by 2003!
Even in the report’s best-case scenario, with reserves growing five-fold, the Club of
Rome expected all the world’s oil resources to be consumed by 2022. Fortunately, the
forecast was off the mark, though the Club of Rome’s arguments may well have helped
jumpstart the drive to curb waste—certainly we have become more efficient in our use
of energy over the last 30 years. But perhaps its most lasting legacy may yet prove to be
a change in the way we think about energy resources in general and oil in particular. 
Traditional assumptions of energy production tend to assume there is a finite
supply of energy that is measurable. But fitting these calculations into a time frame is
extremely complicated because of technological improvements. To use the image con-
jured up by Peter McCabe of the USGS, we might be better off looking at resources as
a pyramid buried underground. How much of the pyramid is above ground and meas-
urable varies over time. As we improve our technology, more of the pyramid is revealed.
This does not necessarily mean that resources are infinite, merely that there are limits
to our abilities to measure those resources. 
The bottom line is that the world possesses much more oil than we generally
think it does. But how much of this oil will be produced will very much depend both
on consumption patterns and on how much the world is willing to pay to extract oil that
exists but cannot yet be classified as proven reserves. 
How oil is used 
Oil’s future role depends on how it is used. In this regard, the United States is in a
league of its own. In rough terms, the world’s 6.4 billion people use, on average, just
over one-third of a metric ton of oil each year (around 0.36 mtoe in 2002). Apart from
the United States, the world’s major industrialized countries use around 10 times this
global average. The United States uses more than 20 times the global average. This
means that even though the United States is one of the world’s largest oil producers, it
is also by far the world’s largest consumer and the world’s leading importer, shipping
in more than half of the oil it consumes daily.
America’s huge oil consumption and its dependence on imported oil have pro-
found consequences in several directions. It makes the United States responsible for a
disproportionate amount of pollution caused by energy in general and oil in particular.
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In political terms, it gives rise to U.S. fears of energy insecurity, which has resulted in
a strange symbiosis between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil
exporter. 
The bulk of the world’s oil, consumed by the industrialized countries, is broken
down into three broad categories: fuel oil for power plants, middle distillates produced
during the refining process for transportation, and jet fuel and aviation kerosene for 
aircraft.
There are three types of major consumers: industrial, residential, and trans-
portation. 
In 2000, industry accounted for 1.2 billion metric tons of oil equivalent (btoe) of
total energy consumption in the various member countries of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), essentially the industrialized world.
Of this amount, oil accounted for some 38 percent, or around 460 mtoe. During this
time, natural gas, particularly in Japan and South Korea, contributed to a steady down-
wards trend in the use of oil for electricity generation. 
Oil also accounted for around 22 percent of residential energy use in 2000. With
the actual level of residential oil consumption totalling around 260 mtoe in both 1990
and 2000, there are indications that this market may have peaked. 
The biggest use for oil is in transportation. In 2000, the OECD member states
burned up 1.22 btoe to keep their cars, trucks, planes, and ships on the go, with oil satis-
fying some 97 percent of this demand. Gas accounted for just 2 percent and electricity
for 1 percent. OECD North America—the United States, Canada, and Mexico—account-
ed for 56 percent of total OECD transportation demand, followed by OECD Europe (30
percent) and OECD Pacific (13 percent). The United States used disproportionately more
oil to fuel disproportionately more transportation than other industrialized countries.
One possible pointer to the future, however, was that natural gas penetrated the transport
market at 3.3 percent in North America against just 0.2 percent elsewhere. But while elec-
tricity accounted for 1.8 percent of the OECD Europe market and for 1.5 percent in OECD
Pacific, it supplied just 0.1 percent of the OECD North America market. 
The world’s reliance on oil for transportation is likely to continue for some years.
While hybrid vehicles, that use a combination of oil and electricity, are being developed
to improve fuel efficiency, the real challenge is coming up with a replacement for the
internal combustion engine. Fuel cell vehicles have already been developed but mass
use of fuel cells in cars is probably still at least some 10-15 years away. Moreover, how
the fuel cells will themselves be fuelled remains in doubt. Hydrogen may well become
the fuel cell standard, but it should be noted that most current production of hydrogen
itself requires extensive natural gas consumption. Even were the United States and the
rest of the industrialized world to move swiftly—not least for environmental reasons—
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into a world of fuel cell transportation, one could be mistaken in thinking that the bur-
geoning new automotive markets of India or China would follow the same course. 
What Are the Security Implications 
of Reliance on Oil?
The security implications of reliance on oil depend very much on whether one is look-
ing at this issue from the perspective of the producer or the consumer. 
Producer state security issues
For many producers, continued global reliance on oil is a good thing because oil is the
main moneymaker for the government. This particularly holds true for most of OPEC,
notably Saudi Arabia, Libya, Nigeria, and Venezuela. But it also holds true of leading
non-OPEC oil producers such as Oman, Brunei, Yemen, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan.
Some OPEC states have a lesser reliance on pure crude oil revenues, either
because they have successfully diversified into gas (Qatar and Algeria) or because they
have set aside considerable past oil profits that now generate funds for possible use in
general national development (the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait). Some major
producers, such as Iran, already possess quite diversified economies. For them, oil rev-
enues remain a leading source of government finance but oil itself is but one of a
number of economic drivers. 
It is commonly asserted that the governments of oil-producing states (whether in
OPEC or not) have an interest in maximizing their oil revenues. But there is consider-
able debate as to whether this goal is best achieved by maximizing current income or
by developing policies that might maximize incomes over a period of one or two
decades, rather than a year or two. 
By and large, most producers tend to operate on a relatively short-term horizon.
Getting enough oil revenue to meet this year’s budget requirements without damaging
next year’s prospects has always been their most important consideration. The two
great oil price shocks of the 1970s, however, may have changed their thinking. The first
great oil price shock resulted after Arab oil producers (rather than OPEC as a whole) ini-
tiated an embargo on oil sales to the United States and the Netherlands because these
countries were perceived to be helping Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The second
was after the 1979 Iranian revolution.
Since the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the idea that oil producers might use oil as a
political weapon has naturally remained a subject of considerable interest. Several
recent trends have profoundly altered the situation. First, the producer states them-
selves (with the exception of Abu Dhabi, which has never exhibited radical tendencies)
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have seen once-considerable financial reserves shrink so low that they would only cover
routine government expenditures for a few months. Second, their own populations
have grown considerably, so that more cash is needed to pay for basic services and
extensive government payrolls. Third, oil prices (even though they may seem high in
nominal price terms) stand in real terms today at well under their peak levels in the late
1970s and early 1980s because of inflation and currency fluctuations. Fourth, almost
all the leading oil consuming countries have built strategic stockpiles to help counter
the consequences of any short-term supply disruption. 
That does not mean that any oil embargo or other supply disruption would not
result in higher prices. But it does mean that the producer states themselves would suf-
fer considerably. Saddam Hussein’s unilateral oil export embargo in April 2002 was
easily offset by higher supplies from other producers, leaving only Iraq to suffer the
consequences. No matter who is in charge, the producer states need their oil revenues
to meet the day-to-day costs of government. As a result of their own reliance on oil,
these governments must remain on good terms with consumers in order to be assured
of continued markets for their oil. Today, OPEC and the IEA, the Paris-based energy watch-
dog for the big oil consumers in the OECD, have a much better working relationship.
Consumer state security issues
For consumer states, there is a similar economic issue—and also a military considera-
tion. In overall economic terms, oil plays a considerable role in consumer states, but it
is not the sole pillar of their economies. 
A prolonged supply disruption might cause price spikes, but most industrialized
countries have to a degree inoculated themselves against such increases by their own
imposition of high energy taxes. With the price of oil paid to producers so much lower
than the price paid by consumers, the impact on the consumers would depend on
whether the government increases taxes to keep up with the price hikes or decides to
forego some of its take. 
Where a supply shortage could really hurt is in the military’s use of oil. The mil-
itary, which runs very much on oil, is only at the start of a long process to see whether
other fuels, such as compressed natural gas, can be harnessed to keep its tanks and
trucks on the road. Though its warships can use nuclear-powered engines, its war-
planes require oil-derived fuels. Preventing or combating supply disruptions remains
as crucial today as it was during World War II.
Given their common dependence on oil—whether as a key fuel or as a key rev-
enue-earner—the governments of producer and consumer countries conduct a regular
and fairly extensive dialogue. Relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States
have been strained by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, in which a number of
Saudi individuals played key roles, and by conflicting views on the Israeli-Palestinian
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conflict. Yet Washington has praised the Saudi authorities for the kingdom’s role in
expanding oil supplies to counter actual or feared oil supply shortages during such
crises as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990–91 and the unsettled situation in the
lead-up to the Iraq war, when Venezuelan production crashed in late 2002 and early
2003 as a result of a politically inspired oil workers’ strike.
In June 2004, Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi convinced his fellow OPEC ministers
to boost the group’s collective production ceiling by as much as 2.5 million b/d to cool
off runaway crude prices that threatened to derail global economic expansion.
What Are the Environmental Consequences 
of Oil Reliance?
Oil affects the environment in two main ways. It contributes to carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions; the increase in human-generated CO2 emissions is generally regarded as a
principal cause of global warming. Oil also contributes to general pollution, including
acid rain, urban smog, marine pollution, reduced biodiversity, and the degeneration of
various ecosystems. 
The development of petroleum resources also affects the landscape, agricultural
patterns, and tourism. In sum, petroleum development and use affects a broad range of
human health and activity. Energy use in general and petroleum use in particular con-
tribute significantly to broad-based economic development with positive consequences
for human health and happiness; but energy and oil also contribute to forms of pollution
that lead to ill health, local environmental degradation, and, through global warming,
potentially severe consequences for development in much or most of the world. 
The CO2 issue can be seen in two parts. The first is the global warming issue; the
second is the highly uneven distribution of fuel-induced CO2 emissions around the
world. As of early 2004, there are few scientific organizations around the world that
continue to doubt the conclusions of the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (which itself embraces the ideas of some 2,500 scientists) that a link
exists between CO2 increases in the atmosphere and changing weather conditions. 
Even a large number of companies, including such giants as BP and Shell, argue
that either global warming should be accepted as a reality or, on the precautionary prin-
ciple, action should be taken to reduce CO2 emissions. 
The conclusion that mankind was contributing to global warming by means of
CO2 emissions fuelling a greenhouse effect was the driving force behind the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997. This pact is intended, by 2010, to provide the world with a workable
program for fulfilling the goal set by the United Nations Framework Convention on
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Climate Change, namely, cutting global CO2 emissions by 7 percent from their 1990
levels. 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol remains the focus of the world’s efforts to
combat global warming. However, these efforts remain severely hampered by the
refusal of the United States to ratify the protocol. In 2001, the Bush administration
withdrew the United States from participation in the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that it
would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy while exempting such major population
centers as India and China. 
The U.S. responsibility for such a large proportion of global CO2 output remains
a source of considerable controversy, not least because the Bush administration’s focus
on exemptions secured by China and India glossed over the relative contributions of
these two countries. Between them, India and China reduced their output of CO2 by 10
percent between 1995 and 1999, while the United States increased its consumption by
more than 6 percent. 
There are ways in which the United States could take action. One would be to
increase taxes on gasoline. That would help reduce U.S. automobile use and start to
redress the imbalance whereby the United States, with just 4 percent of the world’s pop-
ulation, is responsible for more than 20 percent of global emissions. 
On the issue of gasoline taxes, the United States lags significantly behind its col-
leagues in the industrialized world (Table 5). Even Turkey, with a per capita GDP of just
$2,605 or less than one-thirteenth of the U.S. per capita GDP of $35,895 (using 2002
comparisons), considers its consumers able to pay gasoline taxes two-and-a-half times
TABLE 5
Tax Component of Unleaded Gasoline, FOURTH QUARTER 2001 
(as a percentage of final price to consumers)
Mexico 13
USA 26.5
Switzerland 64.9
Hungary 65.4
Turkey 68.9
Netherlands 72.6
Norway 75
France 75.3
Germany 76.2
UK 78.9
Source: Energy Policies 2002, IEA Paris 2002
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higher than gas taxes in United States. And Turkey’s rural population is scarcely less
reliant on the automobile to cover vast distances than its U.S. counterpart.
While one can argue that increasing taxes would necessarily entail political con-
sequences, the question remains whether it is necessary to impose increased taxes on
fuel use to stave off even more severe environmental consequences or whether the
United States might seek to improve its dire record in regard to carbon emissions by
resorting to some alternative approach, such as tougher regulation of fuel emissions. 
Conclusion: The Price of Oil
Oil remains important for development in general and vital for transportation. In time,
this should change, but that day is probably still decades away. There is enough oil to
meet current requirements, but at a cost. That cost is generally reckoned in cash. While
there is a common perception that the U.S. consumer cannot bear much increase in oil
costs, the rest of the industrialized world, which consumes far more oil than the United
States but with greater fuel efficiency, has found its consumers can bear much higher
costs for this vital product. Moreover, current costs remain highly relative. Even with the
oil price hitting record levels of $50/bbl—in terms of nominal U.S. dollars—in October
2004, the true price (adjusted for inflation) was just 60 percent of the oil price peaks of
1980–81. Moreover, with U.S. incomes also rising substantially in the last quarter cen-
tury, the amount a household has had to spend on gasoline has shrunk massively.
Whether the United States, or consumers anywhere else, will be able to rely on
relatively cheap oil for the next few years, or decades, will depend on all sorts of factors,
including the state of the world’s economy and its vulnerability to acts of political or
economic terrorism. But there is no need to fear a shortage of oil. There may, however,
be a need to fear the environmental consequences of using too much oil between now
and the arrival of a post-oil era.
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4. Oil Companies 
and the International 
Oil Market
Katherine Stephan
Twenty-first century oil companies are quite different from John D. Rockefeller’s
Standard Oil Company, which dominated the industry in the 19th century. Today, state
oil companies such as Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and China’s Petrochina are in the top
ranks of the world’s biggest oil companies. The major U.S. and European private oil
companies, while declining in number, have kept competitive through a series of high-
stakes mergers that began in the late 1990s.
This chapter will describe these state and private oil companies and the structure
of the international oil market, and it will explain how oil is bought and sold in the
international market. It will also discuss the growing trend among oil and gas compa-
nies to invest in establishing their reputations for corporate responsibility.
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Changes in the International 
Oil Industry
Through much of the last century, the petroleum industry was dominated by the Seven
Sisters, a group of three international oil companies—Exxon, BP, and Royal
Dutch/Shell—and four American companies that had acquired substantial oil reserves
in the Middle East—Chevron, Texaco, Gulf, and Mobil. Most were created from the U.S.
Supreme Court–ordered dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911.
These companies were called “majors” because each was large enough to influ-
ence international oil supplies and prices, operated in more than one country, and were
active in virtually every stage of the oil production process—from crude oil exploration
to refining and distribution.
Today, the structure of the petroleum industry has changed, due in large part to
wild swings in world oil prices and increased competition from smaller independents
and giant national oil companies (NOCs). Another major reason for the restructuring
was the poor stock market performance of the industry and the need to grow. Organic
growth by discovering new oil fields became more difficult and risky so acquisitions
became the way forward. Natural resources were increasingly controlled by the NOCs,
a new emerging force. The sector saw several mergers in the late 1990s though 2002
that broke apart the Seven Sisters and reduced them to five integrated “supermajors,”
known today as the Big Five. 
The size of these companies can be measured in two fundamental ways. The first
is by looking at market capitalization, or market value. This tells us what investors
believe a company is worth and therefore the economic clout the company wields.
Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the number of outstanding shares of
a company by the current market price of one share.
The second way is to look at reserves. Oil companies that are publicly traded in
the United States must file a report each year with the U.S. Securities Exchange
Commission, the regulatory body for the securities industry. This report outlines to
shareholders how much oil and natural gas the companies are confident they can devel-
op and produce. 
Reserve classifications made front-page news in 2004 when Royal Dutch/Shell
admitted it had overestimated its proved reserves. The admission called into question
the reserve reporting practices of the industry although no other big companies fol-
lowed Shell in re-stating their own reserves.
There are two main reserve classifications: proved and probable. Proved reserves
are volumes of oil that can be recovered with “reasonable certainty” from known reser-
voirs under current economic conditions, operating methods, and government
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regulations, according to the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE). The SPE has spec-
ified a 90 percent confidence level for proved reserves. Proved reserves can be
described as developed or undeveloped. All companies trading on the New York Stock
Exchange are required to report proved oil and gas reserves in their SEC filings.
Probable reserves are those unproved reserves that are more likely than not to be
recoverable. The SPE notes there should be at least a 50 percent probability that the
quantities recovered will equal or exceed the sum of estimated proved plus probable
reserves.
A third category of possible reserves are those unproved reserves that analysis
suggests are less likely to be recoverable than probable reserves. 
Investors look at reserves estimates to gauge an oil company’s future value. How
a company accounts for these reserves must be in line with SEC guidelines. Below is a
glimpse of the five biggest public companies based on factors such as market capital-
ization, net income for 2003, and 2003 production. (Note: Barrels of oil equivalent per
day or boe/d is a term used to standardize natural gas production with oil production,
so companies can refer to one figure rather than two.) 
Major Oil Companies 
ExxonMobil: ExxonMobil is the world’s largest publicly listed oil company, the result of
an $80 billion merger between Exxon and Mobil of the United States in 1999. The
company has the largest energy resource base of any non-NOC. Its massive scope of
operations—from oil exploration and production to refining and marketing to petro-
chemical manufacturing— allows it unique access to investment opportunities all over
the world. Its downstream (retail and refining) business requires much more oil than
the company itself is capable of producing. This fact makes it, and the other superma-
jors, net buyers of crude oil in the market.
Market capitalization, November 2004: $316.5 billion
Net income for 2003: $21.5 billion, up 87.7% year on year 
2003 production: an estimated 4.2 million boe/d in 2003, down 1% year-
on-year.1 Like with some other oil companies, production growth has
fallen short of market expectations.
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BP: BP started merger activity by picking up U.S.-based Amoco in 1998 and Arco in
1999. In 2003, BP took a plunge into the Russian market, agreeing to pay $6.8 billion
for a 50 percent stake in TNK-BP, a newly created major that combined the Russian
assets of TNK, Sidanco, and BP.
Market capitalization, November 2004: $215.3 billion
Net income for 2003: $10.3 billion, up 50% year-on-year
2003 production: 3.6 million boe/d, up 3% year-on-year. Output is expect-
ed to grow another 22% in 2004, with TNK-BP contributing an additional
500,000 boe/d.2
Royal Dutch/Shell: Royal Dutch/Shell is an amalgamation of two companies: Royal
Dutch Petroleum of the Netherlands and Shell Transport and Trading of the UK.
Although it operates like one company, its stock ownership structure is not the same
as that of, for example, ExxonMobil. This Anglo-Dutch giant is the world’s third largest
publicly traded oil company by market value. It shocked investors in 2004 when it
announced it had overstated its proved petroleum reserves and would cut 3.9 billion
boe from its base. The company also admitted it had been inflating its reserve base
since 1996, news that forced Chairman Sir Philip Watts to resign. The major has been
less successful at replacing its reserves and has the lowest reserve life of the Big Five. 
Market capitalization, November 2004: combined $108.5 billion 
Net income for 2003: $12.5 billion, up 32.7% year-on-year 
2003 production: 3.9 million boe/d, down 2% year-on-year 3
Total: Known today as Total, the company was created through two mergers: the first
between France’s Total and Belgium’s Petrofina, which created Totalfina; the second in
March 2000 between Totalfina and France’s Elf Aquitaine. Growth has been a key fea-
ture of the company’s strategy. Unlike many of its peers, it met its 2003 stated volume
expectations and predicts production growth through 2005. 
Market capitalization, November 2004: $127.5 billion
Net income for 2003: $8.8 billion, up 41% year-on-year 
2003 production: 2.53 million boe/d, up 4% year-on-year 4
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ChevronTexaco: Chevron merged with Texaco to create the second largest U.S. major
based on market capitalization and proved reserves of 12 billion boe. It is the world’s
fourth-largest major based on oil reserves and production of 2.5 million boe/d. The
company has not given any firm production growth estimates but sees flat production
through 2005. (In May 2005, the company shortened its name to Chevron.) 
Market capitalization, November 2004: $112.1 billion
Net income for 2003: $7.2 billion, up 539% year-on-year
2003 production: 2.5 million boe/d in 2003, down 3% year-on-year 5
Aside from the Big Five, ConocoPhillips ranks sixth. The 2002 merger of Conoco and
Phillips Petroleum created the third largest U.S. major and world’s sixth largest com-
pany in terms of reserves.
Market capitalization, November 2004: $57.7 billion
Net income for 2003: $7.8 billion, up 83.7% year-on-year 6
2003 production: 1.6 million boe/d, up 49% year-on-year 7
Oil and gas production has been declining. Production in 2004 is expect-
ed to be flat.
Additionally, new Russian companies such as Lukoil, Yukos, and Sibneft have
emerged as a significant counterweight to the Big Five. Though these companies are
comparatively undervalued, they have large reserves and sizable production levels.
They are privately owned or partly privatized. Russia exported 49.19 million metric
tons (4 million b/d) of crude to the West in the first quarter of 2004, up 18.1 percent
year-on-year.
But the Kremlin began in late 2003 to put pressure on Yukos and to a lesser
extent Sibneft, two companies that sprouted out of the Russian privatization process of
the 1990s. The Kremlin’s actions threaten the growth of these companies. An attempt
to temper bankruptcy pressures and cover back taxes resulted in the December sale of
Yuganskneftgaz, the unit that produced 60 percent of Yukos’s output. Nevetheless, the
assault on Yukos has been widely blamed for Russia’s recent economic slowdown.
Building Reserves
The key challenge for these titans in the coming decade will be replacing their reserves
in order to maintain output levels and meet world demand for oil, estimated by the
International Energy Agency to grow nearly 2 million b/d in 2004, the highest year-on-
year rise since 1988. Companies can either find and develop reserves independently, or
acquire those already discovered by others through mergers and acquisitions. 
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Securing reserves is a tricky task in countries that guard their resources closely
and are reluctant to cede control. However, the number of countries that have opened
their doors to foreign exploration grew considerably in the 1990s, and most countries
are now open to some degree. But access to the oil and gas wealth of the Middle East
Gulf, which has most of the world’s oil reserves, is limited.
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, allows outside development of gas
reserves, but only Saudi Aramco, the state oil company, has access to the kingdom’s 261
billion barrels of proven reserves, the world’s largest. Though foreign investors are
obviously attracted to the kingdom’s vast reserves, Saudi Arabia had problems finaliz-
ing contracts for its gas initiative two years ago. The June 2003 collapse of the $25
billion ExxonMobil-led consortia to develop two of the core ventures in the gas initia-
tive led to a watered-down version.8 ExxonMobil and all other U.S. companies are
absent from the deals because the companies and the government could not reach
agreement over rates of return and access to gas reserves.
In non-OPEC Mexico, a strong resource nationalism prohibits direct ownership of
upstream assets, much to the chagrin of President Vicente Fox, a free market supporter
who has been frustrated in his attempts to allow foreign investment in the country’s oil
and gas assets to expand production capacity. Five multiple service contracts (MSCs)
awarded in late 2003 effectively opened Mexico’s gas sector, while preserving the legali-
ties of state control. The MSCs were supposed to raise production and attract $8 billion
in investment from firms signing production contracts with Mexico’s state oil company
Pemex. But two of the largest oil blocks went unclaimed in the first round of negotia-
tions because of concerns about the restrictive contracts and narrow margins. 
Nevertheless, Pemex will enjoy an increase in production, albeit smaller than
originally envisioned. Carlos Morales, head of Pemex’s exploration and production
business, while admitting that the MSCs need refining, feels that 2005 will be the year
of construction and 2006 the year of production.
National Oil Companies 
As Saudi and Mexican examples show, despite all the efforts oil majors make to gain
and maintain clout, it is often the government, through the NOC, which has ultimate
control of a country’s natural resource base. The exploration, refining, and sale of oil in
many countries remain firmly in state hands. 
Often the NOC is regarded as a symbol of national sovereignty and is the single
most important contributor to a government’s budget. Government officials often try
to maximize the revenue from the NOC to offset political pressures. As a result, the
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NOC is unable to retain enough of its earnings to finance needed investments, despite
the fact that it controls the reserve base. In Nigeria, for example, more than 80 percent
of government revenue is derived from the sale of crude oil. 
The strategies of the NOCs vary depending on the role they play within a country
and the relationship they have with the government. A growing number of them are
now focused on achieving commercial performance, but have struggled to stay at the
forefront of technological change. In recent years, NOCs increasingly have courted
independent companies, as well as their investment capital and technology, in order to
upgrade and increase access to export markets. 
Some of their efforts have paid off. In its ranking of the world’s 50 largest listed
energy companies by market capitalization, Washington, D.C.–based consultant PFC
Energy found that Asian NOCs lead the pack in 2003 returns. Topping the list were PTT
of Thailand, PetroChina, Sinopec of China, and ONGC of India. These companies ben-
efited from high oil prices and regional economic recovery. Brazil’s Petrobras also came
in among the highest. 
Production-sharing Agreements
Often national oil companies have exclusive rights to make concessions in the form of
legally binding contracts with foreign oil companies to explore for and develop portions
of the country’s reserves. These contracts fall under many descriptions, including pro-
duction-sharing agreements (PSAs) and production-sharing contracts (PSCs). Gov-
ernments usually award oil blocks to independent companies through a competitive
bidding process, though often they are negotiated on a one-to-one basis.
Under a PSA, a foreign company, or a consortium of companies, typically finances
the costs of exploration and risks losing its investment if no oil is found. Companies are
rewarded for taking this risk by receiving a share of any oil that is discovered and produced. 
A government can take its reward in several forms. The most common method
is by taking a signature bonus, a payment made up-front by an exploration company
when it agrees to develop an area for oil. Companies pay a signature bonus regardless
of whether they actually find oil. These payments are proportional to the expected value
of the project. They are a common means of providing the government with an imme-
diate benefit while demonstrating a firm commitment by the company. 
If oil is found, a government can take its reward by retaining a portion of the oil
production, receiving taxes on production or profits, or obtaining royalties. 
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Advantages to working with NOCs
Partnering with an NOC is essential for foreign companies wanting access to reserves. 
A modern NOC can do more than copy the profit structure of a major inter-
national oil company. It can have strategic goals that include commercial and
noncommercial operations. It can also have a clear understanding of how to make
trade-offs between these goals. Statoil, which is partially owned by the government of
Norway, has used its hybrid status not only to access reserves in other countries but also
to build relationships between those countries and other foreign firms. 
Challenges to working with NOCs
A lack of transparency may be the biggest challenge to working with NOCs, because the
state companies are often reluctant to provide important financial and operational infor-
mation, making it difficult for foreign firms to assess and evaluate their financial health. 
Problems arise when there is a lack of transparency surrounding a foreign firm’s
payment of legitimate fees and royalties, allowing NOC and government officials the
opportunity to divert funds. Payment disclosure is routine in developed countries. The
very fact that payments are kept confidential in many developing countries raises con-
cerns about the potential for revenue misappropriation. In Angola, for example, more
than $4 billion of state oil revenue was lost between 1997 and 2002, according to a
report by Human Rights Watch.9
Funding can also be an issue. Some NOCs are responsible for funding their share
of the costs, despite the fact that they may not receive government funds to do so, thus
slowing up projects. In other instances, government funds fail to improve perform-
ance. The Nigerian government’s $400 million investment in its Kaduna and Port
Harcourt refineries over the last six years has not significantly improved refining per-
formance, weakening government attempts to privatize the refineries as investors are
put off by the decrepit state of the plants. 
Environmental, social, and human rights violations also present daunting chal-
lenges to investors. (For more on these issues, see chapter 7.) NOCs and international
oil companies alike are often seen as not doing enough to provide for impoverished
local communities affected by their operations. Communities frustrated by the lack of
benefits, and sometimes environmental damage, have turned to violence against the
companies and government. Strong criticism and even action have come from stake-
holders such as managers, employees, suppliers, and local communities. In Nigeria,
ChevronTexaco admits that it has reduced production by about 140,000 b/d because of
local protests and sabotage.10
Production is often hampered by crumbling infrastructure, political winds, and
smuggling. Because many NOCs do not have the money to maintain and upgrade
equipment regularly, oil production is sometimes sporadic. A country’s political climate
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can also affect production flows. In Algeria, for example, legislation that would boost
national oil output was recently sidelined after labor unions protested. The law would
have taken away state-run Sonatrach’s regulatory role and forced it to compete with for-
eign firms in bidding for exploration projects.11 In Venezuela, an oil workers’ strike in
early 2003, aimed at overthrowing President Hugo Chavez’s government, resulted in
the loss of about 10 percent of the country’s production capacity.12
Smuggling generally increases when oil prices are high. Governments often
patrol international waters looking for vessels suspected of carrying contraband. In
Nigeria, the theft of crude oil from vandalized pipelines is common.13
A sound national fuel price policy normally requires the elimination of fuel sub-
sidies, but such a move can, and has, set off domestic revolts. Subsidy schemes and
lack of fuel-price harmonization with other countries can lead to corruption, smug-
gling, and shortages. Fuel smuggling has increased in recent years from Angola into
neighboring African countries, where fuel prices on average are much higher than in
Angola, according to German Technical Cooperation, which surveyed fuel prices in 165
countries using a standardized methodology. The report also showed much of Iran’s
below-cost diesel has been smuggled into Afghanistan, with contraband fuel profits
going to local warlords.14
Bureaucracy presents another hurdle. NOC activities are often controlled by sev-
eral state agencies, making it difficult for them to push through decisions. Many
agencies must have prior approval from the energy ministry or even the country’s ruler
before negotiating or signing contracts.
Reputation and Corporate Responsibility: 
Public-Private Partnerships 
Human rights organizations have long criticized the oil industry for signing agree-
ments with governments that thwart human rights protections. Additional concern
over the negative environmental and social impacts of oil operations has exposed the
vulnerability of companies to being held accountable for their conduct, regardless of
geographic lines. How they handle crises can increase or decrease damage caused to
the company’s reputation, a valuable “soft” asset. 
To stem criticism and protect profits, companies are investing in what have been tra-
ditionally considered noncore business areas. “Sustainable development” and “corporate
responsibility” are popular buzzwords companies use to describe these types of activities. 
For example, Royal Dutch/Shell plans to invest in two sustainable development
projects in Nigeria. The company will donate $15 million to fund agriculture and malar-
ia projects and another $3.4 million to fight malaria and infant mortality. Both projects
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will enlist the help of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Shell
Petroleum Development Company Joint Venture (SPDC JV) has also contributed $54.5
million to President Olusegun Obasanjo’s Niger Delta Development Commission, cre-
ated in 2000 to promote sustainable development in the region.15
BP took the unprecedented step of creating a human rights assessment for its
proposed $2 billion Tangguh liquified natural gas project in Indonesia. Based on the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights framework, the report outlines
concrete steps that BP can take to address local community issues related to funda-
mental land rights, natural resources, cultural rights, and religious rights.16
BP also took a lead in addressing human rights concerns in the $3.6 billion Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, which is to deliver crude oil from the Caspian Sea to
the Mediterranean via Georgia. The line, which authorities in early 2005 reported was
93 percent completed, would allow BP and its consortium members, to ship crude from
the Caspian to Western markets, avoiding shipping bottlenecks at the Bosporus Straits.
Some countries have policies that ensure involvement of local companies in oil
projects. In Nigeria, the government made it mandatory for foreign oil companies par-
ticipating in tenders to include evidence of plans for enhancing local competence and
training local residents to work in the industry. Brazil, Angola, Russia, and Iran also
have made local business development and employment a priority in their dealings
with foreign oil companies. Companies often provide scholarships to educate locals at
Western universities specializing in petroleum engineering and geology.
ChevronTexaco recently sent a team of Iraqi oil engineers to the United States to learn
the latest technological advances.
International agreements and evolving legislation on corruption have also
changed the ways companies do business, although they have a less direct impact on
corporate behavior than national laws and regulations. The United Nations Global
Compact is a voluntary program that brings companies together with governments,
labor, and environmental organizations to encourage good corporate citizenship. The
initiative is based on nine principles in the areas of human rights, labor, and the envi-
ronment. The group agreed in January 2004 to add a tenth principle based on
transparency and anticorruption. While Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and other NGOs initially welcomed the global compact, they now question its effective-
ness because the pact is voluntary, its standards are unclear, and no monitoring or
enforcement process exists.17 
An early proponent of greater transparency, economic growth, and social equity
while also protecting the environment was former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro
Harlem Brundtland, who in 1983 chaired the UN’s World Commission on Environment
and Development. Also known as the Brundtland Commission, the commission released
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the 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future.18 The report defined sustainable
development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
In the area of human rights, most oil majors today subscribe to the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights to guide their projects. Signed in 2000 by
the United States and British governments, it is a nonbinding agreement that outlines
ways for companies to respect the human rights of local communities and also meet
security threats to their operations.
In the area of revenue transparency, the Publish What You Pay campaign (see
appendix) has gained the most traction among companies and governments alike.
Launched in 2002 by a coalition of NGOs and backed by international financier and
philanthropist George Soros, it is a movement among over 200 international NGOs
that seeks to make public how much energy companies pay to host governments in
order to hold the governments accountable for their use of the funds. The campaign
urges companies to publish all payments as a condition to being listed on internation-
al stock exchanges. The Global Reporting Initiative is an international standard-setting
organization that has developed guidelines for companies to voluntarily report the eco-
nomic, environmental, and social impacts of their operations. The number of oil
companies that call themselves “GRI reporters” has doubled to 20 in the last year.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched by British
Prime Minister Tony Blair at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development,
encourages companies, governments, and NGOs to work together voluntarily to pro-
mote revenue transparency (see appendix on EITI). In May 2003, a group of
institutional investors representing about $3 trillion issued a statement in support of
this initiative. Nigeria, labeled by Transparency International as one of the world’s most
corrupt countries, jumped on the bandwagon early to launch its own transparency pro-
gram. Angola, which initially resisted signing the EITI, in mid-May disclosed the $300
million it received from ChevronTexaco to extend an oil production concession and
pledged to sign the EITI “shortly.”19
Markets
British North Sea Brent crude and the U.S. Gulf crude West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
have for years served as the benchmark grades for the sale of the bulk of the world’s oil.
Ironically, though production of both grades has been falling, most of the world’s
largest producers prefer pricing their oil through a differential to these benchmarks
rather than setting their own prices.
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Companies can purchase oil in several ways: under long-term contracts with pro-
ducing countries, on the spot or cash market, or by taking physical delivery of contracts
bought on the main futures market, the New York Mercantile Exchange.
By far the most active market in global oil is Nymex and its smaller London-based
cousin, the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). 
A futures contract allows parties to buy or sell oil at a specified price for delivery
in the future. WTI is among the crudes traded as light, sweet crude futures on Nymex,
which also hosts futures contracts for gasoline, heating oil, and natural gas futures.
Together, these commodities are called the petroleum complex. Brent crude oil, gasoil
(a middle distillate used in home heating), and natural gas futures are traded on the
IPE. As open markets where large numbers of potential buyers and sellers compete for
the best prices, these exchanges effectively discover and establish competitive prices.
Oil-producing countries
Much of the oil traded on the global market is produced by the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although the group’s share of world output is
declining, mainly because of self-imposed production quotas. OPEC is comprised of 11
oil-producing nations that try to use their collective production weight to influence
world oil prices. Current members are: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. 
Russia, Canada, Mexico, and Norway are the largest non-OPEC oil exporters,
while the United States is the third largest producer, after Saudi Arabia and Russia.
OPEC pricing policy
Since March 2000, OPEC has adjusted its production levels to keep prices within its tar-
get range of $22–$28 per barrel for the so-called OPEC basket, the average of seven
different crude grades. But changing circumstances including the weakness of the dol-
lar—the common currency of oil trade—and rising domestic demands for higher
revenues has led OPEC to allow even higher prices. The OPEC basket averaged well
above $30/bbl in 2004, much to the chagrin of consuming nations. Some of OPEC’s
price hawks are advocating an increase in the $22–$28/bbl target price.
Even though crude prices consistently set record highs in 2004, some OPEC oil
ministers are concerned that sending too much crude on the market now will come
back to haunt them. Saudi Arabia boosted its own production some 600,000 b/d to 9.1
million b/d in June 2004 but other OPEC members, mainly due to their own capacity
constraints, did not follow suit.
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Information Sources on Oil Companies
Private Oil Companies
When covering company decisions and strategies, it is helpful to start with the annual
report, which is often available on the company’s website. Alternatively, the company’s
investor/external relations department can mail a copy. 
E In the annual report, you will find a summary of the company’s various businesses
and factors that impact performance. In this summary, companies are required to
talk about any trends that will influence returns to the shareholder. The most
important financial details of the annual report are found in the income statement,
the balance sheet, and the statement of cash flow.
E Outside of the annual report, you can analyze a company’s 10K Form, a more
detailed version of an annual report that a company files with the SEC at the end
of its fiscal year. You can find 10K’s by using the Edgar section of the SEC’s website
(www.sec.gov). 10Q forms are quarterly statements that companies file with the
SEC within 45 days of the end of the quarter. Listed companies will also post
presentations on their websites outlining investment strategies.
E When determining the performance of an oil company, there are various criteria.
For financial comparisons, look at capital expenditure; cash flow; dividends in
relation to cash flow; downstream assets; downstream investment; downstream
revenues; long-term debt in relation to total debt; market capitalization; net
income in relation to revenue; net profit per employee; operating profit; return on
assets; return on equity; shareholder equity in relation to total assets; shareholders
return; share price volatility; total assets; total investment spending; total
revenues; upstream assets; upstream investment and upstream revenues. 
E For upstream comparisons, examine total production and production by region;
reserves; reserves in relation to production; oil output versus total oil and gas
output; crude production in relation to refining capacity and upstream operating
profit per barrel of output.
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E When it comes to downstream comparisons, a number of interesting observations
can be made by looking at growth in refined product sales; market share by region;
number of refineries; percentage of product sales in main area; percentage of total
refining capacity in main area; product sales by region; refining capacity by region;
refining market share by region; retail outlets worldwide; total product sales; and
refinery capacity utilization rates.
E Most oil majors today also issue corporate responsibility or sustainable
development reports that outline the ways they are meeting the environmental and
social concerns of their stakeholders.
National Oil Companies
E Although national oil companies are more difficult to access, most have websites
with contact information.
E Follow-up phone calls can be made to a company’s investor relations department,
analysts at brokerage houses who watch the company, and major shareholders.
Daily, weekly, and monthly analyst reports are often distributed to journalists via
email.
E Request interviews with company executives in charge of downstream or upstream
operations, senior financial officials, or marketing and sales executives.
E Monitor daily production levels and calculate revenues by multiplying export
volumes with average prices. Though official production levels are often not
entirely accurate, or in some cases inaccessible, many energy publications and
international news agencies publish monthly estimates of production figures for
most of the world’s producers. OPEC also provides a monthly report on its own
members’ daily production, based on secondary sources or journalists. 
E You can also find analysis at research institutions and consultancies specializing in
energy, including the Oxford Energy Institute, Royal Institute of International
Affairs and Energy Intelligence, and PFC Energy. Though many charge for their
research, a limited amount of information is available free of charge on their
websites.
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5. The ABCs of Petroleum 
Contracts: License-Concession 
Agreements, Joint Ventures, and
Production-sharing Agreements
Jenik Radon
It is in the interest of natural resource–rich countries to use their resources to obtain
funds for social and economic development. To do so, many governments enter into con-
tracts with foreign companies to develop and sell their oil or gas. Negotiating the right
contract is vital to a government’s efforts to reap the benefits of its natural resources. 
This chapter will focus on the different types of contracts that are standard in the
industry while also addressing the important public interest concerns that are too often
neglected in contract negotiations. By reporting on these issues, the media can help
inform public debate about what kind of contracts are best for their country.
Governments have three options to develop their natural resources: They can create
state companies for exploration, development, and production, as in Saudi Arabia, Mexico,
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Venezuela, Iran, and Oman. They can invite private investors to develop the natural
resources, as in the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, and Canada. Or they can use
a combination of these two systems, as in Indonesia, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. 
Contract terms determine how much a producing nation earns from its natural
resources, and often, whether a government will have the regulatory authority to
enforce environmental, health, and other standards that apply to the contractors. 
A government is expected to use its regulatory power to protect the public inter-
est—to ensure, for example, that oil spills don’t damage public drinking water. Yet a
host government is also expected to create a positive investment climate that promotes
economic and job growth while establishing investment laws and penalties for their
violation. Host governments need to learn how to balance these competing needs. 
Further complicating matters is the fact that as a signatory to any contract, the
government acts like a normal business seeking to maximize its revenues. This places
the government in the awkward situation of having to regulate itself. Governments of
resource-rich developing countries also face the challenge of negotiating with major
oil companies, which have the advantage of employing hundreds of well-skilled legal
representatives.
Another reason to focus on contracts is the opportunities for corruption that exist
in the huge investment costs and vast profits involved in most energy deals. Because nor-
mally so little information is made public about negotiations and contract terms, there is
potential for abuse on both sides of the table. Companies bidding for potentially lucrative
deals have sometimes made illegal payments, often disguised, to government officials or
their representatives to curry favor. It is difficult to determine whether a particular com-
pany was chosen for its competitive bid or competence, or its close relationship with a
government official. If the government official is also the regulator, the opportunity for
corruption is even greater. Criminal investigations involving this kind of corruption have
been pursued in Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere.1
Oil Contracts 
Though contracts can vary widely in their details, all must establish two key issues: how
profits (often called “rents”) are divided between the government and participating
companies and how costs are to be treated. 
What complicates negotiations is the high level of uncertainty caused by incomplete
or even faulty information. Typically, neither the oil company nor the host government
knows with certainty at the time of signing the contract how much it will cost to explore
and develop a field, whether future oil or gas prices will justify that cost, or how much oil
or gas there is in a field. Nine out of ten exploration efforts result in a loss.2
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Companies will seek to protect themselves against possible losses, which drive
up investors’ internal costs. Contract negotiation requires skillful bargaining to find a
reasonable and mutually acceptable balance between the interests of an investor and a
government. Often, host governments turn to international financial and legal experts
to advise them during these negotiations. 
One of the first decisions that governments must make is to select the type of con-
tractual system it will use to establish the terms of the development process: a concession
or license agreement, a joint venture (JV), or a production-sharing agreement (PSA).
Each form of contract has its advantages and disadvantages, especially from a com-
mercial point of view. The details of the contract can vary greatly even between similar
types of contracts. To add to the confusion, the provisions of license-concession agree-
ments and PSAs have also come to resemble each other. Governments and investors
should release the terms of their agreements. If they decline to do so, questions need to
be raised about the need for confidentiality since there is no intrinsic reason why such
agreements should be kept from the public. 
Concession or license agreements 
Concession or license agreements have evolved considerably since their introduction in
the early 1900s as one-sided contracts when many of the resource-rich nations of today
were dependencies, colonies, or protectorates of other states or empires. 
The modern form of such agreements often grants an oil company exclusive rights
to explore, develop, sell, and export oil or minerals extracted from a specified area for a
fixed period of time. Companies compete by offering bids, often coupled with signing
bonuses, for the license to such rights. This type of agreement is quite common through-
out the world and is used in nations as diverse as Kuwait, Sudan, Angola, and Ecuador.
Advantages: The advantages from a developing country’s point of view are substantial.
First, licenses or concessions are more straightforward than other types of agreements,
especially if a public bidding system is used to set basic terms. The degree of profession-
al support and expertise required is often less complex than that needed to negotiate joint
ventures or production-sharing agreements. Yet sound financial advisers are still needed
to structure the concession bidding system. An acceptable and reliable legal infrastruc-
ture, including a judiciary capable of interpreting complex agreements, is also necessary.
With a well-developed legal system, as in most industrialized countries such as the UK,
Norway, and Canada, a license or concession agreement can focus on the commercial
terms without the burden of devising contractual provisions to fill in gaps in the legal sys-
tem of the host country. 
The financial and other terms of the license are set forth in an agreement draft-
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Questions about License or Concession Agreements
If your government has entered into a license or concession agreement, there are a num-
ber of questions you can pose to better understand the situation. Some of these same
questions are also applicable to JVs and PSAs. 
E If the tender terms have not been made public, ask government officials for this
information and also ask why the terms were kept secret. 
E How long is the concession valid? How many companies bid? What has the
successful bidder agreed to pay? Which outside experts advised the government in
designing the concession license?
E How long is the work program and how much has the bidder agreed to invest?
What environmental standards will be adhered to and what agency will police
compliance with these standards? Will any residents be relocated to make way for
the natural resource development? 
E How will the proceeds be shared between the central government and the local
governments? 
Questions for Companies
E How much will be paid for the concession and to whom? Will the terms of the
concession agreement be made public? Will company officials publicly confirm
that they have not paid, in cash or in kind, any government official or his family
or friends for the concession? What are the criteria for choosing local
subcontractors? 
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ed by the host government which should then be published and opened to a bidding
process by competing companies. The successful bidder pays the bidding price—usu-
ally the license fee and/or signing bonus—and these fees are kept by the host
government regardless of whether oil is found and commercial production takes place. 
If commercial production occurs, the host government also earns royalties based
on gross revenue and/or a profit tax based on net income, both of which are based on
the quantity of production and the price at which the production is sold. All financial
risks of development, including the costs of exploration, are absorbed by the success-
ful bidder. In short, there are few serious financial or other drawbacks for the host
government, other than the loss of opportunity or the loss of time if the bidding system
does not attract an acceptable, financially strong, and technically competent bidder.
Disadvantages: The main disadvantage from a developing country’s point of view, as
well as from a bidder’s perspective, is commercial. There is normally a lack of adequate
knowledge about the potential of a concession area because seismic exploration has not
been fully undertaken. The result is that the bidding system is often simply an auction. 
Oil companies have no choice but to take calculated risks about what price to bid
for a license. A company will be cautious in the amount it is prepared to bid since there
is no guarantee the concession will cover the company’s costs and return a profit.
Where knowledge and facts are inadequate, the host government will not maximize its
potential return from an auction system. Since the bidding documents specify a mini-
mum work program—a prescribed period of time within which to make the
corresponding investments or run the risk of forfeiting the license—potential bidders
will naturally be more judicious and conservative in their offers. 
For more information about concessions, refer to Box 1 at the end of this chapter.
Joint ventures
Joint ventures (JVs) defy ready explanation and definition because there is no common-
ly accepted definition or meaning. A JV simply implies that two or more parties wish to
pursue a joint undertaking in some still to be clarified form. A “joint venture can be best
understood by comparing it to a modern-day marriage. . . . There is a courtship period.
. . . Parties to a joint venture need to know and understand each other’s goals, interests
and ways of doing business. Without such understanding, it is impossible to draft a
workable prenuptial agreement (i.e., the joint venture agreements). . . . The low success
rate of modern-day marriage applies equally to corporate joint ventures.”3
Given the open-ended nature of this type of structure, it is not surprising that JVs
are less commonly used as the basic agreement between an oil company and a host
government. Nigeria was an exception: The national oil company favored this format
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until it could no longer meet its share of the JV’s financial commitments. Now, new
agreements in Nigeria are mostly PSAs. 
It is in the nature of the JV that the list of issues to resolve is long. Because a JV
demands that the parties do things jointly, by not resolving material issues prior to
entering into a JV, the parties only postpone a potential disagreement or a stalemate,
especially if a JV is a 50–50 deal. JVs require painstaking negotiations over an extended
period of time to ensure that all matters are thoughtfully addressed and that the parties
agree on how to work with each other.
Advantages: The only advantage of a JV for a government is that it is not alone in the
decision-making and responsibility for a project. It can count on the expertise of a major
oil company. It will also share the profits, on top of any other remuneration like taxes or
royalties.
Joint Venture Characteristics
E Partnership between NOC (National Oil Company) and IOC 
(International Oil Company)
E Risks and costs are shared between NOC and IOC 
E Examples: Nigeria, North West Shelf (Australia), Russia
NOC IOC
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Disadvantages: Sharing has a downside. Risks and costs must also be shared, making the
host government a direct and responsible participant in the natural resource extraction.
Responsibility also brings with it potential liability, including for environmental damage. 
T I P  S H E E T
Questions about Joint Ventures
The mere introduction of the term “JV” should provoke journalists to question govern-
ment and oil company officials. 
E What is the exact purpose of the JV? Is it for exploration, development, and/or
operation? 
E What will each party contribute, e.g., cash, know-how, and/or management? What
will each party receive? What is the responsibility of each party, e.g., operation,
sales, and/or government coordination? 
E How long is the JV to remain in existence? What are the agreements that
constitute the JV—e.g., establishment agreement, which sets forth the JV
governance provisions; operating agreement which sets forth, among other things,
how the oil field operations are to be managed? 
E How is the JV to be terminated or dissolved? Can one party take over the rights of
the other party, and under what circumstances? 
E Why was a joint venture format chosen? The decision to use a JV demands an
explanation, if not a justification, of why the host government has agreed to assume
and accept the sharing of risks, and the consequent financial liabilities. Every term of
a JV is freshly drafted and negotiated; full scrutiny is required of almost every single
provision.
E What is the government receiving in exchange for taking on these extra risks and
liabilities? 
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The main disadvantage is that the JV format is inherently ambiguous. It can com-
plicate and intensify negotiations. A JV offers no natural advantage over any other form
of agreement and will probably require more extended negotiations. In short, a JV will
require much more legal advice from experts in petroleum contracts, which will cost
the government and companies more. In addition, JVs take a long time to negotiate.
Production-sharing agreements 
The production-sharing agreement (PSA) was first used in 1966 in Indonesia. Even
though Indonesia had proclaimed its independence in 1945, foreign oil companies’
activities were still based on the Indische Mijnwet, the mining law of the Dutch colo-
nial period.4 As nationalist sentiment grew, this license concession method was
discredited as a legacy of imperialistic and colonial periods. The government refused to
grant new concessions and introduced the “Indonesian formula,” now widely known
as the PSA, in which the state would retain ownership of the resources and negotiate a
profit-sharing system. At first, foreign companies firmly resisted this change, afraid it
would create a precedent that would affect their concessions elsewhere. However, inde-
pendent companies entered into PSAs and the majors had no choice but to follow.5
PSAs spread globally and are now a common form of doing business, especially in
Central Asia and the Caucasus.6
The PSA recognizes that the ownership of the natural resources rests in the state
but at the same time permits foreign corporations to manage and operate the develop-
ment of the oil field.7
Under a PSA, an oil company carries most financial risks of exploration and devel-
opment. The state also faces some risk. Often the national oil company joins the
consortium as an interest holder in the PSA, contributing some of its profits as “share
capital” to the consortium that is developing the area granted under the PSA. Often the
host government has the cost of its initial contribution “carried” by the other companies.
This carried cost will be repaid to the companies from the host government’s future
profits under the PSA.
If the government does not agree to contribute to the share capital, then the oil
companies will try to negotiate a greater share. The exact split is a result of hard bar-
gaining since there are no scientific determinants of what an appropriate or reasonable
split should be. 
The financial terms of the PSAs are similar to those of the license agreement,
although the differing structures may lead to different commercial results. The host gov-
ernment often earns a signing bonus, although this is regularly waived or traded for a
greater share of future profits. The oil company is first entitled to cost recovery for both
current operating expenses, expenses for materials consumed or used in the year in which
they were acquired, and capital investment—expenditures for assets such as buildings,
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equipment, and computers, which have a longer shelf life. Cost recovery for current expen-
ditures is immediate, in the year in which the expenditure is incurred, and cost recovery
for capital investment is spread over a number of years. There are gray areas, where
accountants can reasonably reach different conclusions as to whether certain items, such
as books and tools, should constitute an operating expense or a capital cost. 
What remains after companies have used annual earnings to repay themselves for
their operating expenses and their capital investment, as depreciated in that year, is then
shared according to the agreed percentage division with the host government.8 The for-
eign company is required to pay taxes on its share, but these are often waived by the host
government and included in the company’s portion of the agreed percentage split. 
PSAs have developed in such a way that today there are many different versions
resembling each other only in the basic concept of sharing. This variation is not sur-
prising as they are a product of intense negotiations and the concerns and interests of
each party naturally differ with the circumstances. 
The complexity of a PSA depends on the soundness of the legal infrastructure of
a state. For example, if a country does not possess basic rules governing petroleum
operations, the issues normally covered by such a law will have to be addressed in the
PSA. In short, the less reliable and/or predictable a state’s legal system the more issues
must be covered and specified within a PSA.
Advantages for a host government: All financial and operational risk rests with the
international oil companies. The host government does not risk losses other than the
PSA Characteristics
E Started in Indonesia in 1960
E Work commitment
E Bonus payment
E Royalties
E Recovery of production costs (Cost Oil)
Profits – Cost Oil = Profit Oil
E Profit oil split between company and host country
E Overall share of the host country depends on bargaining 
E Developing countries now prefer PSAs
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cost of the negotiations (mainly fees paid to advisers). At most, the host government
loses an opportunity but suffers no material loss if an exploration or development proj-
ect fails. Should a project not be pursued in accordance with the terms of an exploration
or development program, a government can still, if the PSA is drafted well, cancel or
terminate the deal or bring in another oil company. A host government has the added
advantage that it shares any potential profits without having to make an investment,
unless it agreed to do so. 
If the PSA is enacted into law, it provides legal security for international oil com-
panies—a novel approach used by Azerbaijan and other former Soviet republics. But
from the point of view of a government, such an approach turns a contract, which is a
flexible instrument that can be changed simply by the parties, into an “inflexible” law,
which can only be amended with the approval of parliament. In many cases, the PSA is
superior to, or trumps, all other present and future laws with respect to the matter
addressed in it. The result is that the government effectively surrenders its right to
adopt new laws and regulations in the public interest if such laws or regulations should
adversely impact any rights of the oil company under the PSA.
Disadvantages for a host government: The theoretical flexibility of the PSA as an all-
in-one document is also a disadvantage. It puts a premium on very professional
negotiations and the government having access to technical, environmental, financial,
commercial, and legal expertise. In structuring the financial provisions, the government
must undertake to assess the reserve potential of the oil fields, even though accurate
information may not be readily available. In fact, a host government often has consid-
erably less data and technical and commercial knowledge than the oil companies. 
Most importantly, if the host government will obtain a significant portion of its
share or compensation directly through profits, the PSA puts the government in con-
Bonuses
E Signature bonus
Paid upon contract signing
E Discovery bonus
Paid upon first discovery
E Production bonus
Paid when production reaches a specified level
E Unpopular with oil companies
E Oil companies prefer higher income taxes
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flict with itself. It has to balance the desire for higher profits with the enforcement of
environmental and other regulations. The cost of environmental compliance cuts into
profits. Also, the lower the amount of a company’s profits, the less taxes it will pay to
the government. However, through the terms of the PSA, the host government is at
least passively a decision maker in the development of the oil fields. 
At the same time, a host government has granted oil companies, through the
PSA, a say in the enforcement of environmental and other standards, when these stan-
dards have been incorporated as contractual provisions. A contractual provision can be
more easily contested, and even violated, than a statute or regulation. The reason is
simple. Breaching the provisions of the PSA, even an environmental provision, is only
a contractual violation. The violating party will normally be required only to rectify the
breach, perhaps even pay damages. Only if a serious or material breach has occurred is
termination of the agreement a possibility. 
Moreover, a breaching party could argue that its breach came as a direct result of the
action or inaction of the other party. A breach of a contractual provision is an extension of
the contract negotiation process, a renegotiation, albeit more acrimonious. By contrast, the
violation of a legal statute is an offense, subject to legislatively approved sanctions and
penalties and even pubic condemnation. A contractual breach is a private affair.
In addition, if a PSA has been enacted into law by a country’s parliament, it lim-
its the flexibility of both parties and any changes require parliamentary approval. As the
PSA is also a contract, ambiguities will have to be mutually settled by the government
and the oil companies. By making the PSA a law, as well as a contract, the government
has in part transferred some of its responsibilities to the oil companies and surren-
dered considerable flexibility.
Furthermore, making contracts into law creates a legal infrastructure of one-off,
exceptional situations; the investment climate of a nation suffers accordingly. By adopt-
ing PSAs into law, Azerbaijan has little possibility of developing a coherent and
comprehensive legal system because the PSAs will remain exceptions to any more gen-
eral or principled laws. In short, the PSA is a form of positive legal discrimination or
favoritism for the oil companies. Other investors, whether in tourism, banking or large-
scale agriculture, will invariably lobby the host government and parliament for similar
special treatment. The net result is legal confusion and a general disrespect for the law. 
The government’s take
Many contracts require companies to pay the host government a signing bonus.
Subsequent bonuses may be contingent on reaching certain stages of exploration or
development. 
Local investment provisions in a contract may actually be quite costly for a host
country because oil companies will request concessions in the PSA for this form of pri-
7 2 C O V E R I N G  O I L
vate subsidization of local industry. Most of the time, it is simpler and more transpar-
ent for a government to use part of its proceeds to train workers or provide commercial
credit for local entrepreneurs.
Since the government is typically the owner of the resource, it is legitimately enti-
tled to keep the major share of the rents. This portion that the government keeps, or
the “government take,” depends on a number of factors, including how risky—finan-
cially, commercially, politically, and environmentally—the investment is for the
companies; the availability of alternative projects for those companies on a world-wide
basis; and the prevailing oil market price at the time of negotiations.
The level of government take can increase with a project’s profitability. Thus,
where the investment is successful, government revenues can increase without nega-
tively impacting incentives to explore and to produce. In practice however, it appears
difficult to design a tax system that adjusts perfectly to the rate of return actually
achieved on investment in a project. 
The rents from a petroleum deposit cannot be determined in advance so a com-
pany will be concerned not only about the overall impact of the tax regime, but also by
the way in which the tax burden will be imposed at different points in the field’s life
(the tax structure).10
In order to understand why the level of government take is what it is, the char-
acteristics of each field must be taken into account: Onshore or offshore? Shallow or
deepwater? The country’s geological history is also important: Large and relatively
mature oil sectors as in Norway? Smaller or newer oil fields as in Azerbaijan? The riski-
er the investment, the greater the share of profit demanded by companies.
Government Take in Onshore and Deep Water Conditions9
(expressed in percentages)
Country Onshore Deep water
Portugal 43.2 39.7
State of Louisiana 69.3 47.2
Thailand 67.0 57.5
Nigeria 84.8 64.2
Malaysia 89.4 68.1
Indonesia 89.8 81.1
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T I P  S H E E T
Questions about Production-sharing Agreements
In addition to some of the questions asked about license agreements, journalists should
ask government officials how the investors were identified and chosen. 
E Was there a competitive bid?
E What types of payments will the government receive? Will there be bonuses?
When will the bonuses be paid and for what amount? 
E What other types of payments will companies make? What are the conditions? Will
the companies be paying taxes, and if so at what rate? Will they pay royalties once
production begins? 
E Are the companies obliged to invest in local communities where they operate, for
example, by building schools or hospitals? Will local laborers be engaged? Will
they be trained? And if the answer is yes, will the government give tax or other
financial concessions for such a commitment? Is this commitment an expense to
be deducted from profit or a one-to-one credit against tax obligations?
E How will profits between a host government and the oil companies be shared?
E How will the costs of environmental damage be treated? Are they a deductible
expense? Are they deductible under all circumstances, including negligent conduct
by the oil companies? Will the oil companies alone be responsible for such costs? 
(If the government shares the cost of environmental damage, and its portion of
the profit is accordingly reduced, lax enforcement of environmental regulation is
often the result.) 
E Ask the government, as well as oil company representatives, to detail local content
contractual requirements. (PSAs often contain provisions requiring a specified
share of materials and supplies be procured from domestic suppliers. The
selection criteria for domestic suppliers should be transparent to ensure that the
system is not vulnerable to bribery or nepotism.)
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E How will income and costs be calculated and shared between the companies and
the government? (What companies include as expenses can have great
consequences on how much the host government earns. In Alaska, legal
challenges against the companies’ accounting practices brought the state an
additional $6 billion in revenue.11)
E What are the rates of depreciation, and how do these compare to depreciation
practices in other countries? How is the price of oil calculated? 
If the PSAs in your country are not public documents, ask the government and company
representatives why they refuse to share this information with the public. (Some coun-
tries, like Azerbaijan, make PSAs publicly available, but only because those PSAs have
been enacted into law and therefore must be published.12 However, most countries keep
these contracts confidential.) 
E If the PSA has been adopted as a law by parliament, does it take precedence over
existing and/or future environmental and safety regulations? What are the
consequences if the country later adopts stricter regulations concerning oil and
gas operations? Are the added costs of compliance for the companies deductible
as expenses or does the government have to compensate the oil companies? 
E Does the contract require companies to pay a penalty for damage to the
environment? (Some natural gas contracts require companies to pay a price for
gas flaring, which contributes to greenhouse gas emissions.)
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Certain Contractual Provisions
The concession or license agreement and the PSA have certain provisions in common
as they focus on the same subject matter albeit from a different perspective. The fol-
lowing sections examine some of the more common provisions. 
Parties. The choice of parties to any agreement should be examined carefully, especial-
ly when the parties are from different nations and when one of the parties is a
government or a public institution. To the extent that a host government is a direct
party to an agreement, it accepts direct responsibility and unlimited liability. But it may
limit its liability by engaging one of its own enterprises as a contractual party. There is
often confusion between those two related—but separate—legal entities where the
state-owned enterprise is perceived as the executive arm of the government. 
For example, a host government may agree to provide sufficient electrical power for
a project and if it fails to do so, it can be held liable. But if the national electric company,
even if wholly owned by the government, agrees to provide the power, then only the elec-
tric company will be liable for failure to perfom, and only its assets can be seized to cover
compensation costs. In general, it is advisable for the government to never serve as a
direct contractual partner in a commercial agreement, although this is not always possi-
ble. In oil deals, national oil companies often serve as intermediaries for the government.
For these and other reasons, a government should separate its commercial activ-
ities from its governmental or regulatory functions. It should not assume contractual
liability for exercising regulatory functions. 
The oil company partners in any deal with a host government will usually create
a subsidiary to serve as party to the agreement. This type of subsidiary will have limit-
ed or no assets of its own, and it will not be able to rely on the financial resources of
the parent company to stand behind its commitments, especially in regard to damages
resulting from environmental pollution. Host governments should require a guarantee
from the ultimate parent company of the subsidiary so that the host government has a
reliable contractual counterparty with the resources to cover potential liabilities.
Accounting Methods. In order to determine profits, there must be a decision on account-
ing methodology. The United States, UK, and France each have their own national
accounting standards, and the International Accounting Standards Board is in the
process of drawing up international accounting principles. Accounting standards leave
room for discretion and interpretation, and can lead to serious disputes.13
Moreover, accounting standards do not have provisions prohibiting any particu-
lar type of expenses. Consequently how certain expenses are to be treated should be
clarified in the contract. 
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Intercompany pricing—what firms with a common owner or common control
charge each other for services and goods—is a particularly difficult issue for which
accounting standards provide only guidance and no definitive resolution. Inter-
company pricing can inflate costs and decrease government compensation. 
Recovery of Costs. Companies’ costs are important for host government revenues
because the taxes that companies pay and the royalties they share with the government
are based on the companies’ profits. How companies account for their costs determines
what profits they report.
There are two types of costs: current operating costs and capital investment costs.
Current costs are expensed in the year in which they are incurred and represent an
immediate deduction from gross income and an immediate reduction in profits.
Capital investment costs are long term and can be depreciated over a set period of time.
From a government’s perspective, the longer the rate of depreciation, the higher its
share of the profits during the time period. A company, on the other hand, will seek to
recover its costs as quickly as possible through a more accelerated depreciation. Thus,
the terms that the companies use for depreciating assets can have a significant impact
on government revenues. 
Whether every expense is valid is a different matter. For example, are bonuses paid
to expatriate employees as compensation for working in the host country a valid expense?
Is the import of a foreign wine for expatriate employees a necessary expense? Should air
travel be limited to economy class? A detailed expense policy is necessary.
Capital investment, whether for drilling rigs and other longer-life or “permanent”
investments, is significant. Since they are useable over an extended period of time, they
should be depreciated or expensed over time. The oil companies prefer to recover these
costs immediately and expense them fully in the year in which they are incurred in
order to lower profits for that year and pay less tax and less profit to the host govern-
ment. If the government allows a rapid depreciation of capital investment, an oil
company has less to lose should it decide to discontinue operations. After all, the com-
pany will already have recovered the majority of its costs.
Taxation or Compensation. The question of how to tax production is an extremely impor-
tant issue as income earned from the production and sale of a natural resource often
accounts for the biggest portion of the government budget. But if the government taxes
too much, it runs the danger of pushing companies out of the country to areas that
offer better terms. 
There are several different types of taxes the government can apply. The first is a
profit tax that can come in the form of a corporate income tax or can be subsumed as
part of the amount the government agrees to take from any profits. Tax inspectors col-
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lect data on production and sales volume data and the price at which the product is
sold, and the inspectors audit company expenses. Oil sold to a company’s subsidiary in
another country may be priced lower or higher than prevailing market prices. In coun-
tries where tax administration is weak, this kind of transfer pricing can create
opportunities for tax evasion.
Another tax often imposed on oil companies is a royalty, or excise tax, which is
normally a percentage of the value of the production, although it can be a set fee based
on volume or quantity. This tax is often imposed on top of other taxes. Governments
like these taxes because they are easy to administer, in contrast to the corporate income
tax, and their collection does not have to wait until the project becomes profitable. On
the other hand, these taxes can be inefficient because they tax production without any
regard to profit. When the project is marginal or not competitively profitable, the roy-
alty or excise tax may discourage further investment. 
Bonuses are another source of revenue that are easy to administer. A host coun-
try can require a one-time payment before the company starts exploration (signature
bonus), or continued fixed payments once production reaches certain levels (produc-
tion bonus). Bonuses are fixed payments and do not take into account the success of
the project or its profitability; they are usually tax deductible. 
Norway designed a sophisticated system that adapts relatively well to the stage of
development of a project, and awards the government a significant share of the oil
rents. The tax rules are based on the ordinary corporation tax (28 percent) and the addi-
tion of a special petroleum tax (50 percent). Both taxes are based on the companies’ net
profits, and all expenses relevant for the activities on the Norwegian continental shelf
are tax deductible. Investments are favored by a high depreciation rate. In addition, an
uplift allowance lets a company deduct 30 percent more than it invests against the spe-
cial tax. For example, if capital expenditure is $100 million, the company can recover
$130 million. Thus, the Norwegian petroleum tax system is favorable for marginally
profitable projects because the uplift allowance will shelter profits from the full effect
of the special petroleum tax.14 But it should be noted that Norway has extensive expe-
rience in managing a natural resource tax system.
Environment. Each government has an obligation to protect its environment. However,
where environmental standards are covered by PSAs and license-concession agreements,
environmental rules and regulations can be ambiguous, giving oil companies the right to
interpret, negotiate, or even veto, albeit indirectly, environmental standards. For example,
the PSA for Azerbaijan’s major oil development project allows the contracting companies
to discharge air emissions “in accordance with generally accepted international petrole-
um industry standards and practices.” The problem is that there are none! 
Moreover, if an environmental standard is simply a contractual provision, then
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companies, together with the government, are also interpreters of that provision and
effectively can exercise a veto. It is standard for an agreement to provide that parties
shall mutually interpret or agree on the meaning of unclear terms, which means the
consent of both parties is required. 
Developing countries, if they are lax on environmental standards and their
enforcement, indirectly subsidize the cost of a commercial commodity by permitting
their environment to be despoiled.
Environmental standards are generally higher in Western countries, but there is
no rational reason why they should be, especially in the oil and gas industry, where the
commodities are in such demand. The problem arises when oil companies, avoiding
the stringent environmental standards in one state, take advantage of more lenient leg-
islation in other countries to discharge, for example, their toxic drilling mud. 
Oil companies prefer to pay a relatively low penalty for noncompliance with envi-
ronmental standards rather than invest in costly pollution monitoring and control.
Fines should be high enough to act as a deterrent. Companies usually have an obliga-
tion to restore the area upon completion of a project. While some countries like
Germany strictly enforce this, other nations employ less stringent requirements. 
Work Program. A work program detailing a company’s exploration or development plan
can be murky, often hiding behind technical and financial considerations, including
how to drill in deep water or earthquake areas. In that regard, questions concerning
how to best protect the natural environment also become an issue, partially because of
the cost of installing the necessary protective equipment. 
Often an oil company will slow down certain projects it deems too expensive,
especially in comparison to other projects that it may be developing in another part of
the world. As such, the host government should insist on a work plan that specifies
clearly the circumstances under which a project could be delayed or even discontinued
and the circumstances under which it may not. 
Stabilization. Stabilization provisions protect oil companies from governmental or leg-
islative changes affecting any contract term and grant them compensation from the
host government for any added costs due to future legislative changes, unless other-
wise agreed. 
Originally, stabilization clauses addressed specific political risks that could affect
the contract. In developing countries, the greatest worry was that the host government
would nationalize the investors’ assets or terminate the contract by unilateral decision. 
In the 1970s, there were several disputes between foreign investors and Libya
following the nationalization of the oil companies’ interests and properties in that
country. The arbitrating court decided that Libya’s unilateral decision to nationalize
C O V E R I N G  O I L 7 9
the oil companies’ interests was a breach of contract that gave rise to liabilities and
required remedy.
A stabilization clause is extremely disadvantageous for the government which
“agrees” to it because it freezes the legal and regulatory situation of the country for an
extended period of time and requires the government to pay compensation if changes
affect an investor. 
The stabilization clause must be closely analyzed from a time perspective: what
does it mean today and what will it mean tomorrow? 
Price. How the market price of oil is determined is critical as it directly impacts the
compensation of the host government, whether in the form of taxes or profit sharing.
The only objective method to calculate the selling price of oil is to start with the price
established by the spot market in the particular region. Platts, an oil pricing service
owned by McGraw Hill, publishes a comprehensive list of commonly traded crude oils
and their daily market prices. Normally, a contract would specify what prices would
serve as a benchmark.
What should never be accepted without question as an acceptable contract price
is the price paid between related companies because that price is determined internal-
ly and will not necessarily reflect market rates.
A related company is not just a company that is partially or wholly owned by the
same company. It can also be a company that has contractual or other ties with the sell-
ing party, relationships that are not necessarily public or obvious. The danger for
governments that tax companies based on what the companies report as the price of oil
sold to subsidiaries is that this price may be well below market rates. Even a marginal
difference in price per barrel, can make a considerable difference overall. 
Termination. A contract needs to address under what circumstances an agreement can
be terminated. Agreements can be terminated, for example, for repeated environmen-
tal violations. Termination should also result if companies are no longer developing the
field. At that point the host government could transfer the contract to another compa-
ny that is still willing to develop the field. 
Outside Experts. In negotiating contracts, developing countries usually must rely on for-
eign experts, including, ironically, some from the international energy companies.
Relying on oil and gas companies for their expertise is inevitable as no number of gov-
ernment officials, even if they had the expertise, can oversee every aspect of natural
resource development. Outside experts must be evaluated, selected, then managed and
directed. A nation’s experts need to be truly independent so they can be true advisers
and advocates. 
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Conclusion
As oil contracts are necessarily complex and can be subject to abuse and corruption,
these contracts, as well as any subcontracts and any regulatory terms, should be fully
disclosed and made public. Only then can the public effectively judge the efficacy and
soundness of these agreements and the decision-making of public servants and gov-
ernment officials. 
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Questions about Contractual Provisions
E What are the provisions under which investors may end production of a field or
refuse to invest more in the development of the field?
E Does the contract contain stabilization clauses that negate new laws and
regulations that affect the oil industry?
E What is the price of oil or gas that will be used to determine taxes or other
compensation owed by oil or gas companies? 
E If there are repeated violations for environmental matters, can or should the
contract be terminated? If yes, what does “repeated” mean? If a contract is
terminated who should own the facilities? 
E If the oil company is no longer developing the field, how is cessation defined?
Does it mean no exploitation for a year, or several years? (There is no model
answer, except the issue must be resolved. And the rationale for the resolution of
that issue should be publicly announced.)
E Who are the outside experts advising the government on contracts? How were
they chosen? What is their experience? What are they being paid and who will pay
them? (And yes, the unthinkable question, are they being paid too little, because
one gets what one pays for!) 
E Have the “independent” experts represented or worked for oil companies in the
past? What fees have they earned from oil companies? Are they willing to agree
not to represent oil companies for an extended period after the engagement with
the government is ended?
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In Ecuador, a stretch of oil-stained
Amazonian jungle region surrounding
Lago Agrio—“Bitter Lake”—has become
the subject of a complex, long-running
legal dispute that has become every bit as
acrid as its name.
In 2003, a team of U.S. lawyers filed a
US$1 billion lawsuit in Ecuador against
ChevronTexaco on behalf of thousands of
indigenous people and other rural inhabi-
tants of the Lago Agrio region. The suit
alleges that TexPet, then a subsidiary of
Texaco (which merged with Chevron in
2001), was responsible for dumping tens
of millions of gallons of toxic wastewater
into the jungle, and must now pay for the
costly clean-up. ChevronTexaco contends
that its efforts fulfilled TexPet’s responsi-
bilities under its agreement with the
Ecuadorian government.
Through a joint partership with the
state oil company PetroEcuador, TexPet
operated the Oriente oil fields surrounding
Lago Agrio from 1972 to 1990. Texaco sold
its stake to PetroEcuador in 1992, and
launched a multi-year, US$40 million
clean up program which was approved by
the Ecuadorian government. Chevron-
Texaco recently undertook its own tests of
various drilling sites in the Lago Agrio
region, which showed that pollution levels
met World Health Organization (WHO)
standards. And that is where Texaco’s legal
responsibility ends, lawyers for the
defense claim.
But the plaintiffs, backed by environ-
mental groups like Amazon Watch, claim
that Lago Agrio remains a disaster area.
Rivers and drinking water are dangerously
contaminated, they contend, and responsi-
ble for unusually high cancer rates in the
region. They call the U.S. oil giant’s recent
tests in the rainforest “junk science.”
Attorneys for Lago Agrio residents ini-
tially filed suit in the United States,
claiming that key decisions leading to the
current pollution problem were made at
Texaco’s headquarters in White Plains,
New York. But in 2002, a judge in New
York pronounced that the case had “every-
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thing to do with Ecuador and nothing to do
with the United States.” The judge dis-
missed the lawsuit in New York, but
ordered the company to submit to the
jurisdiction of Ecuador’s courts. 
Now in Ecuador, the case may take
years to resolve. Further complicating mat-
ters, ChevronTexaco has since filed its own
arbitration claim against the Ecuadorian
government, demanding that the govern-
ment pay all the costs resulting from the
current trial. 
Whatever the outcome of the Lago
Agrio case, it will be momentous—a
unique decision regarding the legal liabili-
ty of multinational corporations, and a hot-
button issue in local Ecuadorian politics. A
ruling against ChevronTexaco could
prompt similar lawsuits in Ecuador, the
United States, or other parts of the world.
It could also adversely affect the perception
of foreign oil companies, at a time when
Ecuador is energetically pursuing their
involvement in the sector. And if
ChevronTexaco wins, it could cause a polit-
ical uproar in Ecuador, where indigenous
groups and their supporters believe that a
greedy foreign corporation colluded with a
callous Ecuadorian government to rape
and pillage their rainforest home.
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1ST GENERATION CONCESSIONS
CHARACTERISTICS
MODERN  CONCESSIONS 
CHARACTERISTICS
BOX 1
Monopoly vs. Competition
E Very large area
E Long concession period
E Exclusivity in exploitation rights 
E Complete control over schedule 
and work program
E No requirement to produce
Concessionnaire’s Profitability vs. State’s Revenues
E Royalty (fixed amount per ton 
or barrel lifted)
E Very modest financial 
compensation
General Facts and Figures
E Oldest of petroleum agreements 
(1901 D’Arcy concession, Persia)
E Resource-rich countries used to hold 
a weak position because of economic 
and technical dependency on 
foreign oil companies
E Hostility towards imperialistic foreign 
investors 
E Today, developing countries still 
skeptical of concessions
E Well-defined area
E Limited period of time: 
- exploration phase (3 to 5 years) 
- production phase (15 to 20 years)
E Relinquishment rules
E Required work program 
E Additional investment requirements
E License bidding
E Higher royalty (graduation, i.e.,
the more oil, the higher the 
percentage; the less oil, the lower
the percentage)
E Substantial income tax 
E Bonuses 
E Annual rent (based on size of area)
E Fairer financial terms
E Gordon Barrows Survey (1995): 62
states out of 116 use the concession
agreement*
E Countries that use the concession
are decreasing in number
E Countries which still use this type of
agreement: Sharjah (United Arab
Emirate), the UK, Norway, Turkey,
Somalia, Trinidad, Australia, and
New Zealand
* Andrei Konoplyanik, “Concessions: from d’Arcy to Kozak,” Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, Volume I, Issue #1,
January 2003. 
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BOX 2
Oil Agreements around the World, 2004
LICENSE,
CONCESSION
≈ 62 countries
Asia and
Australia
Joint petroleum
development
area between
East Timor and
Australia15
Europe
Norway*, 
United
Kingdom*
Middle East
United Arab
Emirates*
North America
United States*
Central and
South America
Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador…
PSA
≈ 52 countries 
Asia and
Australia
China*, India,
Indonesia,
Malaysia,
Myanmar,
Vietnam…
Central Asia and
Caucasus
Azerbaijan,
Albania, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan…
Europe
Malta
Middle East
Qatar, Syria,
Yemen
Africa
Algeria, Angola,
Congo, Côte
d’Ivoire, Egypt,
Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon…
Central and
South America
Guatemala…
PSA 
and LICENSE
Eastern Europe
Russia* 
Middle East
Iraq, Jordan
Africa
Sudan
North America
Canada*
JOINT-VENTURE
and/or PSA
and/or LICENSE 
Central Asia and
Caucasus
Kazakhstan (JV,
PSA, and service
agreements),
Turkmenistan 
(JV and PSA)
Africa
Libya (JV and
PSA), Nigeria*
(JV and PSA)
North America
Canada* (JV to
explore)
OTHERS
Middle East
Kuwait* and
Saudi Arabia*16,
Iran*
(buybacks)17,
Oman
Central & South
America
Mexico* (MSC18),
Venezuela*
(licenses and risk
service contracts)
* Top World Oil Producers, Source: Energy Information Administration 2003.
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6. Protecting Developing
Economies from Price Shocks
Randall Dodd
The fact that resource wealth can hamper economic development is by now well
known. Less well known are the possible policy measures that governments can take to
make oil revenues more stable and to promote economic growth and development.
Briefly restated, the resource curse occurs when a country’s abundance in natu-
ral resources causes a distortion in its economy resulting in its resources being used
less efficiently and leading to lower investment and growth prospects (especially in
manufacturing and other tradable goods sectors). The economic distortion can surface
in the form of corruption, an overvalued exchange rate, excessive foreign borrowing,
unsustainably high wages, and profligate spending by governments. These challenges
are described more fully in chapter 2.
Solving these economic problems will usually require governments to adopt and
maintain good financial management.1 Other policy solutions might entail the use of
special financial institutions and financial instruments. This chapter focuses on these
financial institutions and instruments that can be helpful in managing one of the great
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challenges facing economic development: how to manage the commodity price volatil-
ity in a country that is dependent on revenues from the sale of its natural resources.
The price of oil and gas is highly variable and does not necessarily follow normal
business cycles. This variability creates an economic cost that is borne by the govern-
ment as well as the private sector. It makes planning extremely difficult for
governments when their revenues are highly dependent on natural resource revenue.
Oil Revenue Dependence for Some Major Exporters, 2000
Government hydrocarbon revenue as a percent of total revenue
Angola 90%
Equatorial Guinea 88%
Oman 85%
Nigeria 82%
Saudi Arabia 79%
Source: IMF staff estimates and U.S. Energy Information Administration
Variability in commodity prices makes it difficult to maintain budget discipline.
When resource prices suddenly rise, governments tend to increase spending, and this
can lead to inflation and waste. Even more damaging is when prices suddenly fall.
Governments then face the choice of either cutting spending, raising taxes or finding
some alternative source of revenue, or borrowing. Each has its own risks. Cutting
spending and raising taxes is difficult to do quickly, it creates a contractionary force in
the economy, and it usually falls disproportionately on women and the poor. It can also
lead to political unrest. Borrowing abroad is neither cheap nor easy because it occurs at
a time when the government’s revenues from oil or other resource wealth are low and
its creditworthiness poor. In short, prudent fiscal budgeting under this kind of volatil-
ity is difficult. It requires governments to build their entire budget around an
assumption about the price of oil that could prove entirely wrong.
There are numerous financial institutions and instruments that can reduce gov-
ernments’ exposure to the risk stemming from this price volatility. Financial
institutions such as stabilization or savings funds can act as a reserve to cushion the
budget. Alternatively, hedging instruments such as futures, options, and other deriva-
tives can protect governments by shifting some of the risk to investors willing to bear
it. Reducing risk, however, comes at the cost of giving up some revenues when the
price of oil or gas is unexpectedly high, and governments are not always politically
ready to give up that windfall. 
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Policy Remedies
In his novel East of Eden, the American writer John Steinbeck described the unreliabil-
ity of natural resource wealth generated by farming. He described how the rain would
come in cycles with several wet years followed by several dry years. During the wet
years the land was rich and fertile, and the people grew rich and prosperous. During
the dry years the land was bare and desolate, and the people became poor and often
moved away. He concluded: “And it never failed that during the dry years the people for-
got about the rich years, and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years.
It was always that way.”
But it does not have to be that way. Appropriately designed and implemented
public policies can stabilize the income from resource wealth so as to avoid these types
of problems and promote prosperous—rather than unproductive—behavior. 
Managing the Economic Impacts 
of Price Volatility
Variability in prices for natural resources can come from the opening of new oil fields,
a relaxation of OPEC production quotas, or commercialization of new technologies that
result in a price drop. Conversely, a restriction of OPEC quotas, political unrest in an
oil-exporting country, rising demand for oil, war, terrorism, or nervousness among
traders can all contribute to an increase in the price of oil. 
One of the direct ways that price volatility can act as a curse to developing coun-
tries is through its impact on their government budgets. When the natural resource
price rises, government revenues increase accordingly. Greater revenues from rising
natural resource prices can be used to lower budget deficits, increase spending, or some
of both. When the price falls the opposite happens and larger budget deficits are the
most likely outcome. Unless governments find ways to mitigate this volatility, they are
vulnerable to the “stop and go” pattern of pro-cyclical spending: governments increase
spending when market prices for oil rise and cut spending when oil prices fall.
One immediate result of a sharp drop in resource prices is to reduce the ability
of a developing country to make prompt payments on its foreign debts. In the autumn
of 1998, after the price of oil fell from $21 to $13 a barrel over the previous nine months
(a 38 percent drop), the Russian government declared a moratorium on foreign debt
payments, triggering a financial crisis of global proportion.
Significant price changes can cause other important economic problems. Long-
term plans can be disrupted; governments, businesses, and individuals can be forced
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to curtail spending. This in turn will lead to fluctuations in other spending, invest-
ments, and living standards. 
The table on page 91 provides examples of 10 countries whose Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), export revenue, and government revenues are highly correlated with
changes in the price of the country’s major export commodity (second column). The data
in the table are the correlation coefficients between changes in the international prices
for the commodity, and changes in the countries’ GDP, export earnings, and government
revenue between 1989 and 2002 (export values are converted to U.S. dollars). The data
show how closely these countries’ key economic indicators are tied to international prices,
over which the countries have little control. An additional example is Mexico where oil
accounts for 10 percent of its exports but 40 percent of government revenues.
In order to protect themselves from these fluctuations in the price of their natural
resources, developing country governments can use derivatives instruments to hedge
against adverse price movements. Hedging is a means of sharing the risk of price volatil-
ity with investors. If government budgets are not protected from these price fluctuations,
then the price changes are likely to be transmitted throughout the economy. 
There are numerous ways that governments that rely on natural resource rev-
enues can use hedging techniques to reduce their exposure to changes in the price of
these commodities. The three key techniques are 1) stabilization and savings funds, 2)
commodity bonds, and 3) hedging through the use of derivatives.
1) Stabilizing the Effects of Resource Wealth 
Some of the ways in which natural resource wealth becomes a curse is through its
impact on individual and government spending behavior, and its macroeconomic
impact on exchange rates and international trade competitiveness. For example, a large
inflow of foreign exchange can put upward pressure on the value of a country’s curren-
cy in foreign exchange markets. This leads to a decline in the price competitiveness of
the country’s domestically grown and manufactured goods. The corresponding decline
in the manufacturing and agricultural sector is known as Dutch Disease.
One way to prevent or substantially diminish the harmful effects of a sudden
increase in wealth is by establishing financial institutions that will prudently manage
the newfound wealth over time. Examples of such social trust funds are stabilization
funds and savings funds. 
Stabilization fund
The basic economic lesson for stabilization funds is as old as the Bible. The story of
Joseph describes how Joseph advised the leaders of Egypt to conserve output during a
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period of seven bumper harvests—called the “fat” years—and then to dispense the
inventory during future “lean” years. This inventory management stabilized Egypt’s
income over time and contributed to its peace and prosperity. 
Stabilization funds are designed to accumulate funds when resource prices
exceed a target level and to dispense funds when the price falls below the target level.
In doing so, stabilization funds take income away from current spending when high
commodity prices generate windfall gains, and they make additional income available
when low resource prices would otherwise create budget deficits. Consider the exam-
ple of a government setting its benchmark price at $30 per barrel of oil. When the price
of oil is above $30/barrel, the excess income will be transferred to the stabilization
fund. When the price of oil falls below $30/barrel, the difference will be transferred
from the stabilization fund back to the budget.
In order to be effective, stabilization funds require two types of budgetary protec-
tions. The first is a requirement that surpluses in the stabilization fund not be used as
collateral to increase borrowing and thereby offset the stabilization effect by increasing
deficit spending. Without this requirement, government spending would not be damp-
TABLE 1
Correlations with Major Export Commodity Price
Country Commodity GDP Exports Revenue
Burundi Coffee -0.55 0.44 1.00
Colombia Oil 0.05 0.30 0.62
Ethiopia Coffee 0.44 0.33 0.36
Ghana Cocoa 0.75 0.22 0.72
Kazakhstan Oil 0.65 0.90 0.44
Nicaragua Coffee 0.48 0.40 0.48
Nigeria Oil 0.30 0.66 0.11
Uganda Coffee 0.65 0.52 0.64
Uruguay Beef 0.20 0.00 0.45
Venezuela Oil 0.01 0.71 0.50
— GDP and Revenue in real 1995 local currency values
— Exports in nominal U.S. dollar values
— International Financial Ststistics, 1989-2002
Correlation coefficients measure the degree to which variables move together. A value of one means that the two
variables move perfectly in tandem, negative one means that they move in the exact opposite directions, and
zero means that they move independently of one another. A value such as 0.5 means that half the movement of
one variable can be explained by or associated with a similar movement in the other variable. Thus if prices rise
or fall by 10 percent then budget revenues can be expected to rise or fall by half that rate, or 5 percent.
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ened during a boom period. There is little point in saving money if the government is
simultaneously incurring debt as well as potentially paying interest that exceeds the
returns it is making on its stabilization fund. The interest cost on the new debt would
also put a burden on future income when commodity prices might not be so high. 
The second protection, which is important when prices are depressed, is one that
guarantees the fiduciary integrity of the fund so that it is not raided for short-term rea-
sons. The stabilization fund is designed to pump designated amounts of money into
the government budget when commodity prices fall below their target. But sometimes
governments exert great pressure on fund managers for additional resources. In order
to protect the fund’s savings for future stabilization purposes, it needs to be managed
by leadership that is professional, protected from immediate political pressures, and
ultimately representative of the people served by the fund. One way of doing this is to
have a commission or board appointed by the legislative body to terms of intermediate
length that expire at staggered years in the future.
An example of a successful fund is Chile’s Copper Fund. Established in 1985, its sav-
ings are held in an account at the Central Bank and its management comes from an
independent board (which includes members from the state-owned copper corporation
CODELCO.) It has been credited with helping the Chilean government avoid fiscal deficits.
A poor example is that of the Macroeconomic Stabilization Investment Fund (FIEM) of
Venezuela, where the lack of strict budget rules has allowed the government to borrow
against accumulated assets in order to increase spending as well as to delay scheduled pay-
ments into the fund. The result is that the FIEM has only $700 million in reserves2 (even
though oil prices have been very high), and that its effectiveness has been diminished.
In addition to stabilizing government budgets, a successful stabilization fund can
also protect against Dutch Disease by preventing currency appreciation. This is accom-
plished by investing the fund’s savings in foreign currency denominated securities in
order to reduce the pressure to increase the value of the country’s currency. 
An effective stabilization fund can transform a nation’s resource wealth into a sta-
bilizing force in the economy. There is, however, a limit to this policy strategy. It is
premised on the assumption that the “fat” years will come first. Unless the fund can
borrow against future income, then it cannot begin to exercise a stabilizing influence
on government budgets until resource prices have first exceeded the target level.
Therefore the fund has the additional political burden of having to first act as a drag on
the economy before it can act as a stimulus.
Savings fund
A savings fund is different from a stabilization fund in that its primary purpose is to
save money for the future. It can either save for a “rainy day” when the government is
in dire need of funding, or it can save for future generations. This is especially desir-
C O V E R I N G  O I L 9 3
able for nonrenewable natural resources that might otherwise be exhausted by current
generations. The assets in a savings fund form a trust, and the income on the trust can
be paid out over time. One example is the Alaska Permanent Fund, created in 1977. By
the end of 2003 it had accumulated over $28 billion in assets. These assets generate
income that is paid to all Alaskan citizens.3
2) Commodity Bonds
A bond (or note) is a debt security issued by a corporation or government in order to raise
money. A conventional bond consists of regular annual or semiannual payments of
interest (known as coupon payments) and a final payment of the entire principal upon
maturity. For example, a 30-year, $1,000 U.S. Treasury bond with a 5 percent coupon rate
will yield semiannual coupon payments of $25 (based upon 5 percent of the bond’s prin-
cipal) and then pay the full $1,000 principal at the end of 30 years. The price of
conventional bonds is determined by the present value of all the future coupon and prin-
cipal payments. Since future payments are worth less then current payments and
payments in the far future are worth less than those in the near future, the bond’s value
is determined by properly discounting the future payments so as to arrive at their pres-
ent value.
Commodity-indexed bonds
Commodity bonds are different than conventional bonds because they are structured
so that either their coupon payments or principal payment are adjusted according to a
specific underlying commodity price. For instance, an oil commodity bond might have
its principal set to equal 1,000 barrels times the market price of oil at the time of matu-
rity. At $25 a barrel it amounts to a $25,000 bond. If the price of oil were to fall to $20,
then the borrower who issued the bond would only have to repay $20,000. Thus the
borrower will obligate to repay less money at maturity if prices are low than if prices
are high—this shifts oil price risk from developing country borrowers to investors.
In the event the price rises, the same government will have to make higher pay-
ments. But presumably the government will be in a better position to make these larger
payments because its claim on the income stream from the nation’s oil exports also will
be larger due to the oil price increases.
This type of commodity-indexed bond can be thought of as a conventional bond
with an attached derivative that converts either the coupon or principal payments into
payments based on the price of oil. The single principal payment would be the eco-
nomic equivalent to a forward contract and the series of coupon payments would be the
economic equivalent of a swap or a series of forward contracts.4
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Commodity-linked bonds
Another version of a commodity bond links the coupon or principal payments to the
price of the underlying commodity through an attached derivative called an option.5 An
option generates a payment only if the price of the referenced commodity rises above
(or alternatively, only if it falls below) a specified target price known as the “strike” or
“exercise” price. For example, a call option on 1,000 barrels of oil with a strike price of
$50 a barrel will generate a payment equal to one thousand times the extent that the
market price exceeds $50. 
In this case of commodity-linked bonds, the coupon or principal payments might
be structured to fall if the oil price fell below the target or strike price but would not rise
if prices exceeded the strike price. In order to shift the downside risk of oil prices to
bond holders, the borrower would need to pay a risk or insurance “premium” to bond
investors in the form of a high bond yield. Thus the bond’s price and coupon yield
would reflect the fact that the borrower would be holding an option that allowed it to
make lower payments in the event that oil prices fell below the strike price. The bond
investors would pay a lower price or receive a higher coupon rate on the bond in
exchange for their risk taking. 
Commodity-linked bonds are usually of two basic types. Bonds with a “short” put
option provision—as described above—give the borrower the right to pay the lower of a
specified cash payment or one determined by the commodity price if the price falls
below the strike price. This type of commodity-linked bond shifts the downside risk of
resource prices to the foreign bond investor. Bonds with a “long” call option provision
give the bond investor the right to the higher of a specified cash payment or one deter-
mined by the price of the commodity if the price exceeds the strike price. In this instance
the bond investor would share in the upside gain from higher resource prices, and the
developing country borrower would benefit by borrowing at a lower interest rate.6
While all these types of commodity bonds can serve to help developing countries
to transfer some of their exposure to commodity price risk, it can be expensive.
Commodity bonds, whether an attached forward contract or option contract, are more
complex than conventional bonds. In financial markets, complexity is more costly than
simplicity. Moreover, in the commodity-linked type of bond with a short option posi-
tion, the options premiums are an additional expense—borrowers pay this additional
expense in the form of higher coupon yields. In all cases, however, the developing
country borrowers will pay higher yields on bonds that are more complex. Yields will
be higher still on bonds that give the borrower the option to pay lower coupon or prin-
cipal payments if the commodity price drops and that must be sold to the subset of
foreign investors who are also willing to take on a long-term commodity price risk. 
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3) Hedging Using Derivatives
Stabilization funds and commodity bonds are two risk management strategies. Yet
another policy approach, and one which addresses the problem more directly and does
so with potentially less expense, is to use derivatives to hedge the commodity price
exposure.
There are a variety of derivative instruments available in the market. Some are
traded on futures exchanges (mostly futures and options type contracts) and others are
traded in the over-the-counter (OTC) market (forwards, options, and swaps).7
While the exchange-traded contracts are mostly short-term, they can be effective-
ly rolled over from one month to the next in order to provide an effective hedge over a
long period of time.8 Roll-over involves selling a futures contract that expires in one
month and then buying it back before it expires and selling another one that expires in
the month after that. For instance, a hedger would start in January by selling a February
oil futures, then buy it back before expiration and sell a March futures, then buy it back
before expiration and then sell an April futures, and so on. This approach has its skep-
tics, who worry about the risks associated with the roll-over process. While roll-over
risks, such as basis risk and market illiquidity, are real, they have proven over time to
be small and manageable in comparison to the risk of not hedging. Moreover, many
multinational oil corporations, global agricultural corporations, and other businesses
regularly use this technique as an inexpensive and effective hedge against price risk. 
An important variation on this approach comes from the Australian Wheat
Board.9 It promises participating farmers a minimum price for their crops, thus essen-
tially giving away put options to participating farmers, and then hedges its exposure to
this agricultural program by selling wheat futures on futures exchanges. As recently as
the late 1990s, the Australian Wheat Board was the largest participant in the wheat
futures market on the Chicago Board of Trade.
Hedging with futures or forwards 
Hedging works to reduce risk in the following manner. Consider the simple case of a
country in which the production and export of oil amounts to the total national output
and export volume. A 20 percent rise or fall in the price will raise or lower its output
and exports by 20 percent. A country can hedge against this shock by taking a “short”
position in oil. For instance, it can sell oil in the forward market. A short forward posi-
tion requires that a certain amount of the commodity be sold for a specific price at a
specific time in the future. If oil is sold forward on January 1 for delivery on December
31 at $25 a barrel, then a $5 decline in oil prices will generate a $5 profit for every bar-
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The Seesaw of Hedging
The following are examples of considered existing risks. Farmers face the risk that the
price of their crop will fall between the time they have decided to plant and the time
they harvest and get the crop to market. Governments of oil-producing nations face the
risk that the price of oil will decline over the budget year whereas the governments of
oil-importing nations face the risk of oil prices rising.
Hedging is best defined as the reduction of existing risks. In contrast, specula-
tion is best defined as engaging in activity that adds to existing risk.  
Existing price risk can be reduced by using derivatives to hedge—a process some-
times called risk management—by entering into a derivative contract that will offset
losses on existing risk (and also likely offset gains on existing risks). The value of the
derivative used for hedging should change by equal amounts—but in the opposite
direction—from that of the existing price risk. For example, a country exporting a bil-
lion barrels of oil faces the risk of losing $1 billion for each dollar decline in the price
of oil. It can hedge that risk by selling oil futures on the New York Mercantile Exchange
whose value will increase by $1 billion for each dollar decline in the price of oil.  
The relationship of the existing risk to the value of the hedge can be thought of
as financial version of the child’s seesaw or teeter-totter. One end rises in direct pro-
portion to the other end falling; if no one moves then both ends are equal along a
horizontal plane. The following graphic illustrates this concept by showing how when
the value of the spot position, i.e., the crop or oil ready for export (S), rises, then the
value of the futures position (F) falls, and vice versa. In both cases, the sum of the two
positions remains the same at the fulcrum of the seesaw.
Hedging: Sum of change of existing price risk and hedge is zero, or S = F.
S2 F1
S1 F2
S1 = F1
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rel of oil covered by the forward contract. However, if the price of oil were to rise by $5
per barrel, then it would generate a $5 loss for every barrel covered by the contract. 
Hedging will generate gains when prices fall and losses when prices rise, there-
by offsetting the effects of a rise or fall in the revenue from resource sales. This will
reduce the variability of budget revenues due to price volatility. This will help prevent
pro-cyclical fiscal policy and allow the government to serve a more counter-cyclical role
in stabilizing economic performance and promoting sustained growth. Moreover,
everyone will know in January that the value of output and exports will be, for example,
$250 million by year’s end; the government will know that it will have these funds avail-
able (no matter what happens to oil prices) to pay its foreign debt or other obligations.
Hedging through derivatives can be conducted with either futures, forward, or
swap contracts.10 Both futures contracts and forward contracts are an obligation to buy
or sell a specified quantity of a specified item at a specified price at a specific time in
the future. The difference is that futures contracts are standardized, publicly traded,
and cleared through a clearing house. A country’s oil products may not be the same as
the standard ones traded on most major exchanges. If the different grade of oil means
a substantial difference in price variability, then the government may enter into a for-
ward contract in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. These are customized contracts
traded through derivatives dealers (usually major banks or broker-dealers). OTC trans-
actions provide certain benefits: they allow parties to tailor contracts to their needs, and
they do not require initial collateral or margin. OTC transactions also have some draw-
backs: they do not occur on official exchanges and so they are less transparent and they
are not guaranteed by an exchange clearing house—thus exposing the hedger to cred-
it risk from the derivatives dealer. Also, the OTC market is not well protected against
fraud and manipulation while the exchanges are policed by the government and the
exchange itself. 
The advantages of hedging through derivatives are that it is inexpensive, it is a
reversible policy (that is, the government can decide to lift its hedge), and it does not
depend on the “fat” years coming first. It allows the government to borrow through con-
ventional debt instruments instead of paying a premium to tap into smaller pools of
investors willing to invest in commodity bonds. Unlike stabilization funds, hedging
through derivatives contracts neither tempt corrupt officials nor act as a target for those
seeking easy funding for new or expanded programs. The disadvantage is that futures
contracts give up the gains of price increases. A solution to this problem is to hedge
over a limited two- or three-year horizon rather than a longer period or to hedge only
75 percent or 80 percent of the price exposure so that the economy “feels” some of the
effects of the price changes.
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Options hedging
If the government does not wish to use either futures or forward contracts and thus
give up the potential gains from a sudden rise in oil prices, it can use options instead
to buy itself “insurance” against a drop in prices.11 With options, the government pays
a premium to the option seller or “writer” that guarantees a minimum price for the oil.
For example, a government may determine that it will run into serious financial diffi-
culties if the price of oil were to drop below $25/barrel. The government would hedge
against this possibility by buying a “put” option with a strike price at $25/barrel. If the
price remains above $25, then the option is not exercised; but if the price falls below
$25, then the options writer would pay the difference between $25 and the lower mar-
ket price of oil. This protects the government on the downside, and the investor would
absorb the loss.
The option serves as an insurance policy against a fall in the price of oil, and so
it follows that insurance against a highly volatile price is worth more than insurance
against a very stable price. So the option’s premium is higher for more volatile com-
modities like oil than for less volatile items like short-term interest rates. This is akin
to higher auto insurance rates for risky drivers. In order to attract investors to accept
the risky side of this one-way bet, governments will need to pay a premium that reflects
the risks from volatile oil prices. These options premiums can prove very expensive.
The advantage, however, is that if the price of oil rises, the government will be able to
reap the benefits.
Hedging experience
There is little public information about the extent to which petroleum-exporting coun-
tries use hedging instruments to mitigate their risk. While some oil producers, such as
Mexico and the state of Texas have used such instruments successfully, market analysts
agree that the use of hedging by developing countries is still rather limited.12 There are
a number of reasons why developing countries may refrain from government hedging,
despite the financial advantages.
E The primary objection may be a political one. If a finance minister hedged
against a low oil price through using futures contracts, and the market price of
oil in fact rose, then the country would fail to reap the benefits and few people
would commend the minister for his or her prudence. Instead, it would be
politically difficult to explain why the government missed out on the higher oil
revenues. Conversely, if the finance minister did not hedge, and the price of oil
plummeted, the government could shift blame away from itself by blaming
international markets. If the finance minister chose to pay a premium for put
options to protect against unexpectedly low prices, the minister could be blamed
for “wasting” money rather than spending it on more urgent social needs. In
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sum, governments may find it difficult to explain hedging policies to their
public.
E Hedging can also be expensive. All derivatives transactions incur transactions
costs that include commissions, paying the bid-ask spread to dealers, and the
capital costs of posting collateral or margin. Also, options premiums can be
very expensive and the expense increases with the volatility of the commodity
price and the time horizon over which the government wants to hedge.
E Hedging is complex and requires considerable skill and institutional capacity.
Commodity risk management tools require a greater level of financial
sophistication than that traditionally required by government officials. Expertise
is required to understand the risk structure of transactions, to identify risk
management strategies, and to enter into and monitor hedging transactions. This
expertise is readily available, however, by contracting with commercial risk
managers or through the technical expertise provided by institutions such as the
World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Conclusion
While hedging can provide protection against commodity price volatility, it cannot pre-
vent the problem of corruption, which is so common among petroleum-producing
countries. One way to reduce the incidence of both gross fiscal mismanagement and cor-
ruption (meaning the outright embezzlement of funds and the misdirection of funds for
political purposes) is to require a high degree of transparency in government budgets.
In order to put pressure on governments to make their budgets and budgeting
processes more transparent, several hundred nongovernmental organizations have
embarked on an advocacy campaign called Publish What You Pay to get corporations to
report on their costs for royalties, rights, and all other payments to developing country
governments for the extraction of oil and other minerals as well as metals. The cam-
paign is designed to make both corporate reports and developing country budgets more
transparent, exposing and diminishing instances of mismanagement and corruption. 
While it is perplexing to think that wealth can become a curse, it is even more
vexing to see so little done about it. All of the above policy remedies are both feasible
and affordable, and none of them would pose a major policy challenge. Each remedy
would benefit from further research and investigative reporting in order to discover
more of the advantages and flaws as well as what could be learned from earlier experi-
ments. The biggest political challenge is the widespread lack of understanding of the
costs of doing nothing, and the lack of knowledge among policymakers about the mer-
its of appropriate policy remedies.
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Questions about Revenues
E What share of your government’s income comes from the sale of natural
resources such as oil, gas, or minerals? Is this in the form of royalties, rents, or
profit? Is the amount contracted in fixed amounts of the local or foreign currency,
or is the government paid in amounts of the resource produced or exported?
E How much do your government’s revenues vary with the prices of your major
export commodities?
E What steps is your government taking to reduce the impact of price fluctuations
on the government budget? How successful have these steps been?
E What is the government doing to help businesses and individuals protect
themselves from the price shocks?
E What additional steps is the government considering to reduce the country’s
exposure to commodity price risks?
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7. The Environmental, Social,
and Human Rights Impacts 
of Oil Development
David Waskow and Carol Welch
The hydrocarbon era undoubtedly has played a positive role in industrial development
and the modern way of life, but the price tag for progress is turning out to be higher
than expected. The negative impact of oil extraction, transportation, and consumption
on the environment, the social and public health of communities, and human rights
worldwide is now coming under greater scrutiny. 
Massive oil spills, like the 1989 Exxon Valdez and 2002 Prestige accidents, con-
taminate shorelines and sensitive marine ecosystems. And climate change is a
recognized catastrophe in the making for the environment and public health world-
wide, though oil producers dispute oil’s role in global warming.
Extracting oil requires reaching deep beneath the surface of the earth, often in
remote and environmentally sensitive locations. Oil itself, and the materials that
emerge with it from the earth, are made up of extremely toxic chemicals. Processing
and moving this liquid over great distances can be technically difficult and environ-
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mentally hazardous. Oil leaks occur regularly, damaging plant and animal life, and
harmful accidents can happen in all phases of oil development.
Oil extraction may also have profound social impacts. Oil drilling sites are often
guarded by large security details. In some cases, oil companies have partnered with
military or police forces with terrible human rights records. 
Often, those directly affected by oil projects are either not consulted or consulted
in a manner that does not allow their full participation in project decision-making.
When local citizens have protested against the negative impacts on their communities,
the authorities have responded with repressive actions leading to violence and human
rights violations. 
Drilling sites typically alter the social fabric of a community. Those who gain
employment are often resented by the many who have high hopes yet get no jobs. Oil
exploration and production is a technically intensive process that generally does not
generate many jobs for unskilled workers.
As the oil begins to flow, prices for local goods and services often increase rapidly.
The men who get jobs on a drilling site abandon traditional work and traditional ways of
life. Indigenous communities are torn apart, permanently changed. The rates of HIV/AIDS
increase in work areas as oil workers, far from their families, turn to prostitutes. 
These negative results—and a number of others—must be considered and
assessed when evaluating oil’s impact on development and poverty. Government and
company actions in responding to and mitigating these negative impacts should also
be critiqued and analyzed. 
While oil is a resource that can provide financial benefits to local communities 
if managed transparently and equitably, those benefits can and should be viewed in 
the context of oil’s potential social and environmental consequences for those same
communities.
Environmental Issues in Oil Development
The environmental consequences are substantial throughout the entire process of oil
development. Each stage of the process—exploration, onshore and offshore drilling,
refining, pipelines and other forms of transportation—poses serious risks to the ecolo-
gy and public health. Every environmental medium—air, water, and land—is affected.
The degree of environmental harm is determined by operator responsibility, govern-
ment oversight, and conditions in particular ecosystems. Even in heavily regulated
environments, some damage occurs. 
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Exploration, drilling, and extraction
Even before oil and natural gas are brought to the surface, the impacts of development
are felt during the exploration process. Oil and natural gas deposits are generally found
in sedimentary rock. Various seismic techniques are used during exploration to assess
where those deposits are located beneath the surface of the earth. 
Increasingly, remote sensing techniques using a mix of high technology from air-
planes and satellites are used to find oil reserves. However, these approaches have a
limited success rate, and surface-based exploration techniques are still common, often
with environmental consequences. 
Surface-based techniques permit the detection of fossil fuel deposits by physical-
ly creating seismic waves. These surface-based techniques, including vibrating vehicles
(“thumper trucks”), explosions in holes drilled beneath the surface, and special “air-
guns” for marine locations—and the heavy equipment that often accompanies
them—are frequently used in remote and environmentally sensitive areas. 
In addition, extensive exploratory drilling is particularly common in developing
countries where the quantity of oil reserves is less known. Such operations intrude into
local environments at the drilling site itself and as a result of the construction of accom-
panying infrastructure, including road building. Environmental impact assessments
often are not conducted for the exploration phase of fossil fuel development.1
The exploration process is followed by development of an oil field, involving the
drilling of a number of wells, and then the actual extraction process. Frequently, oil
deposits include significant quantities of natural gas, which is brought to the surface
together with the oil. Natural gas can be produced either from oil wells (associated gas) or
separately in wells drilled specifically for the purpose of gas extraction (nonassociated gas).
Crude oil and the byproducts of drilling and extraction all contain significant
quantities of toxic substances and other pollutants. Large quantities of rock frag-
ments—called “cuttings”—are brought to the surface during the drilling process,
creating substantial volumes of waste material that must be disposed of. 
The cuttings are also problematic because they are coated with drilling fluids—
called “drilling muds”—that are used to lubricate the drill bit and stabilize pressure in
the oil well. Once used in the extraction process, these drilling fluids are contaminated
with harmful substances, including heavy metals and other toxic chemicals. The quan-
tity of cuttings and mud produced from a well can range from 60,000 to 300,000
gallons per day.2
In addition, during the actual extraction process, large quantities of water com-
bined with suspended and dissolved solids are brought to the surface. Referred to as
“produced water,” this extracted water generally contains a number of highly toxic sub-
stances, including heavy metals (such as lead, zinc, and mercury) and volatile organic
compounds (such as benzene and toluene). 
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Produced water can also have high saline levels; if released onto land, this water
can be extremely harmful to plant growth in local ecosystems. Produced water can
amount to more than 90 percent of the fluid extracted from a well and represents near-
ly eight barrels of water for every barrel of oil produced in the United States (the
amount of produced water is less for natural gas wells).3
Improper handling and release of waste and toxic substances, including cuttings,
drilling mud, and produced water, can lead to significant damage to local residents, ani-
mals, and vegetation. The use of lined pits is an appropriate, but sometimes underused,
disposal technique for disposal of these wastes, particularly mud and cuttings. Pits that
are not appropriately lined, or covered with landfill when production ends, can allow
seepage of oil and other toxins into soil and groundwater. An alternative to lined pits is
the use of tanks in which waste can be collected and exported from sensitive ecosystems. 
The discharge of produced water that is highly toxic or highly saline into water-
ways and the soil can be extremely harmful to ecosystems. Produced water can be
treated using a number of mitigation techniques, including filtration and biological
processes. In many cases, produced water is re-injected into the well to assist in creat-
ing sufficient pressure for extraction; in these cases, the water must be treated
adequately before re-injection in order to prevent contamination of the soil and ground-
water supplies. At offshore sites, produced water is rarely re-injected, but must instead
be brought onshore for treatment. 
The extraction of natural gas also poses considerable environmental problems at
the extraction site. If natural gas is not separated and processed for use, it is often
burned off at the well site, or “flared,” thereby releasing harmful pollutants. As the
largest source of air emissions from oil and gas extraction, flaring produces carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides (a key component of smog), and sulfur oxides (the principal
cause of acid rain). In Nigeria, the country with the highest levels of flaring, local com-
munities have complained about serious health effects linked to the flaring. 
When it is not flared, unprocessed gas is often vented into the atmosphere,
releasing large quantities of methane, a potent climate-changing gas. In addition, when
natural gas is extracted, it frequently contains significant quantities of hydrogen sul-
fide, a toxic substance that is potentially fatal and also corrosive to pipes (gas with
hydrogen sulfide is often referred to as “sour gas”). This chemical must be removed
from the natural gas as soon as possible. 
The tremendous impacts of oil extraction on land transcend the facility site.
Particularly in remote areas in developing countries, where more and more extraction
will take place as new sources for oil are sought, extraction sites usually involve the
destruction of large tracts of forests for the facility itself and worker camps. Onshore
drilling can also expose animals, including grazing livestock important to human liveli-
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hoods, to possible spills. Ingesting oil or oil-contaminated food or water can be fatal to
animals, or pose long-term health threats.
One of the most significant environmental impacts of extraction is the construc-
tion of access roads. The consequences for sensitive forest areas frequently go
substantially beyond the immediate effects of any land clearing. Access roads open up
remote regions to loggers and wildlife poachers, who normally would not have access
to such areas. Forests then come under threat to further incursion and clearing all
along the route of the access roads. Access roads can also fragment and interrupt habi-
tat, effectively reducing the home territories of forest-dwelling animals. 
According to some estimates, about 400 to 2,400 hectares (1,000 to 6,000 acres)
are deforested and colonized for every one kilometer of new road built through a forested
area.4 In Ecuador, an estimated one million hectares (2.5 million acres) of tropical forest
were colonized due to the construction of 500 kilometers of roads for oil production.5
Even in the rare instances when oil companies opt not to build roads, thus reduc-
ing these negative forest impacts, they must still build landing areas for helicopters and
planes, which can also fragment habitat and negatively impact on migration routes. 
Globally, most oil drilling sites are on land, but there is also a sizable quantity of
offshore drilling sites with the potential for significant impacts on the marine environ-
ment. Offshore facilities are particularly common in Africa (almost half of the sites),
Europe (more than half of the sites), and Asia Pacific (about two-thirds of the sites).6
Offshore drilling can pose unique challenges; in particular, harsh weather conditions
during the transfer and transport of oil from offshore locations increases the chance for
accidents.7
Offshore facilities are often difficult for journalists (or regulators) to inspect,
increasing the opportunities for operators to shirk regulations. Developing countries
with few resources and weak environmental ministries do not have the helicopters
needed to bring inspectors to oil platforms. Sometimes companies provide the trans-
port, but they can then determine when inspections occur.
The location of offshore facilities can be important in determining a facility’s
impact on the marine environment. Rigs stationed in breeding grounds for fish or
other ocean animals can disrupt breeding patterns and affect populations. For example,
shellfish such as mussels and clams that are covered in oil have difficulty breathing and
feeding. Fish eggs that are covered in oil can be destroyed, or they can produce mal-
formed young. A facility’s proximity to sheltered marine areas can result in more
harmful environmental impacts. The quiet tidal action of estuaries and other sheltered
inlets disperse oil slowly, giving it a better chance to seep into the coastlines.
In tropical zones, coastal areas often consist of mangrove ecosystems filled with
a plant species whose roots grow out of the water and into the air. An oil spill that cov-
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ers these roots systems can wipe out the plants and the other species that depend on
them. Mangroves often play a vital role in stabilizing soil and retaining coastlines and
in providing important habitat for fish and other marine animals. An oil spill off the
coast of Panama leaked 50,000 barrels of oil into a mangrove area and killed vegeta-
tion along 20 miles of coastline.8
The impact of oil spills on wildlife can be substantial. Fish and shellfish can be
harmed or killed. Marine mammals that inhale or ingest oil can suffer vital organ dam-
age, including to the kidney and liver. Lesions and internal bleeding have been found
in mammals caught in an oil spill. Immune systems may also be compromised, and
Examples of the Impacts from Toxins and Other Pollutants 
in the Oil Production Process
Chemical Aspect of Oil Production Process Health/Environmental Impacts
Benzene Produced water Carcinogen, reproductive toxicant, 
developmental toxicant
Toluene Produced water Developmental toxicant, suspected 
blood toxicant, neurotoxicant, liver 
toxicant, and kidney toxicant
Mercury Produced water and drilling fluids Developmental toxicant, suspected 
(mud) blood toxicant, endocrine toxicant, 
neurotoxicant, reproductive toxicant, 
immunotoxicant
Zinc Produced water and drilling fluids Suspected blood toxicant, 
(mud) developmental toxicant, and 
reproductive toxicant
Lead Produced water and drilling fluids Carcinogen, reproductive toxicant, 
(mud) developmental toxicant
Sodium (salinity) Produced water Contaminates soil, making it unfit for 
vegetation
Hydrogen Sulfide Natural gas extraction Suspected blood toxicant, 
neurotoxicant, and reproductive 
toxicant
Sulfur dioxide Natural gas flaring Major contributor to acid rain
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behavior in some cases has been altered. These effects increase the animals’ vulnera-
bility to stress and to predators. 
Oil can harm birds that nest or migrate along shorelines by oiling birds’ feathers,
inhibiting their insulation and their ability to fly and swim; moreover, birds that ingest
enough oil may die. Spills have killed tens of thousands of birds, their numbers
depending on where and when oil spills happen (migration paths and seasons, for
example, will affect the tally.)9 Oil spills can also damage tropical coral reefs, causing
them to lose their color and to break apart. 
The disposal of oil wastes from offshore drilling operations is another significant
environmental concern. An oil platform uses nearly 400,000 gallons of sea water daily
as drilling fluids in the extraction process, and, following its use, this oil-tainted water
is discharged back into the ocean.10 One of the apparent impacts of offshore discharges
has been mercury pollution; eating contaminated fish is increasingly regarded as a sub-
stantial cause of human exposure to mercury. A study found that mercury levels in the
mud and sediments beneath oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico were 12 times higher
than acceptable levels under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency standards.11 The
only way to solve the problems caused by offshore discharges is to capture the wastes
and dispose of them in a properly lined waste disposal site on land.
Getting the oil to market: pipelines and refining
Pipelines used to transport oil and natural gas can create serious environmental harm.
While pipelines are sometimes built below ground, building pipelines above ground is
cheaper than burying them, and in many developing countries, above-ground pipelines
are nearly universal. These visually obtrusive pipelines often disrupt grazing animals
and cause hardships for herders and farmers. 
Leaks and ruptures may be caused by faulty joints connecting pipeline compo-
nents, by faulty valves, and by corrosion; more than half of pipeline spills have been
caused by structural problems, most commonly corrosion.12 Pipeline leaks are one of
the most common causes of oil spills; in 1997, for example, pipeline spills were twice
as common as spills from tankers.13
Leaks from above-ground pipelines can spoil land and surface water, while under-
ground pipeline leaks, which can be extremely difficult to detect, can contaminate 
groundwater supplies. Leaks and ruptures can result in hazardous fires and explosions.
Explosions are a particular hazard in the case of natural gas, which is inherently explosive.
As with extraction operations, pipeline construction frequently disrupts land-
scapes and environmentally sensitive areas. For example, the wide path that is cut to
lay the pipeline—referred to as the “right-of-way”—can pass directly through high-
value forests and open these areas to encroachment. The construction process also
requires the building of access roads, which facilitate migration and exploitation of nat-
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ural resources in the areas surrounding a pipeline. Access roads for pipelines can also
lead to fragmentation and reduction of essential wildlife habitat. 
In Bolivia, the 630-kilometer Cuiaba gas pipeline built by Enron, Shell, and
Transredes in the late 1990s traversed the Chiquitano forest, the world’s largest intact
dry tropical forest. A number of rare and vulnerable species live in the forest, includ-
ing approximately 90 species listed in the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). According to residents of local communities, construc-
tion of the pipeline facilitated harmful activities along the right-of-way, including
hunting, illegal logging, and cattle roaming; it even resulted in an effort by a Canadian
mining company to reactivate a dormant gold-mining site in the vulnerable forest,
using dangerous cyanide processing methods.14
Refining is a stage in the process of oil development that also leads to significant
environmental impacts. Using techniques such as boiling, vaporizing, or solvent treat-
ment, refineries separate and convert crude oil so that it can be used as fuel. The end
products of oil include gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, kerosene, lubricating oils, and
asphalt. The average refinery processes over 3.8 million gallons of oil daily.15 Even the
small fraction of this oil that is released into the environment as waste byproducts—
0.3 percent—amounts to over 11,000 gallons of oil released daily at a single site.16
Water used in the refining process must be treated to address the presence of traces of
toxins such as heavy metals and other pollutants. 
Refineries also produce significant quantities of air pollutants. In the United
States, the refining sector is the third leading source of air emissions of highly toxic
Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxins (PBTs), such as mercury, lead, and dioxins, produc-
ing more than 184,000 pounds of air emissions of PBTs in 2001.17 Worldwide, the
refining industry produced more than 48 million pounds of toxic air emissions in
2001, including tons of volatile organic compounds, like cancer-causing benzene, and
chemicals which, in significant enough quantities, can cause asthma and childhood
developmental problems.18 The refining process can also result in substantial releases
of sulfur dioxide, a key contributor to acid rain. 
The complex refining facilities are also vulnerable to leaks and accidents. Leaking
oil storage tanks and barrels are important contributors to chemical and oil releases at
refining facilities, and fires and explosions at refineries can sometimes be a source of
large chemical releases into the air.
Oil spills
The extraction and transportation of oil often results in spills. Internationally, between
20 million and 430 million gallons of oil were spilled in reported incidents in each year
between 1978 and 1997; the number of incidents during that period ranged from 136
to 382 annually.19 Spills occur from storage tanks, pipelines, tankers, and barges and
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other vessels. With the exception of pipelines, spills most commonly occur during
transport, including while loading on tankers, moving from tanker to rail, or from rail
car to storage facility. 
The vast majority of spills are small compared to tanker disasters, releasing
between 10,000 and 1 million gallons, but these “small” spills add up to 15–20 million
gallons spilled in most years.20 If frequent, these spills can be more damaging than
tanker disasters by chronically exposing plants and animals to oil pollution. 
The most visible and largest oil spills, however, typically occur from a tanker acci-
dent, such as the Prestige spill that dumped approximately 17 million gallons off the
coast of northern Spain in 2002. While large tanker spills are less common, the
amount of oil released by spills in any particular year generally depends on the num-
ber of extremely large spills releasing more than 10 million gallons.
In the past several decades, supertankers carrying oil have become truly super:
from a 150 million gallon capacity in 1960 to over 240 million gallons today. Large and
minimally maneuverable, tankers are prone to accidents.21 In addition, inadequate
ship design and construction lead to larger spills when accidents occur. For example,
ships with single hulls (or skins) are much more vulnerable in accidents than those
with double hulls. The U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that all newly construct-
ed tankers operating in U.S. waters be fitted with double hulls and that all tankers in
U.S. waters be double-hulled by 2010. In response to recent spills, particularly the
Prestige accident, the International Maritime Organization, an intergovernmental body,
has now required an accelerated phase-out of large single-hull tankers by 2010. The age
of ships is another key factor in spills; explosions and fires are more common with
older ships. 
Because chronic small spills register low on the radar of many government offi-
cials, the media, and the public outside of the affected area, it usually takes large-scale
accidents to galvanize officials to take action on oil tanker safety and oil spill response
plans. In the United States, for instance, it took the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in
Alaska to push the U.S. government to consolidate legislation pertaining to oil spills.
The accident, which resulted in an oil spill of 11 million gallons, revealed problems with
coordinated rapid response and clear lines of authority in the emergency. The 1990 Oil
Pollution Act established a national response system that mandates the formation of a
committee to coordinate the various government agencies and actors, industry, and
responsible parties after a spill.22 The act also made responsible parties liable for
cleanup costs, compensation, and potential civil penalties, and it established an oil spill
fund for emergency response.23
A comprehensive and rigorous oil spill response plan with well-defined account-
abilities is crucial for oil-producing countries, yet such plans are lacking in many cases.
Azerbaijan, for example, is dramatically increasing its oil production, yet the country
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still does not have a national oil spill response plan. This also hampers effective coop-
eration and coordination with its neighbors on oil spill response in the Caspian Sea. 
The cost of oil spill response can vary dramatically, depending on factors such as
the location of the spill, impact on sensitive resources such as a vulnerable ecosystem
or a tourist area, distance to shoreline, and type of oil spilled. Spills near shorelines are
much more expensive to clean up than spills in the ocean. The type of oil spilled also
affects cleanup costs. Lighter gravity crude and refined oil tends to evaporate and dis-
perse more quickly, reducing the amount of cleanup effort. Heavy gravity crude oil
requires more intense efforts to remove the oil, and heavy crude can be four times as
expensive to clean up as light crude.24 Estimates of cleanup costs for spills range from
$1,000 per ton spilled in Africa to more than $24,000 per ton in the United States
(when the Exxon Valdez spill is excluded from the calculations). In the case of the
Exxon Valdez spill, Exxon says that it spent $2.1 billion on the cleanup.25
When a spill happens, the responders will typically strive to keep the oil away
from shorelines. Dispersants, which are chemical agents that break up and spread oil
in water, may be used to lessen impacts on the shorelines. Dispersant use has not been
free of controversy, however, as the chemicals used can be toxic and they expose fish to
chemicals and prolong exposure to the oil. Bioremediation, in which oil-eating bacteria
are used, is another method of dispersal. Burning oil is another option, but it is haz-
ardous for the workers and it can be difficult to control. Another response technique is
the use of booms to slow the spread of a spill. Booms have a flotation device and a ledge
both under- and above-water to contain the oil. The containment helps prevent spills
from reaching sensitive areas and helps concentrate the oil for easier cleanup. 
Oil spills on land do not spread as fast as on water, and they are easier to contain
than spills in water. Nevertheless, spills that pollute soil can make land useless for graz-
ing or agriculture; spills can make groundwater unfit for human consumption, crop
cultivation, and livestock. 
Consumption of oil and gas
The consumption of oil and natural gas also produces extremely significant impacts on
the environment and public health, both locally and globally. 
One of the principal products produced from oil is gasoline, a vehicle fuel that
creates a number of harmful air pollutants (a significantly smaller amount of oil is also
used for production of electricity and home heating). The pollutants from gasoline
include volatile organic compounds (such as benzene and toluene), some of which are
toxins; nitrogen oxides that result in acid rain and ground-level ozone, the principal
component of smog; sulfur dioxide, a critical cause of acid rain; particulate matter that
causes respiratory illnesses, including asthma; carbon monoxide; and, in those coun-
tries where it is not yet removed from gasoline, lead. 
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Numerous studies have shown a correlation between these pollutants and mor-
tality.26 Acid rain—essentially, a phenomenon caused by sulfur and nitrogen
emissions that form acidic water droplets in clouds—has harmed forests and lakes,
streams, and groundwater supplies. In addition, the combustion of natural gas, which
is principally used for electrical power production, creates nitrogen oxides that con-
tribute to acid rain and smog. 
Consumption of oil and gasoline also has serious global consequences in the
form of climate change (often referred to as global warming). The phenomenon of cli-
mate change can be likened to what happens in a greenhouse, with certain gases
trapping heat energy from the planet in the earth’s atmosphere. The most important of
the “greenhouse gases” from oil and natural gas sources is carbon dioxide (CO2), which
is produced both by the use of gasoline and by the combustion of oil and natural gas to
create electrical power. Worldwide, about 18 percent of electrical power is produced
from natural gas, while 7.5 percent of power is produced from oil. Compared to natu-
ral gas, however, oil creates about one and a half times the amount of CO2 for the same
amount of power produced.27 
There are few scientific organizations around the world that doubt the conclu-
sions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—which itself relied on the
research of 2,500 scientists—that there is a link between increased concentrations of
carbon dioxide and climate change. In a well-publicized 2001 report, a National
Academy of Sciences commission determined that “greenhouse gases are accumulat-
ing in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.”28
The consequences of climate change are likely to be substantial and widespread.
The melting of glaciers and polar ice caps could cause a rise in sea level. Extreme
weather events, such as hurricanes, could increase in frequency and intensity.
Increased heat could lead to desertification in some regions and the reduction of forest-
ed and agricultural zones in others. Infectious diseases such as malaria could be spread
more widely as a rise in global temperature affects the vectors (carriers) for these ill-
nesses. Increases in ocean temperatures are likely to lead to the massive dying off of
coral reefs, the most productive ocean ecosystem.
The understanding that humans are the primary cause of climate change was the
driving force behind the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty agreed to in 1997 as a
protocol to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (itself
adopted in 1992). The intent of the Kyoto Protocol is to provide obligations and a frame-
work for achieving the goal of the Framework Convention to reduce global CO2
emissions by 7 percent below their 1990 level. Its focus is on reductions in carbon
emissions in developed countries. 
Implementation of the treaty remains an important focus of the world’s efforts to
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combat global warming. With Russia’s ratification of the treaty in 2004, the protocol
went into force in February 2005. Efforts to make the Kyoto Protocol effective are
severely hampered by the resistance by the Bush administration, which rejected the
treaty in 2001. The United States remains the single largest national contributor to cli-
mate change, responsible for more than 22 percent of all global carbon emissions.29
T I P  S H E E T
Questions on Environmental Impacts
E Are exploration and drilling activities being conducted in environmentally sensitive
areas, such as vulnerable forests, protected wetlands, sensitive marine areas, or
other ecologically threatened zones? (Examples of environmentally sensitive areas
include IUCN/World Conservation Union protected areas, World Heritage Sites,
UN national parks, and Ramsar Convention protected wetlands). 
E Is a pipeline right-of-way being cut through environmentally sensitive areas such
as those mentioned above? Are roads being constructed in such areas in order to
conduct exploration and drilling or construct a pipeline? Are natural habitats for
animals, particularly endangered species, being disrupted or destroyed? 
E During the exploration process, are remote sensing techniques being used instead
of surface-based seismic testing such as explosions and vibrating trucks? 
E How are the byproducts of extraction, including produced water, drilling muds,
and cuttings, treated and disposed? Are drilling muds being reused? Is produced
water being re-injected? Are any disposal pits properly lined? Are tanks to export
wastes being used? 
E Is associated natural gas being vented or flared into the atmosphere? 
E At offshore wells, are wastes transported onshore for treatment and disposal,
instead of being released into the marine environment? 
E Are pipelines constructed with double-wall piping and automatic cutoff valves to
prevent any possibility of leakage or explosion? Are joints appropriately joined and
sealed? 
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Human Rights and Social Issues
Community input and empowerment 
Since oil extraction and transportation have such far-reaching impacts, developing oil
extraction and transport projects can be extremely contentious. Many civil society
groups and communities contend that high-impact projects should only proceed if a
community agrees with the project and, in effect, gives the company the “social license
to operate” in the form of free and informed consent. In any case, poorly designed
processes that fail to capture the range of possible social and environmental risks could
result in unforeseen costs for the companies involved and considerable damage to their
reputations. 
Bad processes also exacerbate tensions with local communities who feel disem-
powered and suspicious and may be more likely to fight the project. 
In the absence of clear domestic laws or enforcement capacity for some laws, many
companies see the guidelines of the World Bank as a benchmark to guide their consulta-
tion practices and social and environmental policies. The private sector lending arm of the
World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), has a number of environmental
and social safeguard policies that companies seeking IFC financial backing must follow. In
addition, IFC has certain information disclosure and consultation requirements. 
E Have adequate environmental impact assessments (EIA) been conducted for the
impacts of extraction operations, pipelines, and refineries? Does the EIA address
the entire lifespan of an extraction project, beginning with the exploration process?
E Have independent experts conducted the EIAs? Are they publicly available? Can
they be reviewed by other experts? Have alternative approaches to the planned
project—including no project at all—been fully explored? In the case of pipelines,
have alternative routes been fully considered? 
E At refineries, what measures are in place to minimize pollutant releases and the
potential for accidents?
E Do oil tankers have double hulls and the technology needed to prevent spills? Are
other appropriate safety measures in place? Have emergency response plans been
established?
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For Category A projects, which are the most environmentally sensitive projects,
and which should almost always include oil field development and pipeline construc-
tion,30 IFC requires its private sector clients to commission environmental
assessments (EAs) of its projects. These assessments must be publicly disclosed and
subject to public consultations. These EAs must be released at least 60 days before the
IFC approves the project. Many civil society groups would like to see this consultation
period expanded to at least 120 days in order for vulnerable communities to have time
to make informed decisions. 
The IFC also outlines what these assessments should contain and how they
should be designed. They must examine project alternatives, including the “no project
situation,” and identify ways of improving project selection and design. They should
seek first to prevent, and then minimize and compensate for negative environmental
impacts. How impacts will be managed should be clearly outlined. In the assessment,
environmental issues should be considered broadly by including impacts on air, water,
and land, as well as on human health and safety, resettlement, and indigenous peoples.
For sensitive projects, IFC also requires the project sponsor to commission an inde-
pendent party to carry out the EA, and recommends that an advisory panel of
independent, recognized experts advise on the project and its environmental impacts.
An effective process also includes public consultation. For sensitive projects, IFC
requires two consultations with affected communities and civil society groups during
project consideration. The first consultation should occur as early as possible and before
the assessment process begins. The second consultation should be held after a draft EA
is completed to discuss the report. Materials must be provided during the consultations
that are in an understandable language and format for affected people (which includes
taking literacy rates into account). The draft EA itself should be available in a public place
accessible to project-affected people and local civil society groups, including the World
Bank office in the country and national and local government offices. 
The EA itself should include an executive summary, description of the project,
baseline data on socioeconomic and environmental conditions, the project’s likely envi-
ronmental impacts, analysis of alternatives, and an environmental action plan that
responds to the mitigation, monitoring, and capacity building that is needed. Once
projects are underway, consultations should be held on a regular basis to address any
issues that may arise.
Militarization and human rights abuses
Concerns about the human rights impacts of the oil industry have increasingly cen-
tered on the “militarization” of oil development when abusive security forces act to
protect industry operations, particularly for multinational oil companies. Militarization
in the oil sector has largely been the result of the oil industry’s intense global search for
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viable petroleum sources, increasingly leading oil companies to establish or expand
operations in countries with corrupt or repressive governments. While oil companies
have legitimate interests in protecting extractive and pipeline operations, the industry
has increasingly collaborated in these countries with security forces that have less than
stellar human rights records. 
For the most part, the security forces involved have been government sponsored,
including national armies and local police and militia (though oil companies have also
hired private security firms in some instances). In countries such as Nigeria, Burma,
Indonesia, and Peru, the activities of these security forces have resulted in a wide range
of human rights abuses, including denial of free speech and justice, torture, slavery and
forced labor, rapes, extrajudicial killings, and executions. In a number of cases, the
close relationship between companies and governments or security forces, often involv-
ing hiring or other contractual arrangements, has resulted in considerable oil company
connection to, and even complicity in, the activities of human rights abusers. 
The militarization process is often driven by the attempts of oil companies and
governments to quell or altogether put an end to local resistance (or what they believe
will become local resistance) to the large-scale impacts of extractive operations and
pipeline construction. 
In some cases, the military intervention has been in response to vigorous com-
munity opposition to oil-related social and environmental damage, including oil spills,
toxic waste, devastated local ecologies that communities rely on for livelihoods, inade-
quate or misdirected local development, inadequate compensation for expropriated
land or other damage, and poor labor conditions. Objections to these impacts are fre-
quently buttressed by the view of many local communities that the oil resources being
exploited should rightfully be theirs to control. Probably the most notable instance of
militarization used to suppress opposition to the harmful social and environmental
impacts of oil development took place in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. 
Environmental devastation and human rights abuse
Nigeria is a prime example of the paradox of plenty. According to an IMF working paper,
in 1965, when oil revenues per person were about $33, per capita income was $245. Three
and a half decades later, when oil revenues were $325 per person, per capita income was
the same as in 1965. “In other words, all the oil revenues—$350 billion in total—did not
seem to add to the standard of living at all.”31 Between 1970 and 2000, the poverty rate
increased from about one-third of the population to almost 70 percent of the population.32
For communities in the oil-producing region of the Niger Delta, the effects of oil
production have been devastating. Human Rights Watch found that “oil-led develop-
ment has clearly seriously damaged the environment and the livelihoods of many of
those living in the oil producing communities.”33 The Niger Delta is a biologically rich
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mangrove area where fishing and agriculture provide the basis for most people’s sub-
sistence. Oil spills in the Delta, which are all too frequent, kill fish and crops and
pollute water and soil. Canals designed and used by the oil companies to transport the
oil have affected natural water flows and water quality, “again killing off crops, destroy-
ing fishing grounds, and damaging drinking water supplies.”34 Land has often been
expropriated on the oil companies’ behalf, without adequate compensation. 
Communities for the most part have been unable to seek redress for these
wrongs because there is no independent functioning court system. Unsurprisingly,
relations between the oil companies and communities are poisonous, and confronta-
tions are common. In response to the ecological destruction caused by oil extraction in
the Delta, and to the ruin of fishing and agricultural production that served as the basis
for local livelihoods, communities have resisted multinational oil companies’ activities.
Tactics employed included public rallies, nonviolent occupations of oil installations,
and occasional sabotage of pipelines. 
Meanwhile, the government has a number of security forces in the region, and
oil companies have frequently hired security forces, including local police, to protect oil
operations. According to Human Rights Watch, the activities of government security
forces protecting those producers have resulted in severe human rights violations,
including executions, beatings, and imprisonment without trial. In 1999, when
Human Rights Watch reported on the situation in the Niger Delta, the group docu-
mented repeated incidents in which people were brutalized for attempting to raise
grievances concerning the oil companies and found that Royal Dutch/Shell, the largest
producer in the region, was paying for government security forces implicated in
human rights abuses. “In virtually every community, there have been occasions in
which the regular police, or the army, have beaten, detained, or even killed those
involved in protests, peaceful or otherwise, or individuals who have called for compen-
sation for oil damage, whether youths, women, children or traditional leaders.”35
Most notoriously, in 1995 the government of the then-president, General Sani
Abacha, executed writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists from the most effective
community organization in the Delta, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
(MOSOP), despite no credible evidence that the leaders were guilty of the crimes for which
they had been tried.36
In other cases, security forces have engaged in offensive efforts to protect oil
operations in an unstable security environment that includes opposition to a repressive
regime or an active ethnic or separatist movement. Oil development is viewed as the
prerogative of a country’s ruling elite. While the severity of the actual threat posed by
local resistance has varied, there are a number of cases in which security forces have
engaged in proactive security measures that reach far beyond, and are far out of pro-
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portion to, the security concerns being addressed. Moreover, the repressive measures
employed can have the effect of creating a climate of fear and more generally intimi-
dating local communities into compliance with and acceptance of the project. 
The most well-known instance of this type of oil sector militarization occurred in
Burma in the early 1990s, when Unocal and its consortium partners decided to part-
ner with the Burmese military junta in building the Yadana gas pipeline. Although the
appalling human rights record of the regime’s brutal military was well known, the com-
pany nonetheless contracted with the SLORC, the State Law and Order Restoration
Council, now called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), to provide secu-
rity during pipeline construction.37 Human rights advocates believe that the
militarization was aimed at not only ensuring security, but also providing a ready pool
of forced labor to help build infrastructure for the pipeline. The militarization along the
route resulted in repression that went significantly beyond basic security measures,
including forced relocations of entire villages, forced labor for military operations and
garrison construction, and rapes and murders of villagers in the area.38
Militarization has also occurred in order to suppress efforts by local communities
to prevent the introduction of oil development activities in their region. For example, in
Latin America, a number of indigenous groups have opposed efforts by oil companies to
drill for oil and construct pipelines in indigenous territories. In a well-known case in
Colombia, the indigenous U’wa people resisted efforts by Occidental Petroleum to drill
for oil on their sacred land in a sensitive rainforest. In order to ensure that Occidental’s
project could move forward in 2000, the Colombian authorities brought in armed riot
police who clashed with U’wa protesters blocking a key road for the oil project. After
repeated protests, Occidental in 2002 decided not to pursue its oil concession further.39
When human rights abuses occur during militarization, the degree of oil compa-
ny responsibility for abuses is often disputed. Concrete assistance to security forces is
compelling evidence of a company’s involvement in militarization, though that assistance
has varied widely. In some cases, as in Burma, a national military has been hired by an
oil company to provide security; in other cases, the company has paid local security forces,
as Shell did in Nigeria.40 Oil companies have also provided material support to mili-
taries. For example, Shell gave guns to Nigerian security forces, and Chevron called in
and provided helicopters and pilots to a police force that then gunned down nonviolent
protesters on a Chevron oil drilling platform.41 Other ways that companies and security
forces have cooperated include coordinated security strategies, daily security briefings,
and the provision of vehicles, arms, food, and medicine to soldiers and police. 
But the level of financial or material assistance provided to security forces only
answers part of the question about oil company responsibility. Human rights advocates
argue that oil companies that rely on the security services provided by local military or
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police forces should be aware of those forces’ human rights records. They say compa-
nies have a responsibility to be proactive in efforts to prevent and condemn abuses or
avoid doing business with those forces altogether.
In the case of Burma, human rights advocates have disputed Unocal’s contention
that, while it may have been aware of the SLORC’s human rights abuses, it did not want
or order the SLORC to violate human rights.42 As human rights advocates have noted,
the company knew that human rights abuses were likely to occur and therefore had an
obligation to prevent them or to cease doing business with the SLORC.43
In Nigeria, Shell’s passive stance toward the trial leading to the execution of Ken
Saro-Wiwa and his MOSOP colleagues has been questioned. Although Shell called for
a fair trial after facing mounting pressure from civil society to do so, Human Rights
Watch and other groups have criticized Shell for not making clear its objections to the
actual conduct of the trial and the resulting denial of justice.44
In 2000, ongoing controversy over human rights abuses by security forces led the
U.S. State Department and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to convene oil
and mining companies, together with some nongovernmental organizations, to develop
a set of Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The principles were intended
to provide guidance for establishing human rights safeguards in company security
arrangements in the extractive sector (including petroleum and mining). The key com-
ponents of the principles address engagement with private security, engagement with
public security, and risk assessments concerning security environments. Among other
provisions, the principles say that companies should clearly communicate their policies
to government security forces. The oil companies that signed the principles at the out-
set included Chevron, Texaco, Conoco, Shell, and BP.
Examples of Militarization Incidents in Brief
E Nigeria: Shell pays local security forces that commit abuses in Niger Delta; fails to
aggressively step in during the trial and execution of local leaders (1990s)
E Nigeria: Chevron recruited and transported Nigerian military and police who shot
at and killed peaceful protesters from Chevron helicopters (1998 and 1999)
E Burma: Unocal contracts with Burmese military to provide security for Yadana
pipeline; villagers are killed, raped, tortured, and forced to work building
infrastructure (1994 – present)
E Colombia: Colombian riot police brought in to remove members of U’wa
indigenous people resisting Occidental Petroleum’s oil projects (late 1990s) 
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The principles were heralded in some quarters as the first set of guidelines of this
type for the extractive sector and as a global benchmark. Some NGOs, however, were
cautious. Amnesty International welcomed the principles, but did not endorse them,
despite the group’s involvement in their development. Other groups, such as
EarthRights International, criticized the voluntary nature of the principles as inade-
quate. The principles have also been criticized for not encouraging companies to
release the terms of their security contracts and arrangements with security forces.
Resettlement and forced relocation
Some oil development projects may also require people to be resettled, a socially and
economically disruptive experience. Serious concerns have been raised about the failure
of oil companies to provide appropriate compensation for land expropriation and other
harm experienced by local communities in the process of resettlement. Compensation
is a particular concern in the case of pipeline construction, which requires extensive use
of land and destruction of natural resources along a pipeline right-of-way.
In many cases, in order to secure agreement on compensation, companies will
reach terms with a small subset of a community or its leaders without consulting with
the broader community. Compensation amounts are generally kept from public scrutiny,
and it can be expected that they will vary widely depending on particular circumstances. 
In Peru, an investigation in 2003 by environmental organizations found that the
consortium constructing the Camisea pipeline had taken advantage of the inexperience
of local communities and failed to use appropriate methods in calculating compensa-
tion for lands and natural resources.45 Similarly, a 2002 investigation found that a
consortium comprised of Shell and Enron failed to pay the full costs for taking title to
local community lands that were used for the Cuiaba pipeline.46 
IFC’s involuntary resettlement policy is considered one guideline for projects in
developing countries. According to the policy, a resettlement plan should accompany
any project involving involuntary resettlement, and communities should participate in
designing the program. Displaced persons should be compensated for their losses at
full replacement cost prior to moving. Compensation includes land, housing, infra-
structure, and cash as appropriate to the situation. Displaced people should be assisted
in moving and settling into their new location. They should be at least as well-off as
before resettlement, and the project sponsor should assist them in improving their
income-earning potential. Lacking formal title to land is not considered a reason to be
denied compensation. Project sponsors are required to provide a public Resettlement
Action Plan, which (like an Environment Assessment) should be available at the World
Bank office in the country and at national and local government offices. 
The IFC definition of “involuntary” resettlement is controversial, however.
Should a community be so negatively impacted by a project that people feel forced to
1 2 0 C O V E R I N G  O I L
move—for example, if pollution from a facility causes health impacts—the communi-
ty’s residents would nonetheless be considered to be moving voluntarily according to
the IFC policy. As a result, many NGOs feel the definition of involuntary is too narrow. 
Beyond cases of voluntary or involuntary resettlement, there are instances in
which forced relocations have taken place. In Burma, for example, the SLORC burned
entire villages and forced relocations at gunpoint in order to provide security and a
right-of-way for Unocal’s Yadana pipeline.47 Because the relocation was accomplished
under threat and intimidation, a U.S. appellate court found that the military’s actions
constituted a violation of customary international law.
Indigenous communities 
As oil drilling goes to frontier (unexplored) areas, oil companies frequently come into
contact with indigenous communities, many of which have never had contact with the
outside world. Too often these communities have little or no say whether oil exploration
and drilling goes on in their communities. Such communities are frequently not
included in a country’s formal legal system.
Indigenous groups are often forcibly contacted and exposed to non-native dis-
eases and other social threats, often devastating their traditional way of life. Industry
operations can damage sensitive ecological areas where indigenous communities exist
and encroach on lands that are considered sacred. 
The introduction of infectious diseases to which indigenous communities have
not developed immunities is common. For instance, when oil workers entered the
Urarina community’s region in the Peruvian Amazon in the 1990s, the Urarina con-
tracted diseases, including pertussis (whooping cough) and strains of malaria, which
had never been present in their community.48 
Legal issues
Human rights violations have led to litigation against oil companies with ties to abu-
sive security forces. Most notably, legal advocates in the United States have brought a
series of lawsuits under a U.S. statute, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows
plaintiffs to bring claims for tort damages for violations of international law. The cases
brought against oil companies, including Unocal, ChevronTexaco, and ExxonMobil,
assert that the companies were complicit in the human rights abuses carried out by
security forces that provided security assistance for oil operations. While those defend-
ing the companies from the ATCA claims argue that the statute was originally intended
for other purposes, the claims thus far have continued to move through U.S. courts and
will face critical legal tests in the next several years. 
Human rights advocates have also raised concerns about the potential impact of
Host Government Agreements (HGAs), special pacts between a government and for-
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Impacts on Indigenous Communities: Case of the Camisea Pipeline
The Camisea project, which includes the drilling of gas in the remote
Peruvian Amazon and shipment to the coast, is one of the most controver-
sial recent extractive industry projects in the world. The project is located in
one of the world’s most ecologically prized rainforests. The World Wildlife
Fund has designated the area as one of its “Global 200” eco-regions, giving
it a top priority for conservation efforts due to its high biodiversity and glob-
ally important ecological functions. The export facility is located in an
internationally recognized marine reserve. 
The project is also violating the rights of the Camisea region’s
indigenous people, who are living in voluntary isolation within a protect-
ed reserve. The reserve was created to guarantee the territory of the Nanti
and Nahua isolated peoples and to protect them from outside disturbance.
Their rights to remain uncontacted and to determine their own path of
development are articulated in the International Labour Organization
(ILO) Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, which has been
ratified by the Peruvian government. According to local NGOs, project offi-
cials made unannounced visits to these communities. 
The presence of project workers and other outsiders in the reserve has
introduced diseases to which isolated communities have no immunity.
According to the preliminary findings of a health study being conducted by
the London School of Tropical Medicine and the Peruvian Ministry of
Health, all of the Nanti living in the settlements along the Camisea River are
ill with acute respiratory diseases, whereas a typical infection rate for that
population would be about 50 percent. 
Indigenous groups not living in isolation have been inadequately
consulted on project design, environmental management plans, and pro-
posed compensation measures. Environmental organizations found that
the consortium behind Camisea took advantage of the inexperience of
local communities and did not use appropriate methods to calculate com-
pensation owed for use of lands and natural resources. The communities
were also forced to negotiate with up to three different companies offer-
ing different deals. This served to weaken and undermine the negotiations
process for affected people. 
For more information, go to http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/
Camisea_factsheet8-2003.pdf
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eign investors, including oil companies, that establishes terms for the companies’
investment.49 HGAs can provide rights and privileges that enable investors to avoid the
constraints of public interest policies that would otherwise apply. In the case of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, the HGA between Turkey and the BTC consortium
(led by BP) allows the pipeline consortium to seek compensation for business-related
impacts caused by the application of new health, safety, and environmental laws and
regulations.50 The government is also prohibited from hindering any aspect of the
project, including for health, safety, or environmental reasons, unless there is an immi-
nent and material threat present. Further, the Turkish government is itself obligated to
expropriate land for the pipeline project and provide police protection.
Impacts on workers and employment
Oil extraction and transportation operations are capital intensive. Employment impacts
from such operations are minimal. The greatest employment impact is during the con-
struction of facilities, and this employment lasts a few months at best. For example,
BP’s oil and gas pipelines in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey together might employ
up to 6,000 people at the peak of construction; however, at least half of the jobs for
unskilled workers will likely last no more than “two months.”51 After construction, the
two pipelines together are projected to employ 700 people.52 
Nevertheless, communities often have high (and false) expectations of the
employment benefits a project will deliver. When these jobs do not materialize, ten-
sions between the companies and communities escalate. Resentment among those
who do not have jobs toward the few that do feeds into further community strife. False
expectations are often created by politicians and sometimes company officials seeking
to generate support for a project. 
Oil operations may also negatively affect the social fabric of communities. Outside
workers employed at the sites spend long periods of time away from home. The influx of
companies and foreign workers brings with it lots of cash and results in inflation that
leaves local community members unable to pay for goods that were previously affordable. 
While living in worker camps, the men are often tempted by alcohol, drugs, and
prostitution. This further disrupts family life and social structures. While most research
regarding the public health consequences of extractive industries, including the spread of
HIV/AIDS, prostitution, and drug use, has focused on mining operations, the situation is
likely to be similar at oil drilling sites. In the case of South African mining, the prevalence
of HIV among miners was almost 20 percent higher than the base population.53
Health and safety conditions for workers at oil drilling sites are hazardous.
Offshore rigs are exposed to high winds and rough seas. Conditions on oil platforms
can be wet and slippery. Shifts are long and physically demanding (workers typically
work long shifts for extended periods of time followed by extended time off). The
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machines on the rigs are heavy, and their operating speeds can be fast. Excess pressure
on drilling heads causes explosions and fires. All these conditions can lead to serious
injuries. British oil giant BP was fined for two serious worker-related incidents in its
Alaska operations in the United States in 2002: for the death of a worker from a well
explosion and for serious injury caused to a worker from a pipe blowout.54
In fact, working in the oil industry is one of the most hazardous occupations. In
the United States, which has comparatively rigorous occupational safety laws, work-
related deaths in the oil and gas extraction sector are higher than deaths from all other
U.S. industries combined.55 In oil-producing developing countries, the labor conditions
are probably even worse since work safety laws are usually nonexistent or underdevel-
oped. Often the laws that exist are not well enforced, with employers frequently escaping
punishment by bribing authorities. Weak labor unions offer workers little protection. 
On land and at sea, workers at oil extraction sites are potentially exposed to dan-
gerous chemicals, including arsenic and cyanide. High levels of exposure can cause
serious injury and illness; long-term, lower-dose exposure can still damage the health
of workers. Lost workdays from injury tend to be longer than in other industries.56
Conclusion
As the oil industry intensifies its global search for new sources of petroleum, remoter
areas are likely to be affected by the oil industry, and those areas where production and
development are already taking place could see even more activity. At the same time,
the impacts of oil development, including the environmental and social impacts, will
also intensify, and the consequences of this hunt for fossil fuels should be carefully
scrutinized. The potential financial benefits of intensive oil development can and
should be viewed in the context of the serious environmental and social costs that may
be borne first by local communities and then by the global community. At the end of
the day, oil does not come free. 
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Questions about Human Rights
E What kinds of consultations have oil companies engaged in with local
communities? Have these gone beyond consulting with a limited group of
individuals? Have community members been given complete information in local
languages? 
E What security arrangements have oil companies entered into with security forces,
public or private? What is the precise nature of the relationship — i.e., contractual,
employer/employee, agency? Has a company disclosed its security arrangements
or contracts (whether written or not)? Has a company disclosed any agreements
concerning human rights or related issues?
E What is the public human rights record of a country and its security forces where
an oil company is investing? What kinds of specific warnings should have put the
company on notice about human rights concerns?
E Has the oil company undertaken a security risk assessment prior to investing?
What is the nature and content of the risk assessment? Did it address the
potential for human rights abuses? Has a company disclosed its security risk
assessment? 
E What is the company’s presence on the ground? Does it have the ability and
capacity to monitor, prevent, and address abuses? What is the nature of the
relationship between the parent oil company and any subsidiaries operating on the
ground?
E Does the oil company allow free, unrestricted, unaccompanied, and unmonitored
visits to its operations by journalists, human rights groups, and others? 
E Have any local community members been displaced by extraction, pipeline, or
other operations? What kind of compensation, if any, has been provided? What is
the nature of the displacement and under what circumstances did it occur (e.g.,
did it take place under threat and intimidation)? 
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E Does a company have a Host Government Agreement, a legal agreement between
a government and oil company that establishes terms for the company’s
investment, or an equivalent agreement with a country? Has the company made
these agreements public? Do the agreements limit the government’s ability to
protect the public interest? Do these agreements ensure that expropriation and
compensation issues will be addressed appropriately?
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LOS ANGELES, Dec 10, 2003 (Agence
France-Presse) – Oil giant Unocal Tuesday
became the first US firm to stand trial in the
United States for alleged human rights
abuses abroad, in a case centered on the
building of a gas pipeline in Myanmar.
Myanmar villagers have sued the
California-based oil titan claiming it was com-
plicit in human rights abuses by the
Southeast Asian country's brutal military
junta, including forced labor, rape and torture.
The trial in Los Angeles follows two law-
suits filed by up to 15 unidentified villagers
from the nation formerly known as Burma
over the construction of the 62-kilometer
(39-mile) Yadana natural gas pipeline. 
The villagers claim in their seven-year-
old lawsuit that Unocal turned a blind eye as
junta troops murdered, raped and enslaved
villagers and forced them to work on the 1.2-
billion-dollar pipeline in the 1990s. 
“Burmese soldiers enforced a system of
slave labor and committed horrible acts of
violence on Unocal’s behalf,” said Terry
Collingsworth, executive director of the
International Labor Rights Fund, which rep-
resents some of the villagers. 
Unocal, which did not directly operate
the field that was owned by the Myanmar
government, strongly denies any involve-
ment in abuses. 
The case centers on the construction of
the much-disputed pipeline, built by Unocal
and partners including France's Total, to
carry natural gas from Myanmar to neigh-
boring Thailand. 
The villagers are suing for unspecified
damages alleging that Unocal benefited
from use by the Yangon junta of forced labor
and its soldiers' use of murder and rape,
even if it did not agree with the abuses. 
At issue in the first part of the complex
trial is whether Unocal can be held liable for
the conduct of its subsidiaries which invest-
ed in the pipeline. 
Daniel Petrocelli, Unocal's lead lawyer,
said California’s “alter-ego doctrine” bars
plaintiffs from trying to tap a parent corpo-
ration if a subsidiary has valuable assets of
its own. 
“The whole case boils down to one point:
If the subs (subsidiaries) can pay, the case
goes away," he told a crowded courtroom in
opening arguments. 
But lawyers for the villagers maintain that
Unocal is using its subsidiaries as corporate
shells to avoid responsibility in the case. 
“Unocal’s opening statement was a trib-
ute to the ability of corporations to do
whatever they want in the name of profit,”
Dan Stormer, attorney for the villagers, told
AFP. 
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Unocal Becomes First US Firm 
to Stand Trial in US Over Rights Abuses
By Marc Lavine
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“Nothing about these various entities
was independent,” he said, adding that
Unocal should be held directly responsible
for its units' role in the affair as they were
sham companies. 
But Petrocelli insisted the units—
Unocal Myanmar Offshore Co., Unocal
International Pipeline Co. and Unocal
Global Ventures—had hundreds of millions
of dollars in assets and their own corporate
structures. 
“Every one of these companies has the
ability to pay,” Petrocelli said. 
In July, Judge Victoria Chaney rejected
Unocal’s arguments that the case should be
tried at least in part under the laws of
Myanmar or Bermuda, where its subsidies
were based, instead of under US law.
If Unocal manages to convince the court
in the first phase of the trial, that is expected
to last about 20 days, that its subsidiaries,
rather than the parent company, should be
targeted by any suits, it could move to have
the abuse charges thrown out in the second
phase of the trial. 
In written complaints, the villagers said
they were pressed into service to clear a
route and build facilities for the pipeline,
widely described as the largest foreign-
invested project in Myanmar. 
The plaintiffs’ identities have been con-
cealed for fear of reprisals by Myanmar’s
junta. 
Unocal executives have acknowledged
that troops did force villagers to carry
ammunition and supplies for the military
and to perform other labor in the vicinity of
the project, but deny that any of the labor
was linked to the pipeline’s construction. 
Unocal owned the pipeline jointly with
Total, formerly TotalFinaElf, and the Thai
and Myanmar governments. Total is being
sued separately in Europe.
Reprinted with permission of Agence France-Presse
Editor’s Note: As of March 2005, Unocal 
had agreed to settle out-of-court. The settlement
will be aimed at providing funds to improve
local living conditions, as well as monetary com-
pensation to the victims.

Appendix
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EITI, an initiative led by the UK Department for International Development and the
World Bank, aims to ensure that the revenues from extractive industries contribute to
sustainable development and poverty reduction.
The EITI Principles 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should 
be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sus-
tainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can
create negative economic and social impacts. 
2 We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a coun-
try’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the
interests of their national development. 
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over
many years and can be highly price dependent. 
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expendi-
ture over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and
realistic options for sustainable development. 
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5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in
the extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management
and accountability. 
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context
of respect for contracts and laws. 
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct invest-
ment that financial transparency may bring. 
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all cit-
izens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure. 
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accounta-
bility in public life, government operations and in business. 
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use. 
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extrac-
tive industry companies operating in that country.
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant
contributions to make—including governments and their agencies, extractive
industry companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial
organisations, investors, and non-governmental organisations. 
The EITI Criteria  
1. Regular publication of all material oil, gas and mining payments by companies to
governments (“payments”) and all material revenues received by governments
from oil, gas and mining companies (“revenues”) to a wide audience in a publicly
accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner. 
2. Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues are the subject of
a credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards. 
3. Payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator,
applying international auditing standards and with publication of the administra-
tor’s opinion regarding that reconciliation including discrepancies, should any be
identified. 
4. This approach is extended to all companies including state-owned enterprises. 
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5. Civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and eval-
uation of this process and contributes towards public debate. 
6. A public, financially sustainable work plan for all the above is developed by the host
government, with assistance from the international financial institutions where
required, including measurable targets, a timetable for implementation, and an
assessment of potential capacity constraints.
http://www.eitransparency.org/principlesandcriteria.htm
Publish What You Pay
Publish What You Pay campaigns for the mandatory disclosure of taxes, fees, royalties
and other payments by oil, mining and gas companies to governments and other pub-
lic agencies.
The call for companies to “publish what you pay” is a necessary first step towards a
more accountable system for the management of natural resource revenues paid by
extractive industry companies to governments in resource-rich developing countries.
There is also a need for governments to “publish what you earn”. If companies disclose
what they pay in revenues, and governments disclose their receipts of such revenues,
then members of civil society will be able to compare the two and thus hold their gov-
ernments accountable for the management of revenues. This will also help civil society
groups to work towards a democratic debate over the use and distribution of resource
revenues.
Revenue transparency is a vital first step towards alleviating the crushing poverty of
ordinary citizens in many resource-rich but poor developing countries. It is fully con-
sistent with internationally agreed objectives of accountable government, corruption
prevention, and democratic debate over resource management, such as the G8 Action
Plan on Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency. 
Business will benefit too. Transparency will strengthen companies’ social “license to
operate”, by demonstrating their positive contribution to society, and increase the like-
lihood that the revenues they pay to governments will be used for sustainable
development—which creates a stable business environment—rather than being wast-
ed or diverted by corruption, which exacerbates social divisions and can lead to state
failure and conflict. 
Transparency would protect companies from allegations of complicity with corrupt gov-
ernmental practices, as recognised in a recent statement by North American, European
and other investors managing nearly US$7 trillion worth of funds. Business would
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benefit from a level playing field in which all companies would be required to disclose
their payments. This would protect progressive companies from having their contracts
terminated by corrupt governments if they disclose information voluntarily, and would
prevent them being undercut by less transparent competitors. 
Transparency can be achieved through a comprehensive and global approach which
involves simple adjustments to existing company law, accounting standards and the
lending conditions of financial institutions and banks, so as to require disclosure of
revenues by companies and governments. Publish What You Pay believes that disclo-
sure should be on an individual company basis for each country of operation, not
aggregated amongst more than one company. The Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI) has developed one model of a reporting template that could serve as a
model for disclosure. 
A number of regulatory mechanisms are needed to ensure that multinational and state-
owned companies disclose payments made to governments, and that governments
disclose revenues received from the extractive sector. In calling for the implementation
of these mandatory mechanisms, Publish What You Pay’s primary targets are: 
• Stock market listing authorities 
• The World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, MIGA and IFC) 
• The International Monetary Fund 
• Other multilateral and bilateral lending institutions 
• Export credit agencies 
• Producer country governments 
• Developed country governments 
• The International Accounting Standards Board 
• Private, commercial and retail banks that make resource-backed loans 
Transparency is in the best interests of everyone concerned – citizens, companies,
donor governments and the wider international community – except a corrupt elite that
benefit from the spoils of the systematic misappropriation of state assets. 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/objectives/index.shtml
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Glossary
Acid Rain: Precipitation containing harmful amounts of nitric and sulfuric acids
formed primarily by nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides released into the atmosphere
when fossil fuels are burned. (Source: energytrends.pnl.gov/glosa_d.htm)
Assets: An item of economic value that could be converted into cash.
Bitumen: Any of a group of solid and semi-solid hydrocarbons that can be converted
into liquid form by heating. Bitumens can be refined to produce such commercial
products as gasoline, fuel oil, and asphalt. (Source: Houghton Mifflin: 
http://www.college.hmco.com/geology/resources/geologylink/glossary/b.html)
Boe/d: Barrels of oil equivalent per day. Term used to standardize natural gas produc-
tion with oil production.
Bonus: Payment made by a firm to a host government for the right to develop a natu-
ral resource such as oil, gas, or a mineral deposit. Bonuses are often paid in stages: at
the start of a project and when various stages of development are reached. 
Butane: A normally gaseous hydrocarbon which is extracted from natural gas or refin-
ery gas streams. It is used as household fuel, propellant, and refrigerant. (Source:
http://www.pplweb.com/glossary.htm)
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Capital Expenditure: An expenditure for the acquisition, replacement, modernization,
or expansion of facilities or equipment that, under generally accepted accounting
principles, is not properly chargeable as an expense of operation and maintenance. 
(Source: http://www.ohca.state.ct.us/glossary.htm)
Capital Flows: The movement of foreign exchange from one country to another. The
types of transactions used to move money internationally include: loans and loan
repayments, bond issues and payments, foreign direct investment and capital repatri-
ation, and portfolio investment such as stocks, bonds, and derivatives. (Source:
Currency Transaction Tax, Glossary of Financial Terms. http://www.currencytax.org/
glossary.php)
Cash Flow: A measure of a company’s financial health. Equals cash receipts minus
cash payments over a given period of time.
Commodity: This term covers a wide range of items that can be traded, such as gold
and other metals, petroleum, and agricultural products.
Concession: Usually used in foreign operations and refers to a large block of acreage
granted to the operator by the host government for a certain time and under certain
government conditions which allows the operator to conduct exploratory and/or
development operations. (Source: 
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/lagniapp/glossary.html)
Condensate: A term used to describe light liquid hydrocarbons separated from 
crude oil after production and sold separately. (Source: ConocoPhillips energy glos-
sary: http://www.conocophillips.com/utilities/glossary/glossary-c.asp) 
Consortium: A group of unrelated companies combining their forces to develop an oil or
gas field for commercial production, with one company usually serving as the operator.
Crude oil: Liquid petroleum as it comes out of the ground, as distinguished from
refined oils manufactured out of it. Also called simply “crude.” (Source:
http://www.mme.state. va.us/DMR/DOCS/MinRes/OIL/glos.html) 
Depreciation: The loss in value of an asset due to its use and/or the passage of time.
Dividends: When companies pay part of their profits to shareholders, those profits
are called dividends.
Downstream: The oil industry term used to refer to all petroleum activities from the
process of refining crude oil into petroleum products to the distribution, marketing,
and shipping of the products.
Dutch Disease: The deindustrialization of a nation’s economy that occurs when the
discovery of a natural resource raises the value of that nation’s currency, making man-
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ufactured goods less competitive with other nations, increasing imports, and decreas-
ing exports. The term originated in Holland after the discovery of North Sea gas.
(Source: http://www.investorwords.com)
Exchange Rate: The price of one currency expressed in terms of another currency. 
Excise Tax: Tax or duty on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities.
Fossil Fuel: A carbon or hydrocarbon fuel formed in the ground from the remains of
dead plants and animals. It takes millions of years to form fossil fuels. Oil, natural
gas, and coal are fossil fuels. Many scientists worry that the emission of carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere when fossil fuels are burned is a major contributor to
global warming.
Fuel Cell: A piece of equipment that converts chemical energy into electricity and hot
water through an electrochemical process rather than through combusting the fuel
source. (Source: http://www.fuelingthefuture.org/contents/glossary.asp)
Fuel Oil: A liquid fuel composed of a mixture of medium-sized or heavy 
hydrocarbons and produced by refining crude oil. Lighter varieties of fuel oil include
diesel fuel, home-heating oil, kerosene, and jet fuel, while heavier fuel oils are 
used by industries, ships, and electric power plants to generate heat and power.
(Source: http://www.uwsp.edu/cnr/wcee/keep/Audit/glossary-f-g.htm)
Gasoline: A refined form of petroleum used for fueling vehicles with internal-
combustion engines.
Global Warming: The progressive gradual rise of the earth’s surface temperature
thought to be caused by the greenhouse effect and responsible for changes in global
climate patterns. Many scientists believe that a rise in carbon dioxide levels (caused
by automobile, power plant, and other emissions) will lead to further global warming.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The total value of all goods and services produced by
a country’s economy.
Hydrocarbon: An organic compound containing only carbon and hydrogen and 
often found occurring in petroleum, natural gas, and coal. 
(Source: http://www.envirotools.org/glossary.shtml)
Internal Combustion Engine: A type of engine that works by burning fuel (petrol) in
a cylinder to make power. (Source: http://www.learningonthemove.co.uk/gloss.html)
Joint Venture: An investment undertaken by a consortium of companies, usually with
one member acting as operator.
Liability: A financial obligation to pay a debt owed at some future time.
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License Agreement: An agreement in which a government gives an oil company the
rights to explore for and produce oil and/or gas in a designated area.
Local Content Requirements: Laws specifying the portion of a product or the share of
hiring that must come from domestic sources.
Market Capitalization: The stock market value of a company, calculated by 
multiplying the total number of shares outstanding by the market price of a share.
(Source: http://www.slb.com/ir/ar/glossary.html)
Middle Distillate: Hydrocarbons that are in the so-called “middle boiling range” of
refinery distillation. Examples are heating oil, diesel fuels, and kerosene. (Source:
http://www.thebullandbear.com/resource/RI-archive/gloss-oil.html)
Market Share: A company’s sales expressed as a percentage of the sales for the total
industry.
Natural Gas Liquids (LNG): Liquids obtained during natural gas production, includ-
ing ethane, propane, butanes, and condensate (Source:
http://www.careersinoilandgas. com/ general/glossary.cfm)
Net Income: Income after taxes, deductions, and allowances have been subtracted
from gross income.
Operating Profit: A measure of a company’s earning power from ongoing operations,
equal to earnings before deduction of interest payments and income taxes. (Source:
http://www.investorwords.com/3464/operating_profit.html)
Pentane: Any one of the three metameric hydrocarbons of the methane or paraffin
series. They are colorless, volatile liquids, two of which occur in petroleum. So called
because of the five carbon atoms in the molecule. Webster’s Revised Unabridged
Dictionary, © 1996
Per Capita Income: Total income divided by total population, which gives you the
average income per person.
Petroleum: A generic name for hydrocarbons, including crude oil, natural gas liquids,
natural gas and their products. (Source: http://www.conocophillips.com/utilities/
glossary/glossary-p.asp)
Pro-cyclical Capital Flows: Lending that increases when times are good (for example,
when the international price of natural resources is high) but is recalled when times
are bad (such as when the prices of natural resources are low).
Pro-cyclical Fiscal Policy: Government spending that increases when times are good
(for example, when the international price of natural resources is high) and contracts
when times are bad (such as when the prices of natural resources are low).
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Production-sharing Agreements (PSAs): An agreement between an energy exploration
company and a host government in which the company bears the costs and risks of
exploration and production of a petroleum or mining project in exchange for a share of
the production. In some cases, the host government receives a much smaller or no share
of production up to the point that the energy company has recovered its investment.
Profit Oil: In production-sharing agreements, profit oil refers to the oil that is subject
to profit-sharing between a company or consortium and a host government. Profit oil
is what remains after companies have used income from the oil produced to offset
their current expenses and depreciated capital expenses for developing that oil.
Propane: A natural hydrocarbon occurring in a gaseous state under normal atmos-
pheric pressure and temperature; however, propane is usually liquefied through
pressurization for transportation and storage. Propane is primarily used for rural
heating and cooking and as a fuel gas in areas not serviced by natural gas mains and
as a petrochemical feed stock. (Source: http://www.turtletrader.com/glossary.html)
Probable Reserves: In respect of quantities of oil and gas, “probable reserves” are
those reserves that are not yet “proven” but which, on all the available evidence and
taking into account technical and economic factors, have a better than 50 percent
chance of being produced. (Source: http://www.emeraldenergy.com/docs/ar_00/
glossary.htm)
Proved Reserves: Estimated quantities of hydrocarbons that geological and 
engineering data demonstrate will be recoverable from known oil and natural 
gas reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions. 
(Source: http://www.conocophillips.com/utilities/glossary/glossary-p.asp)
Rent-seeking: The expenditure of resources in order to bring about a transfer of goods
or services to one’s self as the result of a “favorable” decision on some public policy.
Examples of rent-seeking behavior would include the various ways by which individu-
als or groups lobby government for taxing, spending, and regulatory policies that 
confer financial benefits or other special advantages upon them at the expense of 
others. (Source: Paul M. Jonson, “A Glossary of Political Economy Terms”
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/)
Return on Assets: A measure of a company’s profitability, equal to a fiscal year’s 
earnings divided by its total assets, expressed as a percentage. 
(Source: http://www.investorwords.com/4246/Return_on_Assets.html) 
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Return on Equity: Earnings divided by stockholder’s equity. This indicates how 
much a company’s owners (its stockholders) are making on their investments 
and is an important measurement of a company’s performance. 
(Source: http://www.meredith.com/archive/investors/financial/glossary.htm)
Royalty: A share of the revenue from the sale of oil, gas, or other natural resources
paid to the owner, usually the host government. The amount is usually a percentage
of revenues obtained through its use.
Smog: A dense, discolored radiation fog containing large quantities of soot, ash, and
gaseous pollutants such as sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide, responsible for human
respiratory ailments. (Source: http://www.nrdc.org/reference/glossary/s.asp)
Stabilization Funds: A fund that can be used to stabilize the government budget
against commodity price volatility. When commodity prices are high, excess earnings
can be transferred to a stabilization fund. When commodity prices are low, the stabi-
lization fund can transfer assets back to the government budget.
Staple Trap: Increasing dependence on the export of a particular staple.
Tax-deductible: A business expense that can be deducted from taxable income.
Tort: Tort refers to that body of law that will allow an injured person to obtain 
compensation from the person who caused the injury.
Upstream: The oil industry term used to refer to oil and natural gas exploration and
production activities.
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